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ABSTRACT
The automotive industry is one of the world's most important economic sectors in terms
of revenue and employment. The automotive supply chain is complex owing to the large
number of parts in an automobile, the multiple layers of suppliers to supply those parts,
and the coordination of materials, information, and financial flows across the supply chain.
Many uncertainties and different natural and man-made disasters have repeatedly stricken
and disrupted automotive manufacturers and their supply chains. Managing supply chain
risk in a complex environment is always a challenge for the automotive industry.
This research first provides a comprehensive literature review of the existing research work
on the supply chain risk identification and management, considering, but not limited to, the
characteristics of the automotive supply chain, since the literature focusing on automotive
supply chain risk management (ASCRM) is limited. The review provides a summary and
a classification for the underlying supply chain risk resources in the automotive industry;
and state-of-the-art research in the area is discussed, with an emphasis on the quantitative
methods and mathematical models currently used. The future research topics in ASCRM
are identified.
Then two mathematical models are developed in this research, concentrating on supply
chain risk management in the automotive industry. The first model is for optimizing
manufacturer cooperation in supply chains. OEMs often invest a large amount of money
in supplier development to improve suppliers’ capabilities and performance. Allocating the
investment optimally among multiple suppliers to minimize risks while maintaining an
acceptable level of return becomes a critical issue for manufacturers. This research
develops a new non-linear investment return mathematical model for supplier
v

development, which is more applicable in reality. The solutions of this new model can
assist supply chain management in deciding investment at different levels in addition to
making “yes or no” decisions. The new model is validated and verified using numerical
examples.
The second model is the optimal contract for new product development with the risk
consideration in the automotive industry. More specifically, we investigated how to decide
the supplier’s capacity and the manufacturer’s order in the supply contract in order to
reduce the risks and maximize their profits when the demand of the new product is highly
uncertain. Based on the newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory, a single period
two-stage supply chain model for a product development contract, consisting of a supplier
and a manufacturer, is developed. A practical back induction algorithm is conducted to get
subgame perfect optimal solutions for the contract model. Extensive model analyses are
accomplished for various situations with theoretical results leading to conditions of
solution optimality. The model is then applied to a uniform distribution for uncertain
demands. Based on a real automotive supply chain case, the numerical experiments and
sensitivity analyses are conducted to study the behavior and performance of the proposed
model, from which some interesting managerial insights were provided. The proposed
solutions provide an effective tool for making the supplier-manufacturer contracts when
manufacturers face high uncertain demand.
We believe that the quantitative models and solutions studied in this research have great
potentials to be applied in automotive and other industries in developing the efficient
supply chains involving advanced and emerging technologies.

vi

DEDICATION

This dissertation is in commemoration of my entering university studies 40 years ago. I
dedicate this in memory of my honourable parents Zhu Qingxiu and Zhou Xueling for their
kindness, unconditional love and devotion in raising me and their support in cultivating my
spirit. They encouraged me during my teenage years to self-learn high school courses when
all schools were shut down during the Great Cultural Revolution in China. Thanks to their
vision, after working in a factory for 7 years, I succeeded in The National College Entrance
Examination in 1978, which changed the course of my life.
I also dedicate this dissertation to my honourable ancestor, Mr. Zhu Bin ( 朱彬) who was a
First-Degree Scholar (举人) and Scholar of Classical Texts (训诂学家). From his youth to
his elder years he studied unceasingly, even taking a national-level Imperial Examination
at the age of 70 in order to benefit the people. He published several famous books and his
three sons (Zhu Shiyan 朱士彦; Zhu Shida 朱士达; Zhu Shilian 朱士廉) all were Imperial
Scholars (进士). My ancestors’ spirit of perseverance inspired me to complete this study
in the last 10 years and realized PhD dream in my sixties.
值此作者（朱世平）考上大学 40 年之际，谨以此博士论文献给我尊敬的父亲朱庆庥、母亲
周学灵。 感谢他们的养育之恩，更感谢他们在我青少年时期鼓励我坚持自学，当时正值中
国文化大革命，读书无用论盛行，学校不正常授课。正因为他们的远见，我才能于 1978 年
中国恢复高考，当工人 7 年后考取大学，改变了自己的命运。
也以此论文献给我尊敬的祖先，我的七世祖朱彬先生（清代举人，训诂学家）， 他一生好
学，著作等身，70 岁高龄时还坚持参加科举考试，经世济民，实现自己的报负。在他的言
传身教下，他的三个儿子朱士彦，朱士达（我的六世祖），朱士廉都高中进士，并有突出
的政绩，成就了“朱氏兄弟三进士”的佳话。我祖先的好学精神和顽强毅力激励了我，经
过 10 年刻苦学习，我终于在花甲之年圆了博士梦，以实际行动传承家风，希望能用自己所
学理论与在汽车行业的实际经验相结合， 继续为社会作出贡献。

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Ph.D. study has enriched my knowledge in the field of Automotive Supply Chain Risk
Management. It has given me the opportunity to summarize my 15 years of working
experience in the automotive industry and to make new contributions to the area.
First, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Guoqing Zhang for the
continuous support of my Ph.D. study and related research, for his patience, motivation,
immense knowledge, and encouragement. Over the last 10 years, Dr. Zhang has helped me
to overcome many of the unexpected difficulties and provided the excellent supporting
efforts and technical knowledge that has guided me throughout the research work and
writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my
Ph.D. study.
Next, I would like to show my gratitude to all my thesis committee members: Prof. Y.
Wang, Prof. W. Abdul-Kader, and Prof. M. Wang for their insightful comments and
encouragement, also for their constructive criticism and willingness to positively enrich
this report. Thanks also to those fellow graduate students who have offered their valuable
suggestions, kind assistance, and friendly cooperation.
Last but not least, I would like to thank my family: my husband, Shaolin Cui, my daughter,
Zhongying, and my son, Matthew Jiachen. Without their support and encouragement, this
work would not have been possible. My daughter, my son and I studied simultaneously in
different programs and encouraged each other to achieve our academic success.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP / PREVIOUS PUBLICATION ..................... iii
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................v
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. viii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1
1.1 Motivation ..................................................................................................................1
1.2 Research Objective and Methodologies .....................................................................1
1.2.1 Model for supplier development and manufacturer cooperation with a
nonlinear return to minimize risks................................................................................2
1.2.2 Optimal contract model for product development with risk consideration
(penalty and compensation). .........................................................................................2
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation ......................................................................................3
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..............................................................................4
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................4
2.2 Automotive Supply Chains and Literature Distribution on Automotive Supply Chain
Risks .................................................................................................................................6
2.3 Automotive Supply Chain Risk Identification and Classification ............................10
2.4 Automotive Supply Chain Risk Assessment and Measures ......................................11
2.4.1 Probability Impact Matrix .................................................................................12
2.4.2 Fuzzy Assessment Method .................................................................................12
2.4.3 Mean-Variance Analysis....................................................................................13
2.4.4 Bayesian Networks ............................................................................................13
2.4.5 Other Risk Assessment Methods ........................................................................13
2.5 Automotive SCRM, Modeling, Methods, and Tools .................................................14
2.5.1 Optimization Mathematical Modeling ...............................................................15
ix

2.5.2 Quantitative-Based Strategies ...........................................................................16
2.5.3 Qualitative Approaches .....................................................................................19
2.5.4 Practical Tools in ASCRM ................................................................................23
2.5.5 Summary............................................................................................................25
2. 6 Conclusion and Future Research ............................................................................27
CHAPTER 3 OPTIMIZING MANUFACTURER COOPERATION IN SUPPLIER
DEVELOPMENT UNDER RISK .....................................................................................32
3.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................32
3.2 Literature Review .....................................................................................................33
3.3 Mathematic Model....................................................................................................40
3.3.1 Markowitz Model ...............................................................................................40
3.3.2 Talluri’s Model – Linear Return Model ............................................................40
3.4 Proposed Nonlinear Return Model ..........................................................................41
3.4.1 The SMMS Model ..............................................................................................42
3.4.2 The TMMS Model ..............................................................................................44
3.5 Numerical Experiments and Results ........................................................................46
3.5.1 Results for SMMS Case .....................................................................................47
3.5.2 Results for TMMS Case .....................................................................................49
3.6 Summary ...................................................................................................................53
CHAPTER 4 OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT WITH RISK
CONSIDERATION (PENALTY AND COMPENSATION) ...........................................55
4.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................55
4.2 Literature Review .....................................................................................................57
4.3 The Model .................................................................................................................65
4.3.1 Problem Statement .............................................................................................65
4.3.2 Assumptions .......................................................................................................65
x

4.3.3 Model Structure and Notations..........................................................................66
4.3.4 The Supplier’s Objective Function ....................................................................68
4.3.5 The Manufacturer’s Objective Function ...........................................................71
4.3.6 Model of Case 2 Q > O .....................................................................................72
4.4 Constraint Optimization ...........................................................................................75
4.4.1 Case 1 Q < O .....................................................................................................75
4.4.2 Case 2 Q > O .....................................................................................................76
4.5 Remarks ....................................................................................................................79
4.6 Appendix ...................................................................................................................80
Appendix A ..................................................................................................................80
Appendix B ..................................................................................................................83
CHAPTER 5 THE SOLUTION FOR THE UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION CASE AND..87
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT .........................................................................................87
5.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................87
5.2 Uniform Distribution ................................................................................................87
5.3 Solution for Uniform Distribution ............................................................................88
5.4 Constraint Solution in Uniform Distribution ...........................................................92
5.5 Numerical Experiment..............................................................................................95
5.5.1 An Example of the Contract Model in Uniform Distribution U(1000, 14000)..96
5.5.2 Optimal Response Function E(π) ......................................................................99
5.5.3 Subcase’s Effective Range ...............................................................................103
5.5.4 The Backward Induction Method Algorithm ...................................................104
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................................................105
5.6.1 Effect of Different (a, b) ...................................................................................106
5.6.2 Effects of High Production Compensation m1 ................................................111
xi

5.6.3 Effects of Penalty Cost e1 and Shortage Cost s1 ..............................................116
5.6.4 Effects of Compensation h ...............................................................................122
5.7 Remarks ..................................................................................................................127
5.8 Appendix .................................................................................................................129
Appendix A: To prove E(cost) in uniform distribution is a convex function ............129
Appendix B: Constraint optimization solution in uniform distribution:...................133
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH .........................................136
6.1 Conclusion..............................................................................................................136
6.2 Future Research .....................................................................................................138
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................142
VITA AUCTORIS ...........................................................................................................156

xii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The automotive industry has been driven to optimize its supply chain performance by it's
demanding and fiercely competitive business environment. However, many uncertainties
and natural and man-made disasters have repeatedly stricken and disrupted automotive
OEMs and their supply chains. In order to protect themselves against the harmful effects
of the supply chain uncertainties and disruptions, automotive OEMs have turned their
attention to supply chain risk management. Unfortunately, the research work and
publications have not kept up the same pace that the automotive industry requires. There
are limited amounts of the published research papers which directly address the automotive
supply chain risk management. To lay a foundation for further research in the area, this
research first provides a review of the existing research work on the supply chain risk
identification and management, considering the characteristics of the automotive supply
chain. Then, the research tries to model the optimal contract for product development with
the risk consideration for the automotive industry, and to model optimizing manufacturer
cooperation in the supply chain.
1.2 Research Objective and Methodologies
The purpose of this research is to find (1) the underlying supply chain risk management
problems in the automotive industry; (2) the theoretical models to help the decision-making
of supply chain managers in uncertain situations. The characteristics of the automotive
supply chain are discussed in the literature review. It also summarizes the theoretical work
and practices related to or applicable to automotive supply chain risk identification and
classification, as well as examines the methodologies of supply chain risk assessment. The
theoretical models, the qualitative approaches and practical tools for supply chain risk
management are reviewed. It is pointed out in this research that implementing an
automotive supply chain risk assessment is a complex and challenging task. The
mathematical models for real-time supply chain disruption management still need
development. More research is needed to model uncertain situations in order to mitigate
risk impacts.
1

This research includes two mathematic models for automotive supply chain risk
management:
1.2.1 Model for supplier development and manufacturer cooperation with a
nonlinear return to minimize risks.
The automotive supply chain is a multiple layer and complex network, so the relationship
between supply chain members is very important for risk management. Supplier
development is a long-term, resource-consuming business activity that requires
commitment from both manufacturer and suppliers. Automotive manufacturers often
invest heavily in supplier development to improve their supplier’s capabilities and
performance. How to allocate the investment optimally among multiple suppliers to
minimize risk while maintaining an acceptable level of return is a critical issue faced by
automotive OEMs. Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model to manufacturer
cooperation in supplier development under risk. Talluri’s model assumes that the return of
investment to the supplier is proportional to the investment. However, in most situations,
the return is nonlinear. This research extends Talluri’s work and presents a new
mathematical model for supply chain development by revising investment return from
linear to non-linear and applies it to the auto industry.
1.2.2 Optimal contract model for product development with risk consideration
(penalty and compensation).
As a common ex-ante strategy in risk management, supply chain contracts play an
important role for supply chain members, such as OEMs and suppliers, to coordinate, and
to share risks arising from various sources of uncertainty. In the automotive industry, when
developing new products, e.g., electric cars, the demand is highly uncertain. Generally, the
manufacturer forecasts the demand and shares the information with suppliers. At the same
time, the manufacturer needs to provide the planned yearly order quantity O, and then the
supplier needs to decide the capacity Q according to order O. As a part of the procurement
contract, the manufacturer can claim compensation or penalty to prevent profit loss caused
by the supplier’s delivery shortage. We model a single–period make-to-order supply chain
consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer with demand uncertainty. The purpose is to
determine the optimal contract variables, capacity Q and order O. Based on the newsvendor
2

model and Stackelberg game theory, we develop a mathematical model for the product
development contract, where both demand uncertainty and compensation are considered.
The analytical solution for the situation that the demand follows uniform distribution is
developed, and computational tests, as well as sensitivity analyses, are also reported. The
proposed solution provides an effective tool for supplier-manufacturer contracts when the
manufacturer faces highly uncertain demand.
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature review of supply chain
risk identification, assessment, and management in the automotive industry. Chapter 3
studies manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk with nonlinear return.
Chapter 4 studies the optimal contract for product development with risk consideration
(penalty and compensation). Chapter 5 studies the optimization for product development
with risk consideration in uniform demand distribution. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a
conclusion on the research and the future work for automotive supply chain risk
management.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
The automotive industry is one of the world's most important economic sectors in terms
of revenue and employment. According to automotive industry statistical data from OICA
(2016), almost 95 million cars and commercial vehicles were produced in the world in
2016, with over 8 million direct jobs in the assembly and manufacture of components,
representing over 5% of the world’s industrial employment, and almost five times more
indirect jobs (González-Benito et al., 2013).
The automotive supply chain is complex owing to the large number of parts assembled into
an automobile, the multiple layers of suppliers to supply those parts, and the coordination
of materials, information, and financial flows across the supply chain. Over the past
decades, automotive supply chains in the world have been stricken and disrupted repeatedly
by natural and human-made disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes, strikes,
economic crises, SARS, plant fires and explosions, terrorist attacks, and other disruptive
events. Such supply chain disruptions can detrimentally impact a firm’s short-term
performance. At the same time, the automotive business has become increasingly more
complex as globalization has become an industry norm. Other new practices, such as justin-time (JIT) delivery, lean manufacturing or lean production (Nakashima and
Sornmanapong, 2013), and supplier consolidation, are also employed. As a result,
automotive supply chains have become increasingly more vulnerable to various risks.
Thus, supply chain risk management (SCRM) plays a critical role in the automotive
industry.
The automotive industry is well known for its efforts to improve its supply chains based
on its demanding business environment and to protect against the harmful effects of supply
chain disruptions to the companies through SCRM. However, research work and
publications have not caught up with the pace required by the industry. We searched related
articles on ASCRM, mainly from Scopus, SCI, SSCI, and ABI/INFORM, and some related
materials available on the Internet. A search using “automotive supply chain/logistics risk
management” as the keywords generated 111 document results from the Scopus database
4

by September 2018. Our review is not limited to these articles. Figure 2.1 shows the
chronological distribution of papers and a generally increasing trend from 2008. However,
there is no review literature devoted to ASCRM.

Figure 2.1. Chronological distribution of papers from 2000 to Sept.2018 from Scopus

To lay a foundation for further research in the area, this study provides a review of the
general research work on supply chain risk identification and management for the
automotive supply chain where the literature is available and seeks the answers to two key
questions: (1) What are the underlying supply chain risk resources in the automotive
industry? (2) How have they been addressed in the current literature, with a focus on
quantitative methods and mathematic models? This review is based on 125 papers and
websites addressing SCRM for the automotive industry and other related industries.
SCRM is "the process of risk mitigation achieved through collaboration, coordination, and
application of risk management tools among the partners, to ensure continuity coupled with
long-term profitability of the supply chain" (Faisal et al., 2007). It should be noted that risk
cannot be completely eliminated from supply chains, but strategies can be developed to
manage these risks if the dynamics between the variables related to risks in a supply chain
are understood (Faisal et al., 2006). The main objective of SCRM is to maximize the
expected profit or minimize the expected loss when a supply chain disruption occurs (Tang,
2006). Risk management has become an essential tool in addressing risk issues in supply
chain management.
In general, the SCRM process consists of four components (Hallikas et al., 2004): risk
identification, risk assessment, risk management decisions and implementation
5

(prioritization of risks), and risk monitoring. In line with these classifications, this review
presents a summary and analysis with emphasis on the first three aspects of ASCRM and
provides quantitative models and future research directions as well.
The rest of this literature review is organized into six sections. Section 2 discusses the
characteristics of the automotive supply chain. Section 3 studies automotive supply chain
risk identification and classification. Section 4 examines the methodologies of supply chain
risk assessment. Section 5 reviews the theoretical models, the qualitative approaches, and
practical tools for risk management. Some future research directions are discussed in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the literature review.
2.2 Automotive Supply Chains and Literature Distribution on Automotive Supply
Chain Risks
The automotive supply chain includes raw material manufacturers, multilayer part
suppliers, car manufacturers, dealers, and customers. There are about 20,000 parts in a car,
and if even only one of these parts is not available, then the vehicle cannot be assembled
or shipped. Typically, there are three to five layers in an automotive supply chain, which
comprises thousands of suppliers. Figure 2.2 displays the schematic automotive supply
chain (Timothy, 2011).
In the past 30 years, the automotive industry has undergone major changes in its supply
chains. Competitive pressure has forced automotive original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs) to improve the quality, to strive to reduce the product development time, and to
lower the development and manufacturing costs of their products. Many Asian and Eastern
European countries, with cheap and skilled labor, offer attractive opportunities for reducing
the supply chain costs. However, these globalization and outsourcing opportunities come
with significant risks, including the cultural and linguistic differences, foreign exchange
rate fluctuation, duty and customs regulations, quality problems, and political and
economic stability. The international logistics (inventory management, border-crossing
procedures, and transportation delays) involve more challenges that could impact the
product availability than domestic logistics.
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Raw Material Manufacturer
Material

Tier 3/4/5
Part

Tier 2
Part

Tier 1

Spare Parts

Part

Car Manufacture
Vehicle/Spare Part

National Distributor
Vehicle/Spare Part

Dealer
Vehicle/Spare Part

Consumer
Figure 2.2. Automotive supply chain (Timothy, 2011)

For decades, the automotive industry has employed the different ways to cut the costs for
gaining the competitive advantage. Several common methods include the following:


adopting just-in-time (JIT) principles to create lean supply chains,



single-sourcing most subassemblies to maximize scalability,



outsourcing to emerging countries, and



globalizing and following the OEMs to their international market.

These practices result in the low inventories, increase the additional dependence on
suppliers, add to the network complexity, and increase the supply chain risks (Thun and
Hoenig, 2011; Nakashima and Sornmanapong, 2013).
In summary, the automotive industry is characterized by low margins, high volumes, high
costs, global supply chains, and multilayer suppliers (Simchi-Levi, 2010; Singhal et al.
2011). Automotive supply chains are deep and broad. Cost reduction efforts such as JIT,
single-sourcing, outsourcing, and globalization add to the network complexity and increase
the supply chain risks in the automotive industry. The automotive supply chain risks
considered here include the different risks that come from sourcing, supply, production,
storage, logistics, and distribution in the automotive supply chain.
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ASCRM has attracted considerable attention in the past decade. The review reported here
is

based

on

111

articles

found

by

searching

“automotive

supply

chain

management/logistics risk,” mainly in the Scopus database. The distributions of those
articles and journal impacts are summarized in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1 DISTRIBUTION OF ARTICLES BY JOURNAL TITLE
Group
Management
and Production
Research

Journal Title
International Journal of Applied
Management Science
International Journal of Operations
and Production Management
International Journal of Production
Economics

Management Decision
Production Planning and Control

Zhang et al. (2018); Xie et al. (2009)

Productivity Management

Hanenkamp (2013)

Greener Management International

Oldham and Votta (2003)

International Journal of
Procurement Management
International Journal of Supply
Chain Management
International Journal of Information
Systems and Supply Chain
Management
Journal of Purchasing and Supply
Management
Supply Chain Management

Hellström et al. (2011)

Journal of Cleaner Production

Logistics
Management

Davarzani et al. (2015)
Dubey et al. (2018); Mohammaddust et al.
(2017); Häntsch and Huchzermeier (2016);
Matsuo (2015); Pernot and Roodhooft (2014);
Sun et al. (2012); Thun and Hoenig (2011a);
Doran et al. (2007); Yang et al. (2017)
Yoon et al. (2018); Grötsch et al. (2013); Hsu
et al. (2011); Thun et al. (2011b); Canbolat et
al. (2008); Caux et al. (2006); Singh et al.
(2005)
Schöggl et al. (2016); Govindan et al. (2014);
Lee (2011); Zimmer et al. (2017); de Oliveira
et al. (2017)
Neumüller et al. (2016)

International Journal of Production
Research

Supply Chain
Management

Articles
Sharma and Bhat (2014a)

Supply Chain Management: An
International Journal
The IUP Journal of Supply Chain
Management
International Journal of Physical
Distribution and Logistics
Management

Nakashima et al. (2014)
Sharma et al. (2017)
Kırılmaz and Erol (2017); Caniëls et al. (2013)
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014); Hofmann
(2011)
Blos et al. (2009); Towill et al. (2000)
Sharma and Bhat (2014c)
Fan and Stevenson (2018); Friday et al. (2018);
Hohenstein et al. (2015); Durach et al. (2015);
Bell et al. (2013); Wieland and Wallenburg
(2012); Lin and Zhou (2011); Blackhurst et al.
(2008); Lippert and Forman (2006); Lalwani et
al. (2006); Svensson (2004)
Pandey and Sharma (2017)

International Journal of Logistics
Systems and Management
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Industrial
Engineering
and
Management

Operations
Management

Operations
Research
Risk Research
Industrial
Management
Automotive

Manufacturing

IT, Computer

Environmental

Business

Science,
Engineering

International Journal of Quality and
Reliability Management
Journal of Industrial Engineering
and Management
International Journal of Industrial
Engineering and Management
Journal of Japan Industrial
Management Association
International Journal of Services
and Operations Management
Journal of Operations Management

Cagnin et al. (2016)

Manufacturing and Service
Operations Management

Swinney and Netessine (2009)

Interfaces

Simchi-Levi et al. (2015)

European Journal of Operational
Research
Journal of Disaster Research

Rezapour et al. (2017)

Journal of Risk Research

Ceryno et al. (2015)

Industrial Management and Data
Systems
Automotive Industries AI

Lockamy (2014); Lockamy and McCormack
(2012); Lee and Cheong (2011)
Barclay (2008); Richardson (2005)

International Journal of Automotive
Technology and Management
International Journal of Advanced
Manufacturing Technology
Journal of Manufacturing
Technology Management
Manufacturing Computer Solutions

Belzowski et al. (2006)

Manufacturing Engineer

Cervi (2007)

Applied Soft Computing Journal

Zarbakhshnia et al. (2018)

Computers and Industrial
Engineering
Journal of Global Information
Management
International Journal of Information
Technology and Management
Management of Environmental
Quality
Resources, Conservation and
Recycling
Benchmarking

Ghadge et al. (2017)

International Journal of Managing
Projects in Business
Global Business Review

Fernando et al. (2018)

Advanced Science Letters

Hudin et al. (2015)

Advanced Engineering Informatics

Mo and Cook (2018)

Abolghasemi et al. (2015); Cedillo-Campos et
al. (2017)
Saueressig et al. (2017)
Nakashima and Sornmanapong (2013); Chino
et al. (2017)
Shimizu et al. (2013)
Sroufe and Curkovic (2008)

Montshiwa et al. (2016)
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Chen et al. (2016); Diabat et al. (2013);
Elmaraghy and Majety (2008)
Lotfi and Saghiri (2018); Palanisamy and
Zubar (2013)
Tinham (2004)

Seth et al. (2017)
Lippert (2008)
Munguía et al. (2010); Cebrat et al. (2008)
Naini et al. (2011)
Sharma and Bhat (2014b); Datta et al. (2013)

Sharma and Bhat (2016)

IEEE

Other aspects

Key Engineering Materials

Rewilak (2015)

Open Engineering

Marasova et al. (2017)

Mathematical Problems in
Engineering
IEEE Transactions on Engineering
Management
IIE Transactions (Institute of
Industrial Engineers)
Biomass and Bioenergy

Vujović et al. (2017)

Journal Européen des Systèmes
Automatises
Scientia Iranica

Giard and Sali (2014)

Wirtschaftsinformatik

Strassner and Fleisch (2005)

Azevedo et al. (2012); Wagner and SilveiraCamargos (2012); Kull and Talluri (2008)
MacKenzie et al. (2014)
Dal-Mas et al. (2011)

Hsieh et al. (2016); Davarzani et al. (2011)

2.3 Automotive Supply Chain Risk Identification and Classification
Risk identification is the first step and a subjective component within the SCRM process.
To reduce supply chain risks, firms should understand the universe of risk categories as
well as the events and conditions that drive them. We analyzed the resources of supply
chain risks existing in the automotive industry, and classified the risks into 10 categories
shown in the fishbone diagram in Figure 2.3. Table 2.2 illustrates the automotive industry
risk profile, risk events, and references.

Figure 2.3. Automotive supply chain risk fishbone diagram
TABLE 2.2 AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY SUPPLY CHAIN RISK CLASSIFICATIONS, EVENTS, AND REFERENCES
Automotive Supply
Chain (SC) Risks
Disruption/disaster

Risk Events

Reference

Natural disaster:
Thailand’s devastating 2011 floods;
Great East Japan Earthquake 2011.

Hsieh et al. (2016); Matsuo (2015);
MacKenzie et al. (2014); Davarzani
et al. (2011); Thun and Hoenig
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Supply

Demand

Logistics

Quality

Globalization

Environmental and
social impact

Human-made disaster:
geopolitical risk, 911 terrorist attack.
“Upstream” activities in SC:
a) purchasing risks, production
capacity, supplier relationship,
b) supplier dependence risk, single
sourcing,
c) supply chain transparency risk.
“Downstream” activities in SC:
demand uncertainty, forecast/planning
accuracy, high inventories or capacity
risk.
Transportation, delivery problem, delay,
border crossing, and customs
regulations.
Recall issues, defects and corrective
actions, engineering change, result in
customer dissatisfaction, and market
share shrinkage.
Geographically more diverse, more
vulnerable to supply disruption,
exchange-rate and energy-price risks,
culture and language differences, trade
regulations, and political and economic
stability.
Global production systems have
ecological impacts globally both
“upstream” and “downstream” of a
specific manufacturer or supplier.

IT system

IT infrastructure, system breakdown,
RFID has "three high problems,"
information sharing,

Technology
changes

Software breakthroughs; new energy
sources.
Financial instability, insolvency or
bankruptcy; untimely payment and
exchange-rate risk.

Financial

(2011a); Rezapour et al. (2017);
Simchi-Levi et al. (2015)
Thun and Hoenig (2011a); SimchiLevi et al. (2015); Hudin et al.
(2015); Häntsch and Huchzermeier
(2016); IBM Global Services
(2009); Sharma and Bhat (2014a);
Davarzani et al. (2011); Kull and
Talluri (2008)
Chopra and Meindl (2010); SimchiLevi (2010); Sharma and Bhat
(2014a); Sharma and Bhat (2014c)
Rice et al. (2003); Xie et al. (2009);
Sharma and Bhat (2014a)
Sun et al. (2012); Rewilak (2015);
Haefele (2014); Thun and Hoenig
(2011a, 2011b);
Thun and Hoenig (2011a);
Richardson (2005); Sharma and
Bhat (2014b); Canbolat et al. (2008);
Zimmer et al. (2017)
O'Rourke and Dara (2014); Sharma
and Bhat (2014a); Caiazzo et al.
(2013); Schöggl et al. (2016);
Häntsch and Huchzermeier (2016);
Caniëls et al. (2013); Diabat et al.
(2013); Lee and Cheong (2011);
Naini et al. (2011); Munguía et al.
(2010); Zimmer et al. (2017)
Tinham (2004); Choi et al. (2017);
Huang et al. (2012); Lippert (2008);
Chopra and Meindl (2010);
Strassner and Fleisch (2005);
Hellström et al. (2011); Seth et al.
(2017)
Hill et al. (2015); Cebrat et al.
(2008)
Sharma and Bhat (2014a); Isidore
(2009); Faisal et al. (2007); Bullis
(2012)

2.4 Automotive Supply Chain Risk Assessment and Measures
Once risks are identified, their impacts and probabilities must be assessed. Risk assessment
involves “a set of logical, systematic, and well-defined activities that provide the decision
makers with a sound identification, measurement, quantification, and evaluation of the risk
associated with certain natural phenomena or man activities” (Haimes, 2004). In this
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section, the models and methods used in the literature for assessing the automotive supply
chain risk are presented.
2.4.1 Probability Impact Matrix
The international engineering standard ISO14971 defines and assesses a risk R as the
product of probability and the harm of an event e: R = Pe Se, where Se and Pe refer to the
severity and probability of e, respectively (Heckmann et al., 2015; ISO 14971:2007).
Supply chain risk assessment aims to estimate the risk probability of occurrences and their
adverse effect on the entire supply chain. In practice, the exact quantification of these
values is often difficult because a precise assessment of the probability of occurrence and
its effect is hardly possible; however, a qualitative method is advisable to evaluate the
identified risk. The probability impact matrix is a qualitative risk assessing tool that has
two dimensions: “probability” (from low to high) and “impact” (from weak to grave) based
on a Likert scale. Through their survey in India, Sharma and Bhat (2014c) concluded that
a likelihood/impact matrix is a widely used method of risk assessment in the automotive
industry.
2.4.2 Fuzzy Assessment Method
Ghadimi et al. (2012) developed a weighted fuzzy assessment method for product
sustainability assessment. A case study of an automotive component was conducted to
illustrate the efficiency of the developed method. The results show how a simple
replacement in the product material can lead a manufacturer toward producing more
sustainable products and achieving the ultimate goal of sustainable manufacturing. Zimmer
et al. (2017) developed a fuzzy analytical hierarchy process to estimate and assess social
risks along global supply chains. Their model was applied to a case study of a German
premium car manufacturer and showed a great benefit for practitioners in purchasing
functions of focal companies.
Vujović et al. (2017) applied fuzzy logic to classify risk factors in production supply
chains with uncertain data from the automotive industry. Palanisamy and Zubar (2013),
Datta et al. (2013), and Diabat et al. (2013) also utilized fuzzy logic for their ASCRM
research.
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2.4.3 Mean-Variance Analysis
Mean-variance analysis introduced by Markowitz (1959) has been a standard tool for risk
management. It tries to achieve a balance between the expected return and the specific risk
measured by variance (Wu et al., 2010). Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model
to manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk. They presented a set of
optimization models that address supplier development undertaken by manufacturing firms
to improve their suppliers’ capabilities and performance. The objective function is to
minimize the risk of the manufacturer’s investments to suppliers. Zhang and Zhu (2012)
extended Talluri’s manufacturer cooperation model to the automotive industry where the
return is nonlinear. Many automotive OEMs have implemented supplier development
programs to assist suppliers. When cooperating, firms share resources, benefits, as well as
cost and risk.
However, some other traditional quantitative risk assessment tools, such as value at risk
and conditional value at risk, have rarely been applied to the automotive supply chain.
2.4.4 Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random
variables and their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph. Lockamy and
McCormack (2012) and Lockamy (2014) used Bayesian networks to assess supply disaster
risks in the automotive industry. The empirical data of design/methodology/approach are
from 15 casting suppliers to a major US automotive company. They found that Bayesian
networks can be used to develop supplier risk profiles, which can assist managers in
making decisions regarding current and prospective suppliers. Abolghasemi et al. (2015)
proposed a Bayesian method based on supply chain operations reference (SCOR) metrics.
The method can manage supply chain risks and to improve supply chain performance. It
was applied to one of the biggest automotive companies in Iran.
2.4.5 Other Risk Assessment Methods
Schöggl et al. (2016) provided a conceptual framework and an aggregation method for
supply chain sustainability assessment using quantitative and qualitative indicators. Their
results are based on a literature review of sustainability assessment in supply chains as well
as on focus group workshops with experts from the European automotive and electronics
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industry. Their paper contributes to the theory and practice of sustainability assessment in
supply chains. Methods for assessing risk are also addressed in supplier evaluation and
selection (Cagnin et al., 2016; Canbolat et al., 2008; Kull and Talluri, 2008).
Sharma and Bhat (2014c) also investigated the tools and techniques used in supply chain
risk assessment practices by Indian automobile companies. For risk identification and
assessment, scenario planning, a likelihood/impact matrix, and checklists are the most
frequently used tools. Other risk assessment tools included failure mode effects and
analysis, Six Sigma, simulations, and analytical hierarchy and network processes.
Marasova et al. (2017) applied heuristics to risk assessment within the automotive industry
supply chain.
A summary of the risk assessment and management methodology reviewed in this paper is
given in Table 2.3.
TABLE 2.3: SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
SC Risk Assessment
Methodology
Probability/likelihood
impact matrix
Fuzzy logic
Mean–variance
Bayesian network

Reference in Automotive
Thun and Hoenig (2011); Sharma and Bhat (2014b)
Palanisamy and Zubar (2013); Datta et al. (2013);
Ghadimi et al. (2012); Diabat et al. (2013); Zimmer et al.
(2017); Vujović et al. (2017)
Zhang and Zhu (2012)
Lockamy and McCormack (2012); Lockamy (2014);
Abolghasemi et al. (2015)

Risk-exposure model (TTR,
TTS, PI)

Simchi-Levi et al. (2014, 2015)

Other risk assessment
methods

Schöggl et al. (2016); Cagnin et al. (2016); Canbolat et al.
(2008); Kull and Talluri (2008); Sharma and Bhat
(2014b); Marasova et al. (2017)

2.5 Automotive SCRM, Modeling, Methods, and Tools
Motivated by the requirements of real-world practice, SCRM has attracted increasing
attention from academia and industry (Tang, 2006; Wu et al., 2011; Simchi-Levi et al.,
2014). This section provides a review of SCRM, modeling, methods, and tools for the
automotive industry.
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2.5.1 Optimization Mathematical Modeling
Optimization modeling is one of the widely used quantitative approaches used to manage
automotive supply chain risk. These models include the following:


linear programming (Kırılmaz and Erol, 2017, Caux et al., 2006), nonlinear programming
(Zhang and Zhu, 2012, Cedillo-Campos, et al. 2017), mixed integer programming (Häntsch
and Huchzermeier, 2016; Ghadge et al., 2017), mixed integer nonlinear programming
(Rezapour et al., 2017; Mohammaddust et al., 2017), and stochastic models (Nakashima et al.,
2014)



multi-objective models (Häntsch and Huchzermeier, 2016);



game theory (Naini et al., 2011; Swinney and Netessine, 2009); and



newsvendor models (Nakashima and Sornmanapong, 2013).

Kırılmaz and Erol (2017) developed a linear programming model for a procurement plan
by considering the cost criterion as the first priority and the risk criterion as the second
priority to mitigate supply-side risks. The proactive approach to SCRM is applied to an
international automotive company.
Dal-Mas et al. (2011) presented a multi-echelon mixed integer linear program (MILP)
model for strategic design and investment capacity planning of the biofuel ethanol supply
chain under price uncertainty. Linear/mixed integer multicriteria optimization models were
used by Elmaraghy and Majety (2008) for determining the identified supply chain design
parameters in an automotive powertrain supply chain design. Mixed integer nonlinear
(MINL) models were used by Rezapour et al. (2017) to find the most profitable resilient
network and risk mitigation policies and by Mohammaddust (2017) to evaluate risk
mitigation strategies for a four-tier SC in a competitive automotive supply chain.
Häntsch and Huchzermeier (2016) presented a multiperiod, multi-objective optimization
model that enables robust production network and location planning during times of
increased market uncertainty and risk exposure in the automotive industry.
Nakashima and Sornmanapong (2013) used the newsvendor model to determine the
optimal order quantity to maximize the expected profit under different scenarios.
Nakashima et al. (2014) studied stochastic inventory control systems with consideration
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for the view of second-tier semiconductor suppliers in automotive industries using a
simulation approach.
Game theory was used by Naini et al. (2011) to design a mixed performance measurement
system for environmental supply chain management that measures and evaluates business
operations. The authors applied their proposed method to a case study of the supply chain
of one of Iran's biggest automotive companies, SAIPA. Swinney and Netessine (2009)
applied game theory to model a contracting game.
2.5.2 Quantitative-Based Strategies


Supply Chain Coordination and Cooperation

Because the automotive supply chain is a multilayer complex network, effective
coordination between supply chain members is very important for risk management.
Belzowski et al. (2006) surveyed the difficulties faced by automotive manufacturers and
suppliers in managing their supply chains. With thousands of Tier-1 to Tier-N suppliers
located across the globe, the external SCM linkages compound the complexity for both
manufacturers and suppliers to manage their supply chain. Therefore, it is very critical for
automotive companies to develop and execute internal integration and external
collaboration strategies to survive challenges and to mitigate supply chain risks.
Pernot and Roodhooft (2014) conducted a retrospective case study of an automotive
supplier relationship and investigated whether the management control system design of
supplier relationships is associated with good performance. Matsuo (2015) focused on a
case of supply disruption of the automotive microcontroller units after the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake. An SCM framework hierarchy was applied to analyze the issues from the
perspective of execution, design, strategy, and sustainability. Montshiwa et al. (2016)
conducted a quantitative study that included supply chain cooperation as a term in their
business continuity plan. The results of 75 automobile parts markers in disaster-prone
regions (Asia and North America) were studied.


Dual Sourcing

Dual sourcing is an important strategy to mitigate supply chain risk. Thun and Hoenig
(2011a) pointed out that building up redundancies is an important way to create a resilient
supply chain. As in other industries, automotive OEMs often use dual sourcing or multiple
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sourcing to create redundancies. They statistically analyzed survey data from 67
automotive manufacturing plants in Germany and concluded that dual sourcing or multiple
sourcing is a valid and reliable factor in SCRM. Davarzani et al. (2011) studied strategies
of single, dual, and multiple sourcing to handle potential disruptions. They proposed a
sourcing model and demonstrated it in the decision-making process for a supply chain in
the automotive industry.


Supply Contracts

Supply chain contracts are used to coordinate supply chain members, OEMs, and suppliers
to align their interests with those of the supply chain system and to achieve optimal supply
chain efficiency. Supply chain contracts also play an important role in supply chain
members sharing risks arising from various sources of uncertainty, such as demand, price,
and product quality. Considerable research work has focused on pricing strategies and
order allocation in multi-supplier systems.
Ghadge et al. (2017) studied a supply chain risk-sharing contract to mitigate demand
uncertainty and price-volatility-related risks in a globalized business environment. They
developed and analyzed an integer programming model followed with an automotive case
study to get insights into a buyer–supplier relationships while considering multiple buyersupplier power and dependence scenarios.
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) studied performance-based contracting (PBC) in service
supply chains. Based on agency theory, they studied two cases of logistics service supply
chains, one of which is in the automotive industry, and identified the key influencing
factors. Swinney and Netessine (2009) investigated short-term contracts, long-term
contracts, and dynamic contracts under the threat of supplier default, because contracting
with suppliers prone to default is an increasingly common problem in some industries,
particularly automotive manufacturing. Game theory was applied to model a two-period
contracting game with two identical suppliers, a single buyer, deterministic demand, and
uncertain production costs. They concluded that the possibility of supplier default offers a
new reason to prefer long-term contracts over short-term contracts.


Supplier Selection
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Supplier selection strategies have been identified as vital for risk mitigation in automotive
companies (Chen et al., 2016). Multiple-criteria decision-making techniques such as fuzzy
quality function deployment (FQFD), the mathematical modeling and analytical hierarchy
process (AHP) (Kull and Talluri, 2008; de Oliveira et al. 2017), and the analytical network
process (ANP) (Palanisamy and Zubar, 2013) are popular approaches used to evaluate as
well as to select suppliers in the automotive industry.
Chen et al. (2016) presented an automotive company case study and evaluated the results
through weighted goal programming (WGP) and preemptive goal programming (PGP)
methods.
Cagnin et al. (2016) evaluated supplier selection methods in the automotive industry
compared with the identified models in the literature.


Contingency Strategies

Risk management strategies in supply chains can be divided into two categories: mitigation
strategies and contingency strategies. The former focuses on taking precautions in advance
of risk occurrence through strategic inventory and dual sourcing. The latter refers to the set
of actions taken in post-disaster conditions, such as contingency rerouting and revenue
management (Tomlin, 2006). Contingency rerouting is a cost-effective risk management
strategy for major disruptions such as natural disasters.
Grötsch et al. (2013) investigated antecedents that support proactive SCRM
implementation from a contingency theory perspective. The hypotheses were developed
and tested via content analysis in 63 interviews with representatives from the automotive
industry. They found that a mechanistic management control system, a rational cognitive
style, and relational buyer-supplier relationships have positive impacts on proactively
managing supplier insolvency risks. Svensson (2004) examined key areas, causes, and
contingency planning of corporate vulnerability in supply chains for a subcontractor in
the automotive industry.
MacKenzie et al. (2014) modeled a severe supply chain disruption and post-disaster
decision-making process and applied the model to a simulation based on the 2011 Japanese
earthquake and tsunami, which caused closure of several facilities of key suppliers in the
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automobile industry and subsequently supply difficulties for both Japanese and US
automakers.
Giard and Sali (2014) studied optimal stock-out risk for a component in an automotive
supply chain. The strategy is to trigger the use of an emergency supply before its occurrence
to prevent stock-out propagation along the downstream part of the supply chain. Their
model considers the cost of producing and maintaining a safety stock and the costs incurred
by the emergency supply. Two alternatives emergency policies were compared in their
analytical solutions.
In addition to the theoretical models, the simulation approach is used in automotive supply
chain disruption research (Lalwani et al., 2006; Canbolat et al., 2008; MacKenzie et al.,
2014).
2.5.3 Qualitative Approaches


Empirical Approach

Most research in automotive SCRM employs the empirical approach to analyze the risk
and assess the risk management strategies qualitatively. González-Benito et al. (2013)
concluded that the empirical approach includes three types: case studies, surveys, and
secondary sources. They found that 60% of research on automotive supply chain risk
employed the empirical approach, some of which combined different methods, such as case
studies and surveys or case studies and mathematical modeling.
Thun and Hoenig (2011a) conducted an empirical analysis of SCRM practices. The
analysis was based on a survey of 67 manufacturing plants conducted in the German
automotive industry. After investigating the vulnerability of supply chains in general and
examining key drivers of supply chain risks, the study identified supply chain risks by
analyzing their likelihood to occur and their potential impact on the supply chain.
Thun et al. (2011b) used the same empirical approach and the same data as Thun and
Hoeing (2011a) to analyze SCRM in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The
analysis shows that SMEs predominantly focus on reactive instruments that absorb risks
through the creation of redundancies instead of preventing risks.
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Some researchers used empirical approaches for conducting regional ASCRM studies (e.g.,
Ceryno et al. (2015) for the Brazilian automotive industry, Sharma and Bhat (2014a, 2014b,
2016) and Sharma et al. (2017) for the Indian automobile industry, Doran et al. (2007) for
the French automobile industry, Towill et al. (2000) for the European automotive supply
chain “health check” procedure, Singh et al. (2005) for the Australian automotive
manufacturing industry, Blos et al. (2009) for the Brazilian automotive and electronic
industries, Lin and Zhou (2011), Xie et al. (2009), and Barclay (2008) for the Chinese
automotive industry supply chain, and Shimizu et al. (2013) and Chino et al. (2017) for the
Japanese automotive industry). Their research offered an initial profile and revealed insight
into the regional automotive industry SCRM and helped to improve it.
Also, there is some research (e.g., Lippert and Forman (2006)) employing the empirical
approach to study tiers of ASCRM. Lippert (2008) tested theoretical models through a
survey of hundreds of supply chain members using an information technology innovation
for part-level visibility and logistics operation along the entire first tier of a major US
automotive supply chain.
Davarzani et al. (2015) used the case study method to study the influence of economic and
political risks (EPRs) to supply chains. They interviewed SC professionals for three cases
from an automotive SC. Sroufe and Curkovic (2008) utilized case-based research for a
sample of firms in the automotive industry to examine the ISO 9000:2000 standard and
supply chain quality assurance. de Oliveira et al. (2017) verified that ISO 31000:2009 can
be used as a standardized method to perform SCRM. They developed a pathway to apply
ISO 31000:2009 risk assessment tools and techniques to integrate a procedure for SCRM
based on AHP and provided an automotive supply chain example.


Risk Mitigation Strategies
 Build a Resilient Supply Chain

A resilient supply chain is critical to the success of an enterprise (Hsieh et al., 2016).
Determining how to build a resilient supply chain to mitigate uncertainty is a priority for
automotive companies (Chen et al. 2016). Recently, supply chain managers have changed
their main focus from reducing costs to giving importance to supply chain continuity and
resiliency (Kırılmaz and Erol, 2017). Rezapour et al. (2017) studied resilient supply chain
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network design under competition using a real-life case study in a highly competitive
automobile supply chain. They recommended three policies used to mitigate disruption
risk: (1) keeping emergency stock at the retailers, (2) reserving backup capacity at the
suppliers, and (3) multiple sourcing.
 Increase Flexibility

Flexibility is commonly associated with the ability to change or react. Owing to the
importance of flexibility for achieving a competitive advantage and mitigating risks,
researchers increasingly study how entire supply chains can deliver flexibility to their
customers. Flexibility includes production diversification, geographic diversification,
increased overall flexibility, flexible input sourcing (e.g., dual sourcing), backup suppliers,
localized sourcing, flexible supply contracts, flexible manufacturing, and flexible
distribution (Ceryno et al., 2015; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Tomlin, 2006; Chopra and
Meindl, 2010; Thun and Hoening, 2011a).
Thomé et al. (2014) studied supply chain flexibility in the automotive industry based on
empirical research on three Brazilian automotive supply chains. A multiple case study was
designed for the research with internal and external validity checks, within-case analysis,
and cross-case comparisons.
 Rethink the Global Supply Chain

During recent years, offshoring and outsourcing have transformed automotive sectors into
global networks of design, production, and distribution across the global value chains
coordinated by the major automotive OEMs (Bailey and De Propris, 2014). As
manufacturing activities tended to be shifted to low-labor-cost locations in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, high-end design, research and development, and product development
have stayed and been anchored mostly to high-cost and high-knowledge-intensive home
economy locations. However, very recently the weaknesses and risks inherent in such
global value chains have been exposed, triggering attempts to rethink their nature and also
raising possibilities to insource some manufacturing activities to home countries. Even
Science Magazine had a special section entitled “Rethink the Global Supply Chain” in its
June 2014 publication. Bailey and De Propris (2014) studied reshoring for opportunities
and limits for manufacturing in the UK automotive sector. Thun and Hoenig (2011a),
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Richardson (2005), Sharma and Bhat (2014b), Canbolat et al. (2008), and Zimmer et al.
(2017) identified globalization risks in the automotive industry.
 Implement Green Supply Chain Management

As the public becomes more aware of environmental issues and global warming, the
environmental and social impact of supply chains has attracted considerable research
attention. Green supply chain management (GSCM) has emerged as an important
organizational philosophy and a proactive approach to reduce environmental risks. To ease
the increasing pressures resulting from globalization and stricter regulations, address
increased community and consumer pressures, and cope with developing countries' aims
to enter the World Trade Organization (WTO), automotive supply chain managers have
been considering and implementing GSCM practices to improve both their economic and
environmental performances (Diabat et al. 2013).
There has been considerable research on GSCM for the automotive industry. Lee and
Cheong (2011) and Lee (2011) used qualitative methods of interviews and document
analysis to collect data on Hyundai Motor Co. and its key first-tier supplier in the Korean
automobile industry. They developed a carbon footprint measurement and evaluation
program in the supply chain and provided a track record to improve carbon and energy
efficiency. Diabat et al. (2013) explored green supply chain practices and performances in
the automotive industry using a fuzzy multiple-criteria decision-making method. Govindan
et al. (2014) used an empirical approach to investigate the impact of lean, resilient, and
GSCM practices on supply chain sustainability. They simultaneously studied the three
dimensions of sustainability (environmental, social, and economic) and the lean, resilient,
and GSCM paradigms considered strategic for supply chain competitiveness. Munguía et
al. (2010) identified pollution prevention opportunities in the Mexican automotive
refinishing industry to improve environmental and occupational conditions in developing
countries.
Other researchers, such as Azevedo et al. (2012) and Caniëls et al. (2013), also proposed
some theoretical frameworks and empirical approaches for the analysis of the influence of
green and lean upstream supply chain management practices on business sustainability.
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2.5.4 Practical Tools in ASCRM
Proactive SCRM can lead to greater customer satisfaction, lower total cost, improved
delivery performance, and higher quality outcomes. Some practical tools have been
developed for SCRM that have shown promising application results in automotive
industries.


Risk-Exposure Model

Simchi-Levi et al. (2014, 2015) developed a new risk-exposure model to identify risks and
mitigate disruptions in the automotive supply chain quantitatively. Unlike traditional
SCRM methods, which rely on knowing the likelihood of occurrence and the magnitude
of impact for every potential event that could materially disrupt a firm’s operation, they
developed a mathematical model that focuses on the impact of potential failures at nodes
along the supply chain, rather than the cause of the disruption. In their model, a supply
chain network was created first. Each node stands for a supplier facility, a distribution
center, or a transportation hub. Three parameters need to be determined for each node: (1)
time to recovery (TTR), (2) performance impact (PI), and (3) the risk exposure index (REI).
TTR is the time it would take for a particular node to be restored to full functionality after
a disruption. Because accurate TTR information is not available in many cases, SimchiLevi et al. (2015) introduced the time-to-survive (TTS) concept. TTS means the maximum
amount of time that the system can function without performance loss if a particular node
is disrupted. PI is a measure of the disruption at the node during TTR. REI measures how
severe the risk exposure of each node is, and its value ranges between 0 and 1 (least to
largest). Simchi-Levi et al.'s model allow companies to identify areas of hidden risk in the
supply chain effectively.


Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) has been suggested as an SCRM tool (Canbolat
et al., 2008; Curkovic et al. 2013; Rewilak, 2015; Sharma and Bhat 2014b; Pandey and
Sharma, 2017). FMEA is commonly used in the automotive industry to collect information
related to risk management decisions in an engineering capacity, but not typically in a
supply chain capacity.
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Based on FMEA, Canbolat et al. (2008) developed a risk assessment and management
method for sourcing components and subsystems to emerging markets for automotive
OEMs. They used a process failure mode effect analysis (PFMEA) structure to characterize
the risks and developed a simulation model to quantify risk factors so that an automotive
OEM can evaluate risk mitigation strategies.
Curkovic et al. (2013) surveyed 67 industrial companies, including four automotive OEMs,
to identify how companies manage risks through supplier assessment and selection and
whether FMEA plays a role in the process. They found that some companies used the
FMEA model to select and assess suppliers.
Pandey and Sharma (2017) applied an FMEA-based interpretive structural modeling
approach to model automotive supply chain risk. A tractor manufacturing company was
studied as an example. First, 17 potential modes of failures or risk sources were identified
through the literature and weighted risk priority numbers (WRPNs) were calculated and
then 11 failure models were selected as key learning aspects based on higher WRPN values.
A further interpretive structural modeling approach was used to model the structural
relationship among these key risks.


Multiple-Criteria Decision-Making Models

In the literature, we found that multiple-criteria decision making (MCDM) or multiplecriteria decision analysis (MCDA) is used for risk assessment in the automotive industry,
such as in supplier ranking and selection (Kull and Talluri, 2008; Palanisamy and Zubar,
2013; Datta et al., 2013; Neumüller et al., 2016).
Blackhurst et al. (2008) developed a multicriteria scoring procedure (also called a factor
weighting procedure) to create risk indices for parts and suppliers in the automotive
industry. The procedure has three steps: (1) Assign a weight to parts and suppliers; the
weights are based on the probability of each category of disruption occurring and its
impact. (the weights are based on the probability of occurrence and the impact of each
category of disruption) (2) Calculate part- and supplier-specific risk indices to form a heat
graph. (3) Track risk indices over time to identify trends toward higher risk levels.
Diabat et al. (2013) explored green supply chain practices and performances in the
automotive industry using a fuzzy multiple-criteria decision-making method. Datta et al.
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(2013) utilized fuzzy logic in an MCDM process for evaluation and selection of third-party
reverse logistics providers for a reputed Indian automobile part manufacturing company.
Other ASCRM research topics include managing risks in JIT and sequence supply
networks (Wagner and Silveira-Camargos, 2012), lean process supply chains (Cervi, 2007;
Azevedo et al., 2012), optimized programming by resource management (Hanenkamp,
2013), entrepreneurial SCM competence and performance of manufacturing SMEs (Hsu et
al., 2011), natural hedging as a risk prophylaxis and supplier financing instrument in
automotive supply chains (Hofmann, 2011), and an economic P-chart model considering
due date and quality risks to mitigate quality risks (Sun et al., 2012).
Other practical tools in ASCRM include a strategic materials positioning matrix (SMPM)
(Saueressig et al., 2017). Using a case study method, SMPM was applied to two families
of items (bolts and plastic finishing) purchased by an automotive industry company in
southern Brazil. The materials were organized by SMPM into four classes: noncritical,
strategic, risk, and competitive. The result of the analysis showed a significant reduction
of shortages in the assembly line and storage facility units required for warehousing.
2.5.5 Summary

A summary of the literature reviewed for risk management in this paper is shown in Figure
2.4. The SCRM research methodologies reviewed are given in Table 4.
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Supply Chain Risk Management, Modeling, Methods, and Tools

Modeling Approaches
Supply Chain
Coordination
Dual Sourcing

Qualitative Approaches

Practical Tools

Empirical Approach: Case
Study Surveys 2nd Sources

Risk-Exposure
Model

Risk Mitigation Strategies

FMEA Method

Emergency Sourcing
MCDM Method
Supply Chain Contract
Supplier selection

Build Resilient SC
Increase Flexibility
Increase Info Transparency

Inventory

Rethink Global SC
Green SC Management

Figure 2.4. Summary diagram of the literature reviewed for risk management in this study
TABLE 2.4: SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (SCRM) MODEL, STRATEGY, AND TOOLS
SC Risk Research Methodology
Mathematical Linear programming
Modeling
Nonlinear programming

Zhang and Zhu (2012)

Mixed integer linear
programming

Dal-Mas et al. (2011); Elmaraghy and Majety (2008)

Mixed integer nonlinear
programming
Stochastic model

Rezapour et al. (2017); Mohammaddust et al. (2017)

Game theory
Newsvendor
Simulation
Quantitativebased Strategy

Reference in Automotive
Kırılmaz and Erol (2017); Caux et al. 2006

Supply chain
coordination and
cooperation
Dual sourcing

Nakashima et al. (2014)
Naini et al. (2011); Swinney and Netessine (2009), Yang et
al. (2017)
Nakashima and Sornmanapong (2013)
Lalwani et al. (2006); Canbolat et al. (2008); MacKenzie et
al. (2014); Nakashima and Sornmanapong (2013)
Belzowski et al. (2006); Zhang and Zhu (2012); Matsuo
(2015); Montshiwa et al. (2016)
Davarzani et al. (2011)
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Supply chain contract
Supplier selection
Contingency strategy
Inventory
Empirical approach
Qualitative
Approach

Risk
Mitigation
Strategy

Build resilience
Increase flexibility
Rethink globalization,
reshore
Implement green supply
chain

Practical
Tools

Increase information
transparency
Risk-exposure model
FMEA method
(Fuzzy) MCDM, AHP

Other tools: SMPM

Swinney and Netessine (2009); Selviaridis and Norrman
(2014); Ghadge et al. (2017)
Kull and Talluri (2008); Palanisamy and Zubar (2013);
Datta et al. (2013); Chen et al. (2016); Cagnin et al. (2016)
Grötsch et al. (2013); MacKenzie et al. (2014); Svensson
(2004)
Nakashima et al. (2014)
González-Benito et al. (2013); Thun and Hoenig (2011a);
Thun et al. (2011b); Ceryno et al. (2015); Sharma and Bhat,
(2014a, 2014b, 2016); Doran et al. (2007); Towill et al.
(2000); Singh et al. (2005); Blos et al. (2009); Lin and Zhou
(2011); Xie et al. (2009); Shimizu et al. (2013); Lippert and
Forman (2006); Lippert (2008); Davarzani et al. (2015);
Sroufe and Curkovic (2008); Govindan et al. (2014)
Hsieh et al. (2016); Chen et al. (2016); Kırılmaz and Erol
(2017); Rezapour et al. (2017)
Thun and Hoening (2011a); Ceryno et al. (2015); Thomé et
al. (2014)
Bailey and De Propris (2014); Science (June 2014)
Lee and Cheong (2011); Lee (2011); Diabat et al. (2013);
Govindan et al. (2014); Munguía et al. (2010); Azevedo et
al. (2012); Caniëls et al. (2013); Oldham and Votta (2003)
Simchi-Levi et al. (2014)
Simchi-Levi et al. (2014, 2015)
Canbolat et al. (2008); Curkovic et al. (2013); Rewilak
(2015); Sharma and Bhat (2014b); Pandey and Sharma,
(2017)
Kull and Talluri (2008); Palanisamy and Zubar (2013);
Datta et al. (2013); Neumüller et al. (2016); Blackhurst et
al. (2008); Diabat et al. (2013); Sharma and Bhat (2014b);
de Oliveira et al. (2017)
Saueressig et al. (2017)

2. 6 Conclusion and Future Research
This study reviewed the existing research work on ASCRM. We first classified the risks
into ten categories and discussed risk assessment methods, and then focused on
summarizing the research on ASCRM’s mathematic modeling, quantitative approaches,
qualitative approaches, and practical tools.
In the modeling approach, optimization models are widely used; these include linear and
nonlinear programming, mixed integer programing, and multi-objective models.
Newsvendor models are used for formulating the problem with uncertain demands, and
game theory are also employed for supply chain coordination and supply contracts.
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Qualitative approaches include empirical approaches and risk mitigation strategies. The
empirical approach is a popular method in ASCRM research. About 60% of the research
employs the empirical approach to analyze risk and to assess risk management strategies
qualitatively in the automotive industry (González-Benito et al., 2013). Also, some new
research trends in risk mitigation strategies can be applied to the automotive supply chain;
these include building a resilient supply chain and addressing the environmental impact of
supply chain risks. Some practical tools such as multiple-criteria decision-making methods,
FMEA, and PFMEA simulation models, and risk-exposure models have been utilized to
mitigate risk in automotive supply chains.
The major conclusions from this study of ASCRM are as follows: (1) Research on ASCRM
has been increasing in recent years. (2) Most papers are published in the following journals:
International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production
Research, Journal of Cleaner Production, International Journal of Physical Distribution and
Logistics Management, Industrial Management and Data Systems, and International
Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology. (3) The main mathematical models
include optimization models, such as linear and nonlinear programming, mixed integer
programming, multi-objective models, newsvendor models, and game theory; tools such
as value at risk and conditional value at risk have rarely been used. (4) The automotive
industry recognizes the importance of ASCRM and expends considerable effort on its
investigation, but academic research is thus far insufficient. (5) The automotive industry
has a very complex, multitier SCM and the risk sources of automotive supply chains are
widespread. (6) There are some practical tools and risk mitigation strategies, such as
MCDM and FMEA, but there is a lack of real-time risk alarm systems and tools for supply
chain resilience.
Based on the reviewed papers in ASCRM, we propose a few important future research
directions as follows:
1). Study and development of systematic methods and systems to analyze ASCRM by
integrating the different risk sources: The automotive supply chain is a huge multitier
suppliers network. A typical automotive OEM has up to 10 tiers between itself and its raw
materials. For example, Ford has 1,400 Tier-1 suppliers across 4,400 manufacturing sites
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and hundreds of thousands of lower-tier suppliers (Simchi-Levi et al., 2015). Most research
work in the automotive industry is based on specific points of views, i.e., the supplier’s or
manufacturer’s. There is no systematic method to analyze and integrate different ASCRM
strategies, such as how to choose supply locations, transportation, to optimize the
objectives for both manufacturers and suppliers as a system and to reduce geographic or
political risks in the automotive supply chain in the global environment. The existing
research on the impact on the automotive network resulting from supply chain risk has not
been sufficient. This area requires more related research to be conducted in the future.
2). Use of data- and big-data-based ASCRM: One of the major automotive supply chain
risks is nontransparency resulting from the multiple layers in the supply chain. Typically,
OEMs have substantial data about Tier-1 suppliers, but they lack data from Tier-2 to TierN suppliers. Nontransparency makes it very difficult to monitor risks and issue warnings.
Big-data analytics can provide a basis for transparency in automotive supply chains. With
the help of real-time big data availability, OEMs and suppliers can improve their supply
chain transparency, monitor the occurrence of risks, provide early warnings and responses,
and enable managers to use the developed risk mitigation strategy to prevent the risks. Bigdata-based sense-and-respond systems for ASCRM are worth further research.
3). Study of the downstream risks to the automotive supply chain: There is not enough
research on automotive-industry-specific models. The special aspect of the automotive
supply chain is its complexity owing to the huge number of multitier suppliers and
globalized network. Further study is required on downstream risks to the automotive supply
chain besides demand uncertainty, such as call-back risk and how to build a resilient
network.
4). Implementation of more quantitative models: Through a literature review, we found
that the majority of research on automotive supply chain risk employs empirical
approaches. There is a real demand in the automotive industry to use quantitative models
to evaluate supplier risks in terms of different tiers and different type of suppliers. Some
quantitative models just address simple two-layer supply chains owing to the lack of deep
downstream suppliers’ information. Various mathematical models have been developed to
assist in planning under uncertainties with simplified real-life situations (Singhal et al.,
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2011). Proposed future work includes quantitative model development for complex
ASCRM and improvement of the mathematical models to cope with real-life situations.
Traditional risk modeling, including the use of the utility function, variance, standard
deviation, mean–variance, value at risk, and conditional value at risk, has rarely been
applied to ASCRM. These modeling methods can be applied to ASCRM.
5). Addressing advanced technology challenges: In recent decades, revolutions in
information technology and telecommunications has brought about dramatic changes in
our daily lives and the automotive industry as well. Automakers continuously offer new
high-technology features in their products (e.g., GPS, telematics, various sensors, ADAS,
RFID, etc.). These high-technology features present many technological challenges in the
automotive supply chain. One of these challenges is the risk posed to vehicle design,
production, quality, and after-sales services by the short product development cycle and
the long useful life of vehicles. Automotive manufacturers must mitigate risk through their
component suppliers. Future research needs to be done on car manufacturers' selection of
proper suppliers and on improving coordination and cooperation among supply chain
vendors.
6). Research on autonomous cars and car-sharing services: In recent years, autonomous
cars have emerged as the future of the automotive industry. Experts have predicted that
fully autonomous cars will arrive at the market by 2025 to 2030 (Liuima, 2016). Carsharing services using autonomous vehicles could be attractive for many private buyers as
well. It is suggested that new-car sales in the US could be eroded by as much as 40%. Like
any new product, autonomous cars will have demand uncertainty because of many
obstacles, such as adoption rate, technological challenges, liability disputes, laws, and
regulations. Demand uncertainty implies overcapacity risk or under capacity risk. Future
work includes improving forecast accuracy to optimize contracts and production capacity
and to reduce supply chain risk.
This research tries to fill the research gap that lacks quantitative models for ASCRM. In
the following chapters, we will implement two mathematic models for ASCRM research.
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(1)

Model for supplier development and manufacturer cooperation with a nonlinear

return to minimize risk. The model and numerical experiment will be illustrated in Chapter
3.
(2)

Optimal contract model for product development with risk consideration (penalty

and compensating). Chapter 4 will develop the mathematical model. Chapter 5 will apply
the model to a uniform distribution case for numerical experiment and sensitivity analysis
for a real-world ASCRM case.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMIZING MANUFACTURER COOPERATION IN SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT
UNDER RISK
3.1 Introduction
An automotive supply chain is a multiple layered, complex network, so the relationship
between supply chain members is very important for risk management. Supplier
development is a long-term, resource-consuming business activity that requires
commitment from both manufacturers and suppliers. Manufacturers often spend a great
amount of investment in supplier development to improve their suppliers’ capabilities and
performances. The automotive industry is no exception. All of the automotive OEMs, such
as Toyota, Honda, and the Big Three U.S. automakers, Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors,
have implemented supplier development programs to assist suppliers (Liker & Choi, 2004),
which have resulted in quality improvement and cost reduction. However, there is a risk
due to the uncertainty of returns in supplier development. For example, for the same
investment of resources, the return from each supplier can vary from the manufacturer’s
expectation. Furthermore, supplier development poses potential opportunistic behavior on
the part of the supplier (Wagner, 2006), which may lead to total failure or termination of
the relationship earlier than expected.
How to perform risk management in new product development and supplier development,
or how to allocate the investment optimally among multiple suppliers to minimize risk
while maintaining an acceptable level of return is a critical issue faced by manufacturers
or automotive OEMs. This research tries to address these problems. This chapter is
organized as follows. First, a literature review about risk management in new product and
supplier development is provided in section 3.2. In section 3.3, Markowitz’s mean-variance
portfolio theory and Talluri’s manufacturer investment portfolio model are introduced. The
proposed non-linear return model in both SMMS and TMMS are developed in section 3.4.
Moreover, numerical experiments and results are shown in section 3.5. Finally, a summary
of this chapter is provided in section 3.6.
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3.2 Literature Review
We first review the available papers related to the keywords “risk management in new
product and supplier development” searching from Scopus.
Quigley, et al. 2018 studied supplier development decisions for prime manufacturers with
extensive supply bases producing complex, highly engineered products. They proposed a
novel modeling approach, a Poisson–Gamma model within a Bayesian framework, which
can help/allow supply chain managers to decide the optimal level of investment and
improve quality performance under uncertainty. The model helps to understand the
relationship between the degree of epistemic uncertainty, the effectiveness of development
programs, and the levels of investment. It was found that the optimal level of investment
does not have a monotonic relationship with the rate of effectiveness. The expected optimal
investment monotonically decreases if an investment decision was deferred until the
epistemic uncertainty is removed, because the prior variance increases, but only if the prior
mean is above a critical threshold. Several methods were developed to apply the model to
industrial decisions in practice, which enables the model to be used with typical data
available to major companies, and also with computationally efficient approximations that
can be implemented easily. The model was applied to a real industry example. The results
support the planning decisions (already in practice?): to learn more about supplier quality
and to invest in improving supplier capability.
Recently, Mizgier et al. (2017) published their work on multi-objective capital allocation
for supplier development under risk. Due to the complexity of today’s supply chains and
the globalization of businesses, the importance of supplier development has been increased
significantly. Manufacturers need to make an informed decision to choose and develop
only a fraction of the suppliers since their resources are limited. Furthermore, when
choosing suppliers for a development program, manufacturers have the risk of uncertain
returns from this investment. The authors proposed a multi-objective model for capital
allocation for supplier development under risk. Their model was applied to an example of
a global car manufacturer and supports the decision-making process about which suppliers
are selected for the development program. A supplier’s performance is assessed by stock
market returns and the cost of capital of suppliers. An informed decision about the tradeoffs
between risk and cost of a supplier development program can be reached based on their
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multi-objective model. In the paper, they demonstrated the different allocation schemes for
supplier development depending on the risk averse-ness of the manufacturer.
Proch et al. (2017) studied supplier development in a decentralized supply chain with a
single manufacturer and a single supplier. Supplier development usually requires
relationship-specific investments. It is crucial for the participating firms to decide the
allocation of investment. The effects of relationship-specific investments on the efficiency
and effectiveness of supplier development were investigated in the study referencing the
relational view. Then they formulated and solved a continuous time optimal control model.
The results characterized the decision to invest in supplier development and showed that
the supplier's incentive to participate in supplier development depends critically on the
manufacturer's share of investment costs. Through the numerical analysis, they also found
that although the subsidy can lead to significant improvement in supply chain performance,
subsidizing a constant share of investment costs is not always economically reasonable
from the manufacturer's point of view. Therefore, they proposed a negotiation-based
algorithm that assists the manufacturing firm in gradually increasing the share of
investment costs to ensure an efficient level of subsidy, resulting in both perfect supply
chain coordination and a win-win situation.
Hosseininasab et al. (2015) introduced a two-phase supplier selection procedure for
selecting a supplier portfolio based on value, development, and risk consideration. In most
of the existing supplier selection research, the supplier selection decisions are based on
supplier eligibility at the time of the decision making. The proposed two-phase method in
this paper is based on the long-term trend of value, stability, and relationship of potential
suppliers. In the first phase, a set of criteria are used to evaluate suppliers and assign a
comparable value to them. In the second phase, this value is analyzed for the long term,
using a multi-objective portfolio optimization model. A supplier portfolio is determined by
maximizing the expected value for the development of suppliers and minimizing their
correlated risk. Their procedure provides a new view of the supplier selection problem.
Numerical tests using the proposed approach showed promising results by selecting for
higher value suppliers with a lower risk of failure.
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Chiang and Wu, (2016), studied early supplier involvement as well as contract design
during new product development. Using upfront supplier resources and expertise, and
allowing for risk sharing with suppliers have become vital for the new product
development. This is due to the intricacy of interfirm collaboration while dealing with
unproven technology and market uncertainty. However, it remains difficult to achieve a
successful implementation of early supplier involvement (ESI) in a new product
development phase. In this paper, the game theoretical contracting strategies are proposed
to achieve manufacturer objectives, such as predictable design timelines, sufficient supplier
commitment, and radical in-process innovations. Based on real options analysis, an
compatible incentive mechanism was designed to suggest which project stage to engage
the supplier best, while considering various project factors, such as revenue forecast,
technical uncertainty, market competition, and team capability. On the other side, the
supplier can use the analysis to determine whether to participate and if so, the appropriate
level of resource commitment. The equilibrium analysis provides managerial insights into
how to best balance the time-to-market mandate with the need for accruing significant
innovations through supply chain partnerships.
Choi et al. (2008) studied mean-variance analysis of the newsvendor problem for inventory
management with stochastic demand. The objective of a typical newsvendor problem is to
either minimize the expected cost or maximize the expected profit. However, using the
expected values to measure the performance alone is not sufficient for decision makers,
because it ignores their risk preference. Authors conducted a mean-variance analysis of the
newsvendor problem and developed analytical models and investigated the problem's
structural properties. They also discussed a case with a stockout penalty cost and a safetyfirst objective. The proposed solution schemes can help to identify the optimal solutions.
Wei and Choi, (2010), extended the research work of Choi et al. 2008 on mean-variance
analysis to supply chains under wholesale pricing and profit sharing schemes. The research
explored the use of wholesale pricing and profit sharing scheme (WPPS) for coordinating
supply chains under the mean-variance (MV) decision framework. First, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for coordinating the centralized supply chain by WPPS were
established analytically. Then they found that there exists a unique equilibrium of the
Stackelberg game with WPPS in the decentralized case. They also discussed that in the
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asymmetric information case, the retailer could pretend to be more risk-averse and benefit
from it. As a result, a new measure was proposed for the manufacturer to prevent this
cheating from happening.
Grochowski and Ohlhausen, (2015), studied cooperation models as the success factor for
interdisciplinary, inter-organizational research and development (R&D) in the automotive
industry. The automotive industry has been challenged by the shortage of fossil fuels, the
politics of global warming and rising competition from new markets nowadays. The stable
success of automotive companies depends on the development of more efficient and
alternative fuel vehicles with new technologies and materials that meet the individual
requirements of the customers. The development of automobiles is so complex that it
requires the skills of various engineering and science disciplines, which are spread all over
the supply chain. Hence the only way to stay successful in the automotive industry is by
cooperation

and

collaborative

innovation.

Therefore,

cooperation

models

for

interdisciplinary and interorganizational development are in high demand and are very
critical in the automotive industry. This paper used a case study (research campus
ARENA2036 in Germany) to analyze and evaluate the cooperation models according to
the applicability to interdisciplinary, interorganizational development projects in the
automotive industry. ARENA2036 is the largest and leading research platform for mobility
in Germany, housing automobile manufacturers, suppliers, research establishments and
university institutes. Based on interviews with the partners and the preceding analyses of
cooperation models, suggestions for implementation are given to ARENA2036 for
investments, agreements, communications, and flexible adaption tasks.
Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model to manufacturer cooperation in supplier
development under risk. The authors presented a set of optimization models that address
supplier development undertaken by manufacturing firms to improve their suppliers’
capabilities and performances. They considered two scenarios: the single manufacturer and
multiple suppliers (SMMS) case and the two manufacturers and multiple suppliers
(TMMS) case. In the SMMS case, authors suggested optimal investments in various
suppliers by effectively considering risk and return. In the TMMS case, they investigated
whether manufacturers with differing capabilities could gain risk reduction benefits from
cooperating with each other in supplier development.
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From the literature review above, we can see the recent research trend in the area of risk
management in new product and supplier development. Due to the complexity of modern
supply chains and the globalization of businesses, the importance of supplier development
has increased significantly recently (Mizgier et al. 2017). Also due to the resource limits
and uncertainty in the supply chain, how to conduct risk management in new product and
supplier development, or how to select, coordinate, cooperate with suppliers, and allocate
the investment optimally among multiple suppliers to minimize risk while maintaining an
acceptable level of return is getting more attention in academia and industry.
In summary, the research topics for risk management in new product and supplier
development are: optimal level of investment or capital allocation for supplier development
under risk (Mizgier, et al. 2017, Quigley, et al. 2018); supplier selection (Hosseininasab,
et al. 2015), early supplier involvement and contract design during new product
development, with risk sharing with suppliers (Chiang and Wu, 2016); and cooperation for
supplier development investments (Grochowski and Ohlhausen, 2015, Talluri et al. 2010).
The mathematical models include Poisson–Gamma model within a Bayesian framework
(Quigley, et al. 2018), game theory (Chiang and Wu, 2016), newsvendor (Choi et al. 2008),
mean-variance analysis (Choi et al. 2008, Wei and Choi, 2010), Markowitz’s model
(Talluri et al. 2010). Table 3.1 shows a summary of the literature review. During the
literature review, we found that there is liited research that deals with optimizing
manufacturer cooperation for supplier development under risk in the automotive industry.
This research is conducted in order to fill the gap.
Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model to manufacturer cooperation for supplier
development under risk. Talluri’s model assumed that the return of investment to suppliers
is proportional to the investment. Actually, in most situations the return is nonlinear. This
research revised the above manufacturer cooperation model with a nonlinear return and
intended to apply it to the auto industry.
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TABLE 3.1: LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY.
Authors

Subject

Supply Chain
Structure

Model

Solution Approach

Quigley,
et al.
(2018)

Supplier quality
improvement: The
value of
information under
uncertainty

prime
manufacturers with
extensive supply
bases producing
complex, highly
engineered
products

a Poisson–Gamma
model within a
Bayesian
framework, which
can support supply
chain managers to
decide the optimal
level of investment
and improve
quality
performance under
uncertainty

the model is used with
typical data available to
major companies, and
with computationally
efficient
approximations that are
implemented easily

Mizgier,
et al.
(2017)

Multi-objective
capital allocation
for supplier
development under
risk

Manufacturers
need to decide to
choose and develop
some fraction of
suppliers

A multi-objective
model for capital
allocation for
supplier
development under
risk

The model was applied
to a global car
manufacturer and
supported the decisionmaking process to
select which suppliers
for the development
program. A supplier’s
performance is assessed
by stock market returns
and cost of capital of
suppliers

Proch, et
al. (2017)

A negotiationbased algorithm to
coordinate supplier
development in
decentralized
supply chains

a decentralized
supply chain with a
single
manufacturer and a
single supplier

a continuous time
optimal control
model

Numerical analysis, and
proposed a negotiationbased algorithm to
assists the
manufacturing firm in
gradually increasing the
share of investment
costs to ensure a supply
chain coordination and
a win-win situation

Hosseinin
asab, et al.
(2015)

Selecting a supplier
portfolio with
value,
development, and
risk consideration

a two-phase
supplier selection
procedure for
selecting a supplier
portfolio using
value,
development, and
risk consideration

a multi-objective
portfolio
optimization model

A supplier portfolio is
determined by
maximizing the
expected value and
development of
suppliers and
minimizing their
correlated risk

Chiang
and Wu,
(2016)

Supplier
Involvement and
Contract Design
during New

Manufacturer and
early supplier
involvement for the
new product
development

game theoretical
contracting
strategies

The equilibrium
analysis provides
managerial insights into
how to best balance the
time-to-market mandate
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Product
Development

with the need for
accruing significant
innovations through
supply chain
partnerships

Choi et al.
(2008)

Mean-Variance
Analysis for the
Newsvendor
Problem

inventory
management with
stochastic demand.

mean-variance
analysis of the
newsvendor
problem and
development of
analytical models

investigated the
problem's structural
properties

Wei and
Choi,
(2010)

Mean-variance
analysis of supply
chains under
wholesale pricing
and profit sharing
schemes

Manufacturer and
suppliers in
centralized,
decentralized
supply chain

extended the
research work of
Choi, et al. 2008 on
mean-variance
analysis to supply
chains under
wholesale pricing
and profit sharing
schemes

found that there exists a
unique equilibrium of
the Stackelberg game
with wholesale pricing
and profit sharing
scheme (WPPS) in the
decentralized case

Grochows
ki and
Ohlhausen
, (2015)

Cooperation
models as a success
factor for
interdisciplinary,
inter-organizational
research and
development in the
automotive
industry

automotive
industry supply
chain cooperation
and collaborative
innovation

a case study to
analyze and
evaluate the
cooperation models
according to the
applicability to
interdisciplinary,
interorganizational
development
projects in the
automotive
industry

Based on interviews
with partners and the
preceding analyses of
cooperation models,
suggestions for
implementation are
given to ARENA2036
for investments,
agreements,
communications, and
flexible adaption tasks

Talluri et
al. (2010)

Manufacturer
cooperation in
supplier
development under
risk

SMMS - single
manufacturer and
multiple suppliers

Applied
Markowitz’s model
to manufacturer
cooperation in
supplier
development under
risk; the objective
function is to
minimize the risk
while achieving the
target return when
the manufacturer
allocates the
investment
amounts

the mean-variance
method with linear
return

TMMS - two
manufacturers and
multiple suppliers
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3.3 Mathematic Model
3.3.1 Markowitz Model
Markowitz model, or mean-variance analysis, also known as the modern portfolio theory
(MPT), was introduced by economist Harry Markowitz in 1950’s, for which the author was
later awarded a Nobel Prize in economics [1]. The model assembles a portfolio of assets
mathematically to maximize the expected return for a given level of risk, defined as
variance. The key point of the model is that an asset's risk and return should be assessed
by how it contributes to a portfolio's overall risk and return. Markowitz model is used as
risk measurement. Mossin (1973), Choi et al. (2008), and Wei and Choi (2010) studied
problems in inventory and supply chain systematically using the mean-variance method.
3.3.2 Talluri’s Model – Linear Return Model
Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model to the manufacturer investment portfolio.
Figure 3.1 shows the case where a single manufacturer engages in supplier development
efforts with multiple suppliers (SMMS).

Supplier 1

x1

Supplier 2

x2

Supplier 3

x3

Manufacturer

x4

Manufacturer
Investment portfolio

Supplier 4

𝑥𝑅

xj: amount manufacturer invests in supplier j;
Rj: return rate from investing in supplier j from M1
Figure 3.1. Single manufacturer and multiple supplier case (Talluri et al, 2010)
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In SMMS, the objective function is to minimize the risk while achieving the target return
when the manufacturer allocates the investment amounts. Risk is affected by variability of
returns from suppliers and the amounts invested.
We minimize this objective function:

𝑉𝑎𝑟

𝑥𝑅

=

𝑥 𝑥σ =

1
𝑇

𝑟 −𝑟 𝑥

Subject to these constraints:
budget constraint

𝑥 = 𝑋,

return expectation constraint

𝑟 𝑥 ≥ ρ𝑋
𝑙 ≤𝑥 ≤μ ,

manufacturer investment
constraint

∀𝑗 = 1~𝑛

Where j is the jth supplier;
n the total number of suppliers;
xj is the amount the manufacturer invests in supplier j;
X is the total budget;
μj is the maximum amount that can be invested in supplier j;
lj is the minimum amount that needs to be invested in supplier j;
Rj is the random variable representing “rate of return” from investing in supplier j;
ρ is the minimum overall expected rate of return required by manufacturer.

3.4 Proposed Nonlinear Return Model
Zhang and Zhu (2012) updated/replaced the above manufacturer cooperation model with a
nonlinear return model and applied it to the auto industry. Talluri’s model assumes that the
return of investment to a supplier is proportional to the investment. In fact, in most
situations the return is nonlinear. For example, to improve the quality of products, a new
technique should be used or new equipment with high performance should be purchased.
This study extends the work by Talluri et al. (2010) by developing a new investment
scheme and examining how Markowitz’s model can be used to help firms optimally
allocate resources under nonlinear returns and then comparing the results to the linear case.
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One example where the return rj and the investment xj follows a nonlinear relationship is
shown below in Figure 3.2 (Zhang, 2010):

Figure 3.2. A nonlinear relationship between investment xj and return rj

3.4.1 The SMMS Model
First, we extended Talluri’s SMMS model to replace the linear relationship with a nonlinear relationship between the return rate rj and the investment xj to. The goal of the
manufacturer is to allocate investment amounts so that a target return is achieved at
minimum risk. The risk is affected by the variability of returns from suppliers and amounts
invested. The objective function is to minimize the variance of the supplier development
investment portfolio:
𝑉𝑎𝑟

𝑥𝑅

(3.1)

Subject to:
𝑥 =𝑋

(3.2)

𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 𝜌𝑋

(3.3)

𝑥 ≥𝑟 𝑦

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(3.4)

𝑥 ≤𝑟 𝑦

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(3.5)
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𝑦 =

1,
0,

(3.6)

∀𝑗

𝑦 =1

if investor 𝑗 invests in level 𝑖
otherwise

(3.7)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

𝑥 =𝑥

∀𝑗

(3.8)

𝑙 ≤𝑥 ≤μ

∀𝑗

(3.9)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(3.10)

𝑥 ,𝑥 ≥ 0
Where R is the return rate;

X is the total available budget for the next period;
i is the ith investment level;
ρ is the average return from n suppliers;
𝑟 is the return lower limit;
𝑟 is the return upper limit;
𝑦 = 1 if supplier j invests ith level, 𝑦 = 0 otherwie

To evaluate the objective function, (as Talluri et al. 2010, page 168), we have:

Var

𝑥𝑅

= (1/𝑇)

𝐸 𝑥

= (1/𝑇)

𝑟

−𝑟 𝑥

(3.11)

where

𝐸 =

𝐸 𝑥 =

𝑦 (𝑟

𝑦 (𝑟

(3.12)

−𝑟 )

−𝑟 )

𝑥

=

[𝑦 (𝑟

− 𝑟 ) + 𝑦 (𝑟

− 𝑟 )][𝑥

=

[𝑥 (𝑟

− 𝑟 ) + 𝑥 (𝑟

− 𝑟 )]

+𝑥 ]

(3.13)
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3.4.2 The TMMS Model
Secondly, we apply a non-linear relationship between return rate r j and investment xj to
Talluri’s TMMS model.
We assume cooperation, and that the return rate depends on the sum of investment of two
manufacturers. We wish to minimize

Var

𝑥𝑅 +

(3.14)

𝑥𝑅

Subject to:
𝑥 =𝑋

(3.15)

𝑥 = 𝑋′

(3.16)

𝑟 (𝑥 + 𝑥 ′ ) ≥ 𝜌𝑋

(3.17)

Manufacturer1
Investment portfolio

x1

Supplier 1

Supplier 2

x2

x1’

Manufacturer 1

𝑥𝑅

Manufacturer 2

𝑥𝑅

x’2
x3

Supplier 3

x3’
x4

x4’

Supplier 4

…

Manufacturer2
Investment portfolio

xj: amount manufacturer invests in supplier j;
x’j: amount manufacturer 2 invests in supplier j;
Rj: return rate from investing in supplier j from M1;
R’j: return rate from investing in supplier j from M2
Figure 3.3. TMMS model (Talluri et al, 2010)
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𝑟 ′ (𝑥 + 𝑥 ′ ) ≥ 𝜌′𝑋′

max 𝑟 , 𝑟

(3.18)

(3.19)

≥ max[𝜌, 𝜌 ] (𝑋 + 𝑋 )

𝑥 +𝑥

𝑥 + 𝑥′ ≥ 𝑟 𝑦

(3.20)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

Constraint (3.20) is used in the single manufacturer case. In the two-manufacturer case, it
becomes (3.21)
(3.21)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

𝑥 +𝑥 ≥𝑟 𝑦 +𝑦
𝑥 + 𝑥′ ≤ 𝑟 𝑦

(3.22)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

Constraint (3.22) is used in the single manufacturer case. In the two-manufacturer case, it
becomes (3.23)
𝑥 +𝑥 ≤𝑟

(3.23)

∀𝑖, 𝑗

𝑦 +𝑦

𝑦 =1

∀𝑖

(3.24)

𝑥 =𝑥

∀𝑗

(3.25)

𝑥′ = 𝑥′
𝑙 ≤𝑥 ≤𝜇
𝑙 ′ ≤ 𝑥 ′ ≤ 𝜇′

∀𝑗

(3.26)

∀𝑗

(3.27)
(3.28)

∀𝑗

𝑥 ,𝑥 ≥ 0

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(3.29)

𝑦 = {0,1}

∀𝑖, 𝑗

(3.30)

To evaluate the objective function, (as Talluri et al. 2010, page 168), we have:

𝑉𝑎𝑟

𝑥𝑅

=

1
𝑇

𝐸 𝑥 +

𝐸 𝑥

=

1
𝑇

𝑥 +

𝑟′ − 𝑟

𝑥
(3.31)

since
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𝐸 =

𝑥

𝑟

−𝑟

and 𝐸 =

(3.32)

𝑥′ 𝑟′ − 𝑟′

3.5 Numerical Experiments and Results
We use the data from Talluri et al. (2010)’s paper for our numerical experiments.
Manufacturer 1’s historical return data in Table 3.2 are randomly generated from four
normal distributions, N(0.15, 0.0225), N(0.2,0.04), N(0.25, 0.0625), and N(0.3, 0.09), for
suppliers 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The average return for manufacturer 1 from the four
suppliers is ρ = 0.225. Manufacturer 1’s total investment budget is assumed to be X =
$100,000. The maximum investment limit for every supplier is $50,000.
Manufacturer 2’s historical return data in Table 3.3 are randomly generated for suppliers
1, 2, 3, and 4 with Normal distributions, N(0.2,0.04), N(0.25, 0.0625), and N(0.3, 0.09),
and N(0.35, 0.1225), respectively, with all coefficient of variation (CV) controlled at 1 (see
Table 3.3). Manufacturer 2’s budget is also assumed to be $100,000. The average return
for manufacturer 2 from the four suppliers is ρ = 0.275.
TABLE 3.2. MANUFACTURER 1’S EXPECTED RETURNS AND ACTUAL HISTORICAL RETURNS BY THE SUPPLIER
(SOURCE: TALLURI ET AL., 2010)
Actual returns

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

P6

P7

P8

P9

P10

rj

Supplier 1

0.1725

0.1248

0.1706

0.1882

0.1229

0.1482

0.1521

0.1380

0.1301

0.1295

0.1500

Supplier 2

0.2098

0.2053

0.2014

0.1815

0.2151

0.2140

0.2512

0.2611

0.2126

0.2586

0.2000

Supplier 3

0.1132

0.2169

0.2103

0.2438

0.2549

0.2655

0.2272

0.2059

0.2188

0.1846

0.2500

Supplier 4

0.2893

0.2385

0.2131

0.1262

0.2080

0.4015

0.3539

0.2041

0.2612

0.3659

0.3000

Unit: $/per dollar invested.
Expected return: rj.

TABLE 3.3: MANUFACTURER 2’S EXPECTED RETURNS AND ACTUAL HISTORICAL RETURNS BY THE SUPPLIER
(SOURCE: TALLURI ET AL., 2010)
Actual returns

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

P6

P7

P8

P9

P10

rj

Supplier 1

0.2301

0.1911

0.2237

0.2163

0.1606

0.2421

0.2283

0.1553

0.2783

0.2331

0.2000

Supplier 2

0.2578

0.3305

0.2412

0.2137

0.2860

0.3473

0.2654

0.2584

0.2522

0.2211

0.2500

Supplier 3

0.3918

0.2606

0.3446

0.3401

0.1493

0.3325

0.4027

0.1415

0.2428

0.2583

0.3000

Supplier 4

0.4882

0.3894

0.3991

0.5917

0.3724

0.3304

0.3304

0.1658

0.2380

0.3422

0.3500

Unit: $/per dollar invested.
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Manufacturer 2 is assumed to have the better capability in implementing supplier
development initiatives than manufacturer 1 for every candidate supplier.
In the following numerical experiment, we use a GAMS algorithm to model every case.
The experiment has two steps. In the first step, the linear return model, or Talluri’s original
model is studied to check if our GAMS algorithm is correct. In the second step, the
nonlinear return model, or our proposed model is studied. Then a comparison is made
between the results of both models.
3.5.1 Results for SMMS Case
Using GAMS on the model and the data from Table 3.2, we get the following SMMS
results in Figure 3.4 below


Linear return, which is the same as a result of the Talluri et al. (2010) paper. It
verifies our GAMS algorithm.

Figure 3.4. Supplier allocation vs overall expected return (ρ) with investment limits



Nonlinear return: both expected return 𝑟 and actual return rijt are multiplied by
[0.9, 1.0, 1.1]. Using GAMS to our proposed nonlinear return SMMS models, the
nonlinear returns are given in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5.
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TABLE 3.4 NONLINEAR RETURN INVESTMENT FOR SMMS.
Investment range

Nonlinear returns (multiplier)

Investment level

0 - 18788.0

0.9

1

18788.1 - 34608.1

1

2

34608.2 - 50000.0

1.1

3

TABLE 3.5 NONLINEAR RETURN SOLUTIONS FOR INVESTMENT IN SMMS CASE WITH Ρ = 0.27
Suppliers

Manufacturer's investment allocation

Investment level

S1

0

1

S2

34608.2

3

S3

27413.7

2

S4

37978.1

3

NLR-SMMS
expected & actual return change

60000

x1
x3

x2
x4

50000

$

40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0.15

0.17

0.19

0.21

0.23

0.25

0.27

ρ
Figure 3.5. Supplier allocation vs overall expected return (ρ) with investment limit and nonlinear return

Figure 3.4 and 3.5 show investments across the four suppliers at different levels of ρ when
investment is restricted to a maximum of $50,000 for each supplier. It is evident from
Figure 3.4 that at low levels of ρ the manufacturer needs to consider investing more in
suppliers 1 and 2 and to a lesser degree in suppliers 3 and 4. As the ρ value increases the
manufacturer must consider investing more in suppliers 3 and 4 and less in suppliers 1 and
2. The managerial implication is that when high overall expected return is risky to achieve
or is infeasible, the manufacturer may lower the expectation or adjust the investment
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allocation based on the analysis from Figure 3.4. Nonlinear return in Figure 3.5 has a
similar trend to linear return in Figure 3.4, but the performance is delayed for ρ. For
example, in linear return, when ρ = 0.15 ~ 0.18, supplier allocation is kept the same, while
in nonlinear, this happens when ρ = 0.15 ~ 0.19. In linear return, when ρ ≥ 0.23, supplier 1
gets 0 investment, while in the nonlinear case, this happens when ρ ≥ 0.25. When ρ = 0.27,
supplier allocation is more even in nonlinear return than linear return. It means that in high
overall expected return ρ situation, nonlinear return solution is less risky than that of linear
return.
3.5.2 Results for TMMS Case
Using GAMS on our proposed nonlinear return TMMS models, one example of the
nonlinear solutions for investment is given in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7.
TABLE 3.6 NONLINEAR RETURN INVESTMENT FOR TMMS.

0-18788.0

Nonlinear returns
(multiplier)
0.9

1

18788.1- 34608.1

18788.1- 34608.1

1

2

34608.2-50000.0

34608.2-50000.0

1.1

3

M1 investment range

M2 investment range

0-18788.0

Investment level

TABLE 3.7 NONLINEAR RETURN SOLUTIONS FOR INVESTMENT IN TMMS CASE WITH Ρ = 0.29.
Suppliers

Manufacturer 1

Investment level

Manufacturer 2

Investment level

S1

0

0

34608.2

3

S2

49700.7

3

37036.8

3

S3

46844.9

3

2935.9

3

S4

3454.3

2

25419.1

2

From Table 3.6, we see that manufacturer 1 (M1) and manufacturer 2 (M2) have the same
investment range in a nonlinear return situation. Table 3.7 shows the nonlinear return
solutions for investment in TMMS case with ρ = 0.29.
Using GAMS on the models and the data from Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, both TMMS results
with linear and nonlinear return rates are shown in the following figures: Figure 3.7, Figure
3.8, and Figure 3.9 (corresponding to Fig.4, Fig. 5, Fig. 6 from the original paper).
In the original paper, Fig. 4 compares the case of cooperation and non-cooperation between
two manufacturers with the linear return.
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ρ
Figure 3.7a. (original Fig.4) with linear return Cooperation vs. non-cooperation: TEB/risk vs. ρ. (with linear
return)

The vertical axis is TEB/Risk. Where TEB is Total Expect Benefit, which can be obtained
from:
For manufacturer 1 with non-cooperation,

TEB = ∑

𝑟𝑥

For manufacturer 2 with non-cooperation,

TEB′ = ∑

𝑥′

For M1 and M2 with cooperation

TEB′′ = ∑

max[𝑟 , 𝑟 ′ ](𝑥 + 𝑥 ′ )

The Risk in formula TEB/Risk can be obtained from Risk = √Var for each case

The figure below shows the nonlinear return case:

Figure 3.7b. Cooperation vs. non-cooperation: TEB/risk vs. ρ. (with nonlinear return)
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Similarly, for nonlinear return, we have:
For manufacturer 1 with non-cooperation,

TEB = ∑

∑

𝑟 𝑥

(3.33)

For manufacturer 2 with non-cooperation,

TEB′ = ∑

∑

𝑟 𝑥

(3.34)

For M1 and M2 with cooperation,
𝑇𝐸𝐵′′ = ∑

∑

max[𝑟 , 𝑟 ](𝑥 + 𝑥 )

(3.35)

Moreover, Risk = √Var for each case

Figure 3.7a compares the cases of cooperation and non-cooperation between the two
manufacturers. It is evident from this figure that when manufacturer 1’s expectations of
returns increase while manufacturer 2’s is held constant at 0.275, cooperating with
manufacturer 2 is always beneficial to manufacturer 1 because the TEB/risk ratio is higher.
High TEB to risk ratio indicates high benefit per unit of risk, which is preferred by
manufacturers.
The results with the linear return are the same as the results from the Talluri et al. (2010)
paper. It verifies our GAMS algorithm for TMMS model. Nonlinear return in Figure 3.7b
has a similar trend to the linear return in Figure 3.7a.
In the original paper, Fig.5 examined the impact of various levels of expected returns on
the TEB/Risk ratio from manufacturer 1’s perspective. The current expected returns for
manufacturer 2 are (0.2, 0.25, 0.3, and 0.35). The expected return (ER) ratio indicates an
increase or decrease of expected returns from these base level values at which the ER ratio
is 1. The actual performance data listed in Table 1 and Table 2 is left unchanged when
varying the ER ratio. Manufacturer 2’s ER ratio was varied from 0.8 to 1.5 while
manufacturer 1’s ER ratio was set at 1.0 and ρ at 0.225. Using GAMS to model, we get the
following TMMS results for Figure 3.8 corresponding to Fig. 5 in the original paper.
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Manufacturer 2 ER Ratio

Manufacturer 2 ER Ratio

a. (original Fig.5) with linear return

b. with nonlinear return

Figure 3.8. Cooperation vs. non- cooperation for manufacturer 1: TEB/risk vs. manufacturer 2 ER ratio.
(corresponding to Fig. 5 in the original paper)

From Figure 3.8, we can see that it is not always beneficial for manufacturer 1 to cooperate
with the manufacturer 2. When the ER ratio of manufacturer 2 is ≥ 1.35 (original paper
1.42), or ≤ 0.89 (original paper 0.92) manufacturer 1 should choose to not cooperate with
manufacturer 2, because manufacturer 2 is relatively under-performing when compared to
their expectations. In other words, in the linear return case, only if the manufacturer 2 ER
ratio is from 0.89 to 1.35, should manufacturer 1 choose to cooperate with manufacturer 2.
In the nonlinear return case, the cooperation region is smaller, which is from 0.94 to 1.28.
Figure 3.9 provided similar analysis and strategies that must be pursued by manufacturer
2. In this case, manufacturer 1’s ER ratio varied from 0.8 to 1.5, while manufacturer 2’s
ER ratio was set at 1 and ρ at 0.275. The actual performance data listed in Table 1 and
Table 2 is left unchanged when varying M1’s ER ratio. Using GAMS to model, we get the
following TMMS results for Figure 3.9.
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a. (original Fig.6) with linear return

b. with nonlinear return

Figure 3.9. Cooperation vs. non- cooperation for manufacturer 2: TEB/risk vs. manufacturer 1 ER ratio.
(corresponding to Fig. 6 in the original paper)

Figure 3.9 shows that when manufacturer 2 is a better-performing manufacturer,
manufacturer 2 is likely to benefit from cooperating with manufacturer 1, unless
manufacturer 1 is highly under-performing or over-performing. The results in Figure 3.9a
(linear return) and Figure 3.9b (nonlinear return) show TEB/risk in the nonlinear situation
is larger than that in a linear situation.
3.6 Summary
Since the automotive supply chain has multiple layers and is a complex network, the
relationship between supply chain members is very important for risk management.
Automotive OEMs often invest heavily in supplier development to assist suppliers, which
have resulted in quality improvement and cost reduction. However, there is a risk for the
manufacturer to implement supplier development. Manufacturers need to allocate the
investment optimally among multiple suppliers to minimize risk while maintaining an
acceptable level of return. Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model to manufacturer
cooperation in supplier development under risk. Talluri’s model assumes that the return of
investment from the supplier is proportional to the investment. Actually, in most situations
the return is nonlinear. We revised the above manufacturer cooperation model with
nonlinear returns and applied it to the automotive industry. The non-linear relationship
between the return rj and investment xj is closer to a real situation. Using the same data in
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Talluri’s study and GAMS program, we did a numerical experiment for our nonlinear
return model. The revised nonlinear return models were subject to the same analyses as
Talluri’s model, such as, investigate the SMMS and TMMS cases, study the collaborative
supplier development, and identify if cooperation or non-cooperation are beneficial for
manufacturers. Also, we compared the results of the numerical experiment for the linear
model and the nonlinear model. The numerical experiments show that non-linear retunes
algorithm has better results than linear return, such as less risk in high return situation for
SMMS and higher TEB/risk in TMMS.
The nonlinear model can be applied to auto OEMs to decide how to optimally allocate their
supplier development investments among multiple suppliers to minimize risk while
maintaining an acceptable level of return and corporate profitability. It also provides a
novel method to assess the benefits of cooperating with other firms in supplier development
efforts. Future work includes the application of the non-linear return supplier development
model to the automotive industry, such as more suppliers (30 ~ 100), and more total
investment amount.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMAL CONTRACT FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT WITH RISK
CONSIDERATION (PENALTY AND COMPENSATION)
4.1 Introduction
Automotive supply chains are complex due to the large number of parts assembled into an
automobile, the multiple layers of suppliers to supply those parts, and the coordination of
materials, information, and financial flows across the supply chain. There are many types
of supply chain risks in the automotive industry. As a common ex-ante strategy in risk
management, supply chain contracts play an important role for supply chain members, such
as OEMs and suppliers, when coordinating and sharing the risks that arise from various
sources of uncertainty, including demand, price, and product quality.
Automotive product development has a long lead time from concept design to launch that
requires more than 30 months as shown in Figure 4.1 (Hill, 2007) below.

Figure 4.1. The automotive product development timeline (Source: Center for automotive research)

There are many uncertainties and risks during the product development time frame (Zhu
and Zhang, 2017). First, new product development necessitates significant investments
from both OEMs and suppliers. For example, the suppliers of innovative parts need to build
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new factories or assembly lines. However, the demand forecast for a new or innovative
product, such as an electric car, is highly inaccurate due to the long lead time and
uncertainty of customer’s preference for the new products. Thus, deciding upon a suitable
production capacity for a new facility is challenging for both the manufacturer and supplier.
This process involves a large investment, some workers, and facility/equipment building.
It is of interest for both the manufacturer and the supplier to engage in a collaborative effort
to reduce the risk. It is common practice that both partners sign a contract after the supplier
is selected to provide the new parts (Asian and Nie, 2014). However, there is limited
research on the capacity decision for product development with risk consideration in such
kind of contracts, especially for the automotive industry (Zhang, 2015, Zhu and Zhang,
2017).
This study is based on a real case in the automotive industry. An OEM plans to develop a
new vehicle model, namely an electric vehicle (EV). The demand is still highly uncertain,
even though the various forecasting methods are utilized to estimate the demand for this
new vehicle model. There are many new and innovative components and sub-systems
required for a new EV, and the rechargeable battery pack is one of the most expensive and
investment intensive sub-systems. The total investment for developing the battery pack
and establishing its production capacity is in the range of multi-millions of dollars. The
battery pack supply contract signed between OEM and supplier normally sets up a planned
annual volume based on the uncertain demand forecast. Thus, the OEM and the supplier
need to decide a suitable capacity for the new battery pack production lines collaboratively
for two reasons: to reduce the risk of over-capacity or under-capacity, and to maximize the
profits for both sides.
The objective of the research in this chapter is to design a supply contract when developing
a new product in order to reduce the risks and maximize profits under uncertain demands.
To reduce the risks and maximize their profits, this study investigates how to decide the
supplier’s capacity and the manufacturer’s order in the supply contract when the demand
of the new product is highly uncertain. Based on the newsvendor model and Stackelberg
game theory, we developed a mathematical model for the product development contract
where both demand uncertainty and compensation are considered. The analytical solution
for the demand situation for uniform distribution is developed, and computational tests are
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also reported. The proposed solution provides an effective tool for supplier-manufacturer
contracts when the manufacturer faces highly uncertain demand.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: a literature review is presented in
section 4.2; a proposed model based on Newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory
is developed in section 4.3; the constraint optimization is discussed in section 4.4; lastly,
concluding remarks including a summary of the main results and some future work
direction is given in section 4.5. Proofs of all propositions appear in section 4.6
Appendix.
4.2 Literature Review
Automotive supply chains are multi-layered and complex networks. Supply chain contracts
are used to coordinate supply chain members, OEMs and suppliers, in order to make their
interests align with that of the supply chain system and to achieve optimal supply chain
efficiency. Supply chain contracts also play an important role because they allow supply
chain members to share risks arising from various sources of uncertainty, such as demand,
price, and product quality. There are many studies on supply contracts under uncertainty
(Chen et al. 2014, and Ghadge et al. 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, there
is limited research on optimal contract design specifically for product development in the
automotive industry.
In the following paragraphs, we will review the available papers related to the keywords
“contract, demand uncertainty, product development” from Scopus in the period from 2001
to 2018.
Erkoyuncu et al. (2011) conducted a literature review and found that the current research
did not consider cost uncertainty for an industrial product–service system. They analyzed
the drivers of uncertainty, factors of the sustainability of a contract and the activities
dealing with service delivery. They reviewed suitable methods for considering service
uncertainty in cost estimation and proposed to substitute the traditional probability theory
with Fuzzy set theory, taking advantage of its capability to assign probabilities to
ambiguous events or vague knowledge, which suits whole life cycle applications.
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Liu and Özer (2010) studied channel incentives in sharing new product demand
information, which is often highly uncertain, as well as robust contracts. Distribution
channels with a manufacturer and a retailer are considered in their paper. The authors
investigated the impact of improved demand information for centralized and decentralized
channels and modeled both channels using the newsvendor model. They found that the
manufacturer's incentive to share its improved demand information depends on the supply
contract signed with the retailer. Furthermore, mandating the manufacturer to disclose its
improved demand information can reduce the total channel profit. Three types of widely
used contract forms, price-only contracts, quantity flexibility contracts, and buyback
contracts, are analyzed for their robustness under an unanticipated demand information
update observed by the manufacturer. The results show that the quantity flexibility contract
with a high return rate is not robust. The buyback contract is robust and always achieves
information sharing while preserving channel performance.
Kim and Netessine (2013) investigated collaborative cost reduction and component
procurement by manufacturers and suppliers during the development of an innovative
product under information asymmetry. They focused on two stages: the product
development stage and the production stage. A game-theoretic model was developed to
capture the incentive dynamics that arise when a manufacturer and a supplier exert
collaborative efforts to reduce the unit cost of a critical component; however, the supplier
may be unwilling to share its private cost information. They investigated how information
asymmetry and procurement contracting strategies interact to influence the supply chain
parties' incentives to collaborate. The main model is to maximize profit. The authors
considered different procurement contracting strategies and identified the expected margin
commitment (EMC) as a simple and effective strategy to promote collaboration.
Reimann and Schiltknecht (2009) studied the interdependence of contractual and
operational flexibilities from a manufacturers' point of view. Manufacturers in the market
of specialty chemicals are exposed to high uncertainty and financial risk since their
customers are granted a large degree of freedom concerning demand quantity and time. To
deal with changing customer requirements, manufacturers can exploit their operational
flexibility, i.e., the capability to adapt planning and production or place emphasis on the
contractual flexibility represented by the capability to select the product portfolio or the
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possibility proactively to obtain the advance demand information from customers. The
authors used a two-stage stochastic program based on the newsvendor concept to quantify
the effect of this contractual flexibility and relate it to the manufacturing flexibility
concerning capacity allocation. The first stage occurs before the reveal-date where besides
the demand distribution no precise information is available, and the second stage occurs
after the reveal-date when the required amount of the product is known. To maximize the
manufacturer’s expected profit, they combined the two-stage models into a stochastic
mixed integer linear programming framework. Through the valuation of these flexibilities
and a case study, the paper provides the first insights for the manufacturer about which
customer requests to accept, how to set up the associated contracts with the customers and
how to allocate capacity for a given portfolio of products.
Chen et al. (2014) researched stable and coordinating contracts for a decentralized supply
chain with a single retailer and multiple suppliers where the agents are risk-averse. CVaR
is used as the objective function for each agent to capture the behavior of managerial
decision making better. The Pareto optimality concept, which is equivalent to maximizing
the sum of objectives of all agents, was used to solve supply chain optimality. They showed
that the supply chain is coordinated only when the least risk-averse agent bears the entire
risk and the lowest-cost supplier handles all production. Coordinating contracts allow
flexible objective sharing among all the agents, but competition makes certain contracts
unstable. The concepts of contract core and contract equilibrium were introduced to study
the stability of the coordinating contract. Contract core reflects the agents’ “bargaining
power” and restricts the set of coordinating contracts to a subset which is “credible,” while
contract equilibrium helps to characterize contracts that are immune to opportunistic
renegotiation. Their research showed that the contract core concept imposes conditions on
the share of profit among different agents, and the contract equilibrium concept imposes
conditions on how the payment changes with the order quantity.
Asian and Nie (2014) studied coordination in supply chains with uncertain demand and
disruption risks using supply contracts. A supply chain problem is investigated where a
buyer sources a short life-cycle product from two suppliers: a cheap but unreliable main
supplier and a perfectly reliable but expensive backup supplier. The buyer wants to sign an
option contract with the backup supplier to remedy supply and demand uncertainty. To
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improve supply chain coordination, the option contract is reconstructed for optimization
problems, which is modeled with the newsvendor concept. Results revealed under demand
uncertainty and supply disruptions, the proposed mechanism led the backup supplier to
choose an underproduction policy and provided an insight on the effectiveness of contractbased mitigation strategies that enable firms to ensure responsive backup capacity. The
idea of win-win coordination under demand uncertainty is analogous to our research, but
the life-cycle and development phase in the automotive industry are quite different from
the industry in Asian and Nie (2014). Therefore, the supply chain structures are quite
different.
The above contract optimization papers are not directly related to the automotive industry,
however. We searched for further literature using the keywords “automotive supply
chain/logistics risk management”, and found the following papers related to contracts in
the automotive industry.
In order to understand the buyer-supplier power and their dependence, Ghadge et al. (2017)
developed a supply chain risk-sharing contract in a globalized business environment. The
authors conducted an automotive case study with demand uncertainty and price volatility
risks. The objective function is to minimize total purchase cost for the buyer and to
maximize the commitment quantity for the supplier. To reflect the possible leverages
involved in the decision-making, multiple buyer-supplier power and dependence scenarios
are considered. Their risk-sharing contract model provides a relational perspective on the
dynamics of supply chain design and collaboration which also potentially contributes a
novel perspective on current theory in buyer-supplier power and dependence. Comparing
with our research, their supplier’s objective function and modeling methodology are quite
different.
Selviaridis and Norrman (2014) studied Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) in service
supply chains based on agency theory. The authors studied two cases of logistics service
supply chains, one of which is in the automotive industry, and collected data through semistructured interviews with 30 managers of providers and sub-contractors and reviewed 35
documents especially including contracts and target letters. The paper identified the factors
that influence the provider’s willingness to bear the financial risk induced by PBC in
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service supply chains. The authors’ research methodology is different from ours, as they
focus on performance contract based on agency theory and use a qualitative method.
Swinney and Netessine (2009) investigated the issues of contracting with suppliers prone
to default, since it has become an increasingly common problem, particularly in automotive
manufacturing. Game theory was applied to model a two-period contracting game with two
identical suppliers, a single buyer, deterministic demand, and uncertain production
costs. They found that the buyer prefers short-term contracts when a supplier’s failure is
not possible or, on the other hand, the buyer prefers long-term contracts when a supplier’s
failure is possible. They also found that dynamic long-term contracts allow the buyer to
coordinate the supply chain in the presence of default risk. The authors concluded that the
possibility of supplier default offers a new reason to prefer long-term contracts over shortterm contracts. Their research differs from our research, as they focus on contracting with
suppliers prone to default rather than finding the buyer’s optimal order and supplier’s
optimal production capacity under demand uncertainty.
Yang et al. (2017) researched capacity investment strategy under cost sharing contracts for
various industries including the automotive industry. Two capacity sharing contracts were
proposed: the full capacity cost sharing contract (FCCSC) and the partial capacity cost
sharing contract (PCCSC). In FCCSC, a retailer shares an agreed upon percentage of the
capacity cost with the manufacturer. In contrast, a retailer shares capacity cost in PCCSC
only when the manufacturer's capacity level exceeds a certain threshold. Their research
found that the retailer would share more cost but a lower capacity in PCCSC than that in
FCCSC. They also found the threshold of capacity level would decide the choices of
FCCSC or PCCSC by the retailer and manufacturer, and only in a certain interval would
both players choose the PCCSC.
Table 4.1 summarizes our literature review on the topic of supply chain contracts.
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TABLE 4.1 LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY.
Authors

Subject

Erkoyuncu
et al. (2011)

Understanding
service
uncertainties in
industrial
product–service
system cost
estimation
Performancebased
contracting in
service supply
chains: A service
provider risk
perspective

Selviaridis
and
Norrman
(2014)

Supply Chain
Structure
Product–service
system (PSS),
service supply
chain

Model
Literature review

PerformanceBased
Contracting
(PBC) in service
supply chains

Data were
collected through
semi-structured
interviews with
30 managers and
review of 35
documents.
Risk sharing
contract model.
The objective
function is to
minimize total
purchase cost for
the buyer and
maximize the
commitment
quantity for the
supplier
Convex ordering
and
Newsvendor
model.
Expected
channel profit in
the centralized
channel;
The retailer's
optimal order
quantity, its
expected profit,
and the
manufacturer's
profit in the
decentralized
channel.

Ghadge et
al. (2017)

Using risk
sharing contracts
for supply chain
risk mitigation:
A buyer-supplier
power and
dependence
perspective.

Multiple buyersupplier power
and dependence
scenarios

Liu and
Özer (2010)

Channel
incentives in
sharing new
product demand
information and
robust contracts

A distribution
channel with a
manufacturer
and a retailer
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Solution
Approach
Fishbone
diagram,
diagrams, tables

Autospecific

Identified the
factors that
influence the
provider
willingness to
bear the financial
risk induced by
PBC
Integer
programming
model

Yes

Three widely
used contract
forms: price-only
contracts,
quantity
flexibility
contracts, and
buyback
contracts are
analyzed in the
decentralized
channel.
Mathematical
proof, numerical
experiments

No

No

Yes

Kim and
Netessine
(2013)

Collaborative
cost reduction
and component
procurement
under
information
asymmetry

a manufacturer
and a supplier

Game –theoretic
model with an
objective
function
constraint
functions

Swinney and
Netessine
(2009)

Long-term
contracts under
the threat of
supplier default

A two-period
contracting game
with two
identical
suppliers, a
single buyer,
deterministic
demand, and
uncertain
production costs

Reimann
and
Schiltknecht
(2009)

The
interdependence
of contractual
and operational
flexibilities in
the market of
specialty
chemicals

A manufacturer
who can process
multiple
products, and
multiple
customers with
different
demands

Chen et al.
(2014)

Stable and
Coordinating
Contracts for a
Supply Chain
with Multiple
Risk-Averse
Suppliers

multiple
suppliers,
single retailer
with uncertain
demand. All
agents are riskaverse

Game theory;
A benchmark
model without
failure; shortterm contracts,
long-term
contracts, and
dynamic
contracts under
the threat of
supplier default
Two stage
stochastic
program based
on the
newsvendor
concept. The
objective is to
maximize the
expected profit
with respect to
the probability
distribution of
demands, subject
to several
constraints.
Modeled
flexibility
CVaR objective
function
for both retailer
and suppliers as
a risk measure

Asian and
Nie (2014)

Coordination in
supply chains
with uncertain
demand and
disruption risks:
Existence,
analysis, and
insights

A buyer who
sources a short
life-cycle from
two suppliers, a
cheap but
unreliable main
supplier and a
reliable but
expensive
backup supplier
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Centralized
Benchmark
Model,
Decentralized
Benchmark
Model,
the option
contract,
win-win
coordination
mechanism

Expected margin
commitment
(EMC),
screening
contract.
Mathematical
proof,
numerical
experiments
Mathematical
proof. Concluded
that the
possibility of
supplier default
offers a new
reason to prefer
long-term
contracts over
short-term
contracts
The model is
transferred to
stochastic mixed
integer linear
program.
Numerical
analysis,
case study

No

Newsvendor
Pareto optimality
Mathematical
proof

No

Newsvendor,
theorem,
computational
results, and
analysis

No

Yes

Yes

In summary, contracts for product development under demand uncertainty can be modeled
using game theory, newsvendor, and stochastic theory. Supply chains include a
manufacturer with one or more upstream members and one or more downstream members.
The objective functions are usually to maximize the expected profit of the entire supply
chain or separate supply chain members. Uncertain demand can be modeled by the
probability distribution of demands with known mean and variation or known probability
density 𝑓 and cumulative density function 𝐹 . The models can be solved by mathematical
proof, stochastic mixed integer program, and numerical analysis in a case study. The works
listed in Table 4.1 dealt with different kinds of supply chains and supply chain contracts in
several industries: short-cycle product supply chains (Asian and Nie 2014), service supply
chains (Erkoyuncu et al. 2011, Selviaridis and Norrman 2014), and supply chains in the
chemical industry (Reimann and Schiltknecht 2009). Very few research dealt with supply
chain contract models in the automotive industry. Swinney and Netessine (2009) studied
long-term contracts under the threat of supplier default for auto industry supply chains, but
this is out of the scope of our research. Limited research exists in contract modeling
considering characteristics of the automotive industry, especially for how to decide a
suitable production capacity of a new facility, which is a challenging problem faced by
both the manufacturers and the suppliers. The purpose of our research is to try to fill the
research gap to meet the demand of automotive industry supply chain risk management.
Our research mainly focuses on contract models for new product development with
uncertain demand in the automotive industry, to reduce the risk of over-capacity or undercapacity and also to maximize the profits for both manufacturers and suppliers.
Zhang (2015) formulated the first mathematical model for this problem but does not
provide a solution nor numerical analysis. This work verifies the model, provides a solution
approach and conducts numerical analysis. This chapter will focus on optimal production
development for new products in the automotive industry for which the demand is
uncertain.
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4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Problem Statement
As mentioned previously, this study is motivated by a real case in the automotive industry.
This problem also exists in many similar manufacturing situations, and can be stated as
follows.
Consider a two-stage supply chain that consists of one supplier and one manufacturer.
Generally, the manufacturer forecasts the yearly demand of the new product, most of which
is the planned order quantity, denoted as O, then shares this information with the supplier.
Because the auto industry uses a make-to-order policy, the actual order quantity, denoted
q, may be far different from the planned order quantity, depending on the realized demand.
Considering the demand uncertainty, the supplier then needs to decide the capacity Q
according to order O. As a part of the procurement contract; the manufacturer can claim
compensation or penalty to prevent the profit loss caused by the supplier’s delivery
shortage.
The problem here is to determine the following two variables to reach an optimal contract
under demand uncertainty:


For the supplier: the number of units the supplier can produce, i.e., the capacity of
the part Q



For the manufacturer: the planned yearly order quantity O (as a reference for the
capacity)
4.3.2 Assumptions

Based on the real-world problem in the auto industry, we have the following assumptions:


The demand for the finished product is uncertain but the distribution of the demand
can be estimated. Our model is independent of the distribution functions.



The information about the demand and capacity is shared between the supplier and
OEM.



The supplier needs to invest heavily to develop the production process to produce
the component; building the facility with the designed capacity takes a long time.
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There is a penalty if the supplier cannot supply the amount of the component in the
contract.



There is a compensation if the supplier can supply 20% above the contract amount
if the actual demand is higher than expected (according to an automotive OEM
supply chain expert).
4.3.3 Model Structure and Notations

We formulate the single period make–to-order supply chain contract consisting of a
supplier and a manufacturer with demand uncertainty by using a Newsvendor model and
Stackelberg game theory. The newsvendor model is a classical mathematical model in
operations management and applied economics, used to determine optimal inventory levels
under demand uncertainty. It is characterized by fixed prices and uncertain demand for a
(perishable) product. We applied the newsvendor model to determine the supplier’s
optimal capacity and the manufacturer’s optimal order.
The Stackelberg game is a strategic game in which the leader moves first and then the
follower moves sequentially, and they compete on quantity. The Stackelberg game can be
applied in economics to consider the idea of a “Stackelberg equilibrium” in a duopoly
(Stackelberg, 2011). The Stackelberg model can be solved to find the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, i.e. the strategy profile that serves each player best, given the strategies
of the other player; this means every player plays in a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
The Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game involving two or
more players in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the
other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only their own strategy
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). In the Stackelberg game, backward induction is used to
calculate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, i.e. we must first calculate the best
response functions of the follower then consider the best response function of the leader
[1][2], (Stackelberg, 2011, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993).
Applying the Stackelberg game to our study, the manufacturer as the leader decides yearly
order quantity O, then the supplier as the follower determines its production capacity Q
according to the order O. In Stackelberg games, each player makes its own decision, to
maximize its individual profit or minimize the cost. In our model, the manufacturer’s
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objective is to minimize the total cost related to that component that satisfies the demand,
and the supplier tries to maximize the profit. We have these objective functions:
 Maximize the supplier’s expected profit
 Minimize the manufacturer’s expected cost
For any given order from the manufacturer, the supplier has two options regarding its
capacity: Q ≤ O, or Q > O. If the demand greatly exceeds expectations, i.e. the demand >
1.2O and the supplier can provide this extra quantity, it receives a compensation. Thus, it
has two sub-options for Q > O. Similarly, there are two options for Q ≤ O. The structure of
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is given in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2. The structure of the Stackelberg model for the contract

Based on backward induction for determining the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we
first calculate the supplier’s response for each of the manufacturer’s sub-options, and then
find the best response for each option; next we compare the supplier’s response for each
option to find the overall best response. However, it may be difficult to compare the
performance of each option (or sub-option) because the performances depend on the
parameters and distributions. Thus, we can compare the performances based on given
demand distribution and given parameters.
Notations
The notation used in our model is shown below:
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Parameters
D

Annual demand of the product at OEM

cs

Supplier's unit variable cost, including raw materials, purchased components,
labour cost, variable overhead cost and transportation

c0

Supplier’s unit fixed cost invested in equipment maintenance, supervisory costs
and insurance and plant administration

csb

Supplier’s fixed cost for equipment at the beginning of development

g0

Manufacturer’s unit fixed cost invested for the equipment

gb

Manufacturer’s fixed cost for equipment at the beginning of development

p

Unit price of the component the manufacturer pays to the supplier

T

Planning horizon, t =1,2, …, T, in this model T = 1

h1

Unit compensating cost that manufacturer pays to supplier, if O >> Dt

e1

Unit penalty that supplier pays to manufacturer, if Q < O and Dt > Q

s1

Unit shortage cost of manufacturer if Dt > Q

m1

Unit high production compensation M pays to S, if Q > O and Dt > 1.2O

cm

Manufacturer's unit variable cost, including labor cost and transportation

π

Supplier’s profit

Decision Variables
O

The manufacturer's planned yearly order quantity, as a reference for the supplier's
capacity

Q

The number of units the supplier can produce, i.e., the capacity of the component
4.3.4 The Supplier’s Objective Function

The objective function of the suppler is to maximize the its expected profit. For a given
demand, the supplier’s profit can be formulated as follows:
Supplier’s profit = min (demand, production amount) × (unit price – variable cost)
– fixed cost – penalty + Compensation.
Before formulating the model, we introduce the related revenue and each cost component.
To simplify the written mathematics, we represent the demand D with x. Assume that the
demand is a continuous nonnegative random variable with density function f (x) and
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cumulative distribution function F(x). If Q ≤ x, all Q units are sold and a profit of Q(p-c)
results. On the other hand, if Q > x, only x units are sold and a profit of x(p-c) results.
The production cost of the supplier consists of two parts, variable cost cs and fixed cost
𝑐 (𝑄) : cs is the supplier's unit variable cost, including raw materials, purchased
components, labor cost, overhead cost and transportation; 𝑐 (𝑄) is the fixed cost of the
supplier invested for the equipment, which is related to the supplier’s production capacity.
The fixed investment cost is a yearly amount based on the total investment at the beginning
of development.
𝑐 (𝑄) = 𝑐

+𝑐 ×𝑄

Because the demand for the new product is highly uncertain, the actual demand is usually
different from the manufacturer’s planned order quantity. The supplier’s production
capacity depends on the manufacturer’s contracted order quantity. In practice, it is
acceptable for the supplier if the difference between the actual demand and the contracted
order quantity is less than 20%. However, the supplier may request some compensation
due to investment lost if the actual demand is much lower than the contracted order quantity
(more than 20%). The low demand compensation h(D, O, Q) is formulated as the
following:
ℎ(𝐷, 𝑂, 𝑄) = ℎ × (min(𝑂, 𝑄) − 𝐷 − 0.2 × min(𝑂, 𝑄)) = ℎ × (0.8 min(𝑂, 𝑄) − 𝐷)
On the other hand, the supplier may decide to build the facility with a smaller capacity than
the contracted order quantity from the OEM, which may result in paying the penalty e(Q,
O) where
𝑒(𝑄, 𝑂) = 𝑒 × (𝐷 − 𝑄)
Thus, we have the supplier’s profit
𝜋 = min(𝑄, 𝑥) × (𝑝 − 𝑐 ) − 𝑐 (𝑄) − 𝑒(𝑄, 𝑂) + ℎ(𝑥, 𝑂, 𝑄)
The supplier has two options (or strategies): set the capacity less than the contracted order
quantity, or set the capacity greater than the order quantity. Next, we will discuss the two
cases respectively.
Case 1: Q < O
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In this case, the supplier’s capacity is less than the contracted order quantity. Thus, the
supplier has the risk of paying the penalty if the demand is more than the capacity. On the
other hand, if the demand is far less than the capacity, the supplier will get the low demand
compensation h(D, O, Q) from the manufacturer, which is simplified below:
ℎ(𝐷, 𝑂, 𝑄) = ℎ × (0.8 min(𝑂, 𝑄) − 𝐷) = ℎ × (0.8𝑄 − 𝐷)

The supplier’s expected profit can then be formulated as follows:
𝐸(π) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)

− ∫ 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

(4.1)

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

As stated before, to calculate the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with backward
induction, we first calculate the follower’s (supplier’s) objective function to get their
optimal solution, then consider the leader’s (manufacturer’s) objective function.
To determine the value of Q that maximizes the supplier’s expected profit E(π), we apply
Leibniz’s rule to equation (4.1) (see appendix A). We get:
𝑑𝐸(𝜋)
= 𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑄) + (𝑝 − 𝑐 )[1 − 𝐹(𝑄)] − 𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑄) − 𝑐 + 𝑒 [𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑄)] + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
= −(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 )𝐹(𝑄) + 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄)

Setting

( )

= 0, we get the supplier’s optimal production capability Q*
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) =

𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄 ∗ )
𝑝−𝑐+𝑒
(4.2)

To verify the solution, we check the second derivative of E(𝝿). If

( )

≤ 0, the function

E(𝝿) has the max value in the optimal solution Q. Since
𝑑 𝐸(𝜋)
= −(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 )𝑓(𝑄) + 0.64ℎ 𝑓(0.8𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
(4.3)

It is difficult to check if the second derivative of E(𝝿) is negative at Q*. In Appendix A,
( )

we proved that in a uniform distribution,

≤ 0 is true. Thus, function (4.1) is

concave in uniform distribution and has the max value in the optimal solution Q*.
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It is noted that we require Q ≤ O, which is the constraint of Case 1. We will discuss the
constraint solution later.
To solve the manufacturer’s decision variable O, we assume the optimal solution is Q* =
R(O).
4.3.5 The Manufacturer’s Objective Function
The manufacturer’s objective is to minimize the expected cost (Zhang, 2015). The
manufacturer’s cost can be formulated as the follows.
Manufacturer’s cost = min (Demand, production amount) × (unit price + variable cost)
– fixed cost – penalty + Compensation + shortage cost
= (p + 𝑐 ) × min(Q, x) + g(O) – e(Q, O) + h(x, O, Q) + shortage cost
Where: g(O) = gb + g0*O which is the manufacturer’s fixed cost.

The manufacturer’s shortage cost is same to the supplier’s penalty cost (Nahmias, 2012,
pp. 269), except the distribution regions are different.
As we stated before, the supplier may have two options: Q < O or Q > O. Accordingly, the
manufacturer also has these 2 cases.
Case 1: Q ≤ O
In Case 1, the supplier’s capacity is less than the contracted order quantity. If the demand
is more than the capacity, the manufacturer may have the chance to get the penalty e(Q, O)
from the supplier, which reduces manufacturer’s cost. On the other hand, if the demand is
far less than the capacity, the manufacturer will pay the supplier low demand compensation
h(D, O, Q), which increases the manufacturer’s cost. The manufacturer’s expected cost can
be formulated as follows:
𝐸(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
− ∫ 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.4)

Based on the Stackelberg model procedure, we substitute the supplier’s optimal solution
Q* = R(O) to (4.4),
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𝐸(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) = ∫

( )

(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ ( )(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑅(𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + g + g · O

− ∫ ( ) 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑅(𝑂))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

( )

ℎ (0.8𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.5)

+ ∫ ( ) 𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

To determine the value of O that minimizes the manufacturer’s expected cost, we have
(

)

= 0. Apply Leibniz’s rule to equation (4.5), and we get the manufacturer’s

optimal order quantity O = O*, which is shown in Appendix B.
𝑅′(𝑂)(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠) + 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 )
+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) + 𝑔 = 0

(4.6)

4.3.6 Model of Case 2 Q > O
In Case 2, the supplier’s capacity is more than the contracted order quantity. The supplier
does not have a risk to pay the penalty e(Q, O) even if the demand is more than the capacity,
which means penalty e(Q, O) = 0. As it is in Case 1, if the demand is far less than the
capacity, the manufacturer will pay the supplier low demand compensation h(D, O, Q).
Since Q > O, low demand compensation becomes:
ℎ(𝐷, 𝑂, 𝑄) = ℎ × (0.8 min(𝑂, 𝑄) − 𝐷 ) = ℎ × (0.8𝑂 − 𝐷_𝑡)

On the other hand, we also need to consider high production compensation. According to
the assumptions, there is compensation if the supplier can supply 20% above the contract
amount when the actual demand is very high, which means when demand x > 1.2O and x
< Q, the manufacturer will give high production compensation to the supplier. In
emergency orders, some manufacturers pay three times more than the normal price for
emergency orders. High production compensation can be formulated by
𝑚(𝑂, 𝑄) =

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
.

where 𝑚 is high production compensation per unit.
Case 2 also has two different subcases. Case 2a: Q > 1.2O; and Case 2b: O < Q < 1.2O.
They are discussed separately as follows.


Case 2a: when Q > 1.2O
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In this situation, the supplier’s capacity is more than the contracted order quantity by at
least 20%. Thus the supplier may have chance to get the high production compensation, or
m(O, Q) > 0.
 The supplier’s objective functions for Case 2a is:
𝐸(π) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
+∫ .

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)
.

(4.7)

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

Using the same steps in Case 1, apply Leibniz’s rule to equation (4.7), set

( )

= 0, we

get the supplier’s optimal production capability Q*: (see Appendix A.)
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

1
[𝑐 − 𝑚 (𝑄 ∗ − 1.2𝑂) ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄 ∗ )]
𝑝−𝑐

(4.8)

Next, the second derivative is examined. (See Appendix A)
𝑑𝐸 (π)
= 𝑓(𝑄) ⋅ (𝑚 − 𝑝 + 𝑐 ) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝑓 ′ (𝑄)
𝑑𝑄

(4.9)

As proved in Appendix A, in uniform distribution U(a, b), and m1 satisfies m1 < p – cs =
p (1– cs /p), we have

( )

< 0, so E(𝝿) has the maximum value at Q*.

 For manufacturer in Case 2a.
If the manufacturer invests extra for more than O is assumed, manufacturer’s cost needs to
add the item of ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥.
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ .
+∫

.

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

(4.10)

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

Substitute Q = R(O) to (4.10) and apply Leibniz’s rule to it to determine the value of O that
minimizes the manufacturer’s expected profit E(cost),
𝑑𝐸(cost)
= (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)
𝑑𝑂
+ 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+ 𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )]
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(

set

)

= 0, the optimal solution O* is obtained from
(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

+ 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)

+𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )] = 0
(

)

(4.11)

will be examined later.

 Case 2b: when O < Q ≤ 1.2O
In this situation, supplier’s capacity is more than manufacturer’s order, but does not exceed
20%. According to the assumption, the manufacturer will not give the high production
compensation to the supplier. So m(O, Q) = 0.
 The supplier’s objective function is:
𝐸(π) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
+∫

.

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)

(4.12)

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

To determine the value of Q that maximizes the supplier’s expected profit E(π), we apply
( )

Leibniz’s rule to equation (4.12), and set

= 0 the supplier’s optimal production

capability Q* is
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

This result can also be found from (4.8) when setting m1 = 0. As shown in Appendix A, we
( )

always have

< 0 in Case 2b, so E(π) has a maximum at Q*.

From (4.13), we can see that Q* is a constant in Case 2b and it not related to O, which
means Q ≠ R(O). R’(O) = 0.
 The manufacturer’s objective function is:
𝐸(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
(4.14)

+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
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𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

To determine the value of O that minimizes the manufacturer’s expected cost, we apply
Leibniz’s rule to equation (4.12) and set
(

is no O solution to satisfy

)

(

)

= 0. But as shown in Appendix B, there

= 0. Actually,

(

)

> 0 in this case.

 Mathematically, since the first derivative is always > 0, and the target function is to
minimize the cost, the optimal solution is at the smallest O, i.e, O = 0. For Case 2b O
< Q ≤ 1.2O, boundary or constraint O = Q/1.2 is the smallest O.
So the optimal solution or Case 2b is a constraint solution:
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

O* = 1/1.2 ∙ Q*

(4.17)

This is a constraint optimization problem. We will discuss it in the next section.
4.4 Constraint Optimization
From above sections, the optimization solutions for subgame Case 1 Q < O and Case 2 Q
> O are developed. In some subcases there are no optimal solutions, such as Case 2b, in
which a boundary solution needs to be considered. In other cases, the solutions may not
satisfy the assumptions. The constraint optimization solutions are required to make the
subgame perfect, since the contract mathematic model is based on some constraints, such
as Q < O for Case 1, and Q > O for Case 2. To determine the subgame perfect equilibria,
the backward induction method is applied to solve the constraint optimization problem [2].
4.4.1 Case 1 Q < O
For Case 1, we assume Q < O. For any given parameters, assuming Q* = R(O), Q* and O*
can be calculated by the formula (4.2) and (4.6).
where
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) =

𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄 ∗ )
𝑝−𝑐+𝑒

𝑅′(𝑂)(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠) + 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 )
+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) + 𝑔 = 0
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(4.2)
(4.6)

Here demand distribution can be any type of distribution.
Checking the results Q* and O, if the result is not within the constraints Q < O, the
constraint solution is required to adjust the result.


If Q* > O*, let Q*= R(O) = O; which means R’(O) = 1,

Substituting them to formula (4.6), when Q*= O, the optimal O* is obtained from (4.18)
below:
(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠) + 𝐹(𝑂) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 ) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 = 0

(4.18)

Q*= O is the constraint solution if Q* > O in Case 1.
4.4.2 Case 2 Q > O
From Figure 4.2, Case 2 can be divided to 2 subcases: Case 2a Q > 1.2O, and Case 2b
O<Q ≤ 1.2O.
1) For Case 2a Q > 1.2O,
For any given parameters, assuming Q* = R(O), Q* and O*can be calculated by (4.8) and
(4.11) below.
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

1
[𝑐 − 𝑚 (𝑄∗ − 1.2𝑂) ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄 ∗ )]
𝑝−𝑐

(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

(4.8)

+ 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)

+𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )] = 0

(4.11)

Here the type of demand distribution is not specialized, which can be a uniform distribution
or a normal distribution.
The results Q* and O need to be checked to see if the result is within the constraints Q >
1.2O or not. If not, the solutions need to be adjusted to meet the constraints. That means:


If Q* > 1.2O*, Q* is a solution from formula (4.8) and (4.11).



If Q* < 1.2O* from (4.11), we take Q*= 1.2O+1 since it is concave, so formula (4.8)
and (4.11) is till the solution.

2) For Case 2b O<Q ≤ 1.2O,
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In this situation, 𝑚(𝑂, 𝑄) = 0, supplier’s expected profit becomes
𝐸(𝜋) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
+∫

.

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)

(4.12)

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

The supplier’s optimal solution from (4.12) is
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

Q* is not related to manufacturer’s production order, or Q*≠R(O). On the other hand,
according to (4.16), the manufacturer’s objective function has no valid solution. The
constraints are considered for the solution.


Constraint solution is: (from Q* to O)
𝑐
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −
𝑝−𝑐
O = 1/1.2 ∙ Q*

Based on the constraint solution, the profit of the supplier and cost to the manufacturer can
be calculated. The final solution can be determined by comparing the subcase results to get
the subgame perfect equilibria. Table 4.2 summarized supplier’s profit model E(𝝿),
manufacturer’s cost model E(cost), Leibniz’s rule application, and constraint optimization
solution for Case 1 and Case 2 and their subcases.
TABLE 4.2 SUMMARY OF SUPPLIER’S PROFIT, MANUFACTURER’S COST, LEIBNIZ’S RULE APPLICATION, AND
CONSTRAINT OPTIMIZATION SOLUTION FOR CASE 1 AND CASE 2 AND THEIR SUBCASES.

Case 1: Assume Q ≤ O
∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
S. E(π)

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)

− ∫ 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.1)

∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
M.E(cost)

− ∫ 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
(4.4)
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Leibniz's
( )

𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) =

=0

𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄∗ )
𝑝−𝑐+𝑒
(4.2)

Q =R(O)
Leibniz's
(

)

𝑅′(𝑂)(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠) + 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 )
+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) + 𝑔 = 0
(4.6)

=0

Case 1
Optimal

If Q ≤ O Q* form (4.2), O* from (4.6)

Solution
Case 1

If Q* > O, let Q*= R(O) = O*

Constraint

(4.18)

Solution

Case 2: Assume Q > O
Case 2a：Q ＞ 1.2 O

Case 2b：O < Q ≤1.2 O
𝑚(𝑂, 𝑄) = 0

𝑚(𝑂, 𝑄) ≠ 0
S.

∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

E(π)

+∫.

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 + ∫

.

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 −

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.7)

(4.12)

∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
M.

+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ .

E(cost)

+∫

.

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂) + ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄) + ∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

(4.14)

(4.10)
Leibniz's

𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

( )

1.2𝑂) 𝑓(𝑄 ∗ )]

=0

[𝑐 − 𝑚 (𝑄 ∗ −

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓

𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐
(4.13)

(4.8)
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Q =R(O)

(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

Leibniz's

+𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹
+𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔

𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
=0
𝑑𝑂

+𝑔 +0

𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
𝑑𝑂
= 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂)
− 𝑔 𝐹(𝑄) > 0

(4.11)

Q ≠ R(O). No valid solution.
Need to calculate constraint solutions.
Case 2

Q* is from (4.8) and O* is from (4.11).

If O < Q*≤ 1.2O

Optimal

If Q* >1.2O, this is the solution

𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

Solution
O*= 1/1.2∙ Q*
Case 2
Constrain

If Q* < 1.2O, let Q* = 1.2O+1,

Since the boundary constrains are always
satisfied, no need to calculate boundary

O* is from (4.11).

Solution

conditions
calculate the objectives

4.5 Remarks
It is common that the demand for any newly developed products is highly uncertain. How
to reduce the uncertain demand risk faced by both the manufacturer and the supplier is a
challenging problem. This research investigates the new product development in the
automotive industry and designs a contract to reduce the risk. We developed the models to
determine the manufacturer’s order quantity and the supplier’s planned production capacity
so that both the supplier and the manufacturer can reach the optimal decisions in terms of
supplier’s maximum profit and manufacturer’s minimum cost while taking into account
the risk of market uncertainty.
The Newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory are applied to formulate the
supplier’s profit and the manufacturer’s cost objective function. The models are based on
a single supplier, a single manufacturer, and a single period. Two cases are considered,
Case 1 Q ≤ O, and Case 2 Q > O, which are described with Nash subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Our model shows that:


Case 2 can be divided to 2 subcases: Case 2a Q > 1.2O, and Case 2b O < Q ≤ 1.2O.
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Each case has its mathematical model, which is a constraint optimal problem. The
constraint solution needs to be considered if the solution conflicts with the assumption.

The final solution can be determined by comparing the subcase results to get the subgame
perfect equilibria.

4.6 Appendix
Appendix A
Supplier’s objective function:
Case 1: Q < O
Supplier’s objective function is to maximize its expected profit. The supplier’s expected
profit can be expressed by
𝐸(π) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)

− ∫ 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.1)

Apply Leibniz’s rule (Nahmias, S. 2009) to equation (1) to determine the derivative of
( )

.

set

( )

= 0. We get the supplier’s optimal production capability Q*
𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄 ∗ )
𝐹(𝑄 ) =
𝑝−𝑐+𝑒
∗

(4.2)
Check if the second derivative is negative to ensure that the total expected profit is
maximized at Q*.
𝑑 𝐸(𝜋)
= −(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 )𝑓(𝑄) + 0.64ℎ 𝑓(0.8𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
(4.3)
It is difficult to check if

( )

≤ 0, or (4.3) < 0. For uniform distribution,
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= f(Q) = f(0.8Q), so (4.3) becomes:

𝑓(𝑥) =

𝑑 𝐸(𝜋)
1
= [−(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 ) + 0.64ℎ ]
𝑑𝑄
(𝑏 − 𝑎)
Since

≥ 0, considering real parameters value, we have

−(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 ) ≪ 0 Or: −(𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 ) ≪ 0.64ℎ , which results

( )

≤ 0. It means

function E(𝝿) is a concave function in a uniform distribution, and has the max value in the
optimal solution Q*.
Case 2: Q > O (include Case 2a: Q > 1.2O and Case 2b: O < Q < 1.2O)
Case 2a: when Q > 1.2O, m(O, Q) > 0.
𝐸(π) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
+∫.

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)
.

(4.7)

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

To determine the value of Q that maximizes the supplier’s expected profit E(π), we apply
Leibniz’s rule (Nahmias, S. 2009) to equation (4.7) to determine the derivative of

( )

.

𝑑𝐸(π)
= (𝑝 − 𝑐 )[1 − 𝐹(𝑄)] − 𝑐 + 𝑚 (𝑄 − 1.2𝑂) ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
Set

( )

= 0, we get the supplier’s optimal production capability Q*

(𝑝 − 𝑐 )[1 − 𝐹(𝑄)] − 𝑐 + 𝑚 (𝑄 − 1.2𝑂) ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄) = 0

(4.8)

Next, the second derivative is examined.
𝑑𝐸 (π)
= −(𝑝 − 𝑐 ) ⋅ 𝐹′(𝑄) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝑓′(𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
= − (𝑝 − 𝑐 ) ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝑓′(𝑄)
=𝑓(𝑄) ⋅ (𝑚 − 𝑝 + 𝑐 ) ⋅ +𝑚 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝑓′(𝑄)
𝑑𝐸 (π)
= 𝑓(𝑄) ⋅ (𝑚 − 𝑝 + 𝑐 ) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝑓 (𝑄)
𝑑𝑄
For uniform distribution U(a, b),
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(4.9)

𝑓(𝑥) =

1
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝑓′(𝑥) = 0

𝑑𝐸 (π)
1
=
⋅ (𝑚 − 𝑝 + 𝑐 )
𝑑𝑄
𝑏−𝑎
Since the denominator > 0, we need to analyze nominator. Only if nominator (m 1 + cs – p)
< 0, or m1 < p – cs , E(𝝿) has the maximum value at Q*, or E(𝝿) is a convex function is
this situation.
If m1 > p – cs, E(𝝿) has the minimum value at Q* which is not our objective.
eg 1: If p = 9300, cs = 6000, m1 < p – cs = 9300 – 6000 = p – 0.645p = 0.355p.
eg 2: If p = 9300, cs = 8000, m1 < p – cs = p (1 – cs/p) = p (1– 0.86) = 0.14p.
So choose m1 = p , 2p, or m1 > p (1 – cs/p) are not valid, which results

( )

> 0.

E(π) becomes minimum at Q*.
Case 2b: O < Q < 1.2 O
The manufacturer will not give the supplier with high production compensation. So
m(O, Q) = 0
𝐸(π) = ∫ 𝑥(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫
+∫

.

𝑄(𝑝 − 𝑐 )𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 − 𝑐 (𝑄)

(4.12)

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

Apply Leibniz’s rule (Nahmias, S. 2009) to equation (4.12) to determine the derivative of
( )

. Set

( )

=0

We get the supplier’s optimal production capability Q*
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

This result can also be found from (4.8) when setting m 1 = 0.
To examine the second derivative of (4.12), we just simply substitute m 1 = 0 to (4.9)
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𝑑𝐸 (𝜋)
= 𝑓(𝑄) ⋅ (𝑚 − 𝑝 + 𝑐 ) + 𝑚 ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝑓 (𝑄) = 𝑓(𝑄) ⋅ (−𝑝 + 𝑐 )
𝑑𝑄

Since p > cs, we always have

( )

< 0, which proves that function (4.12) is a concave

function, and E(π) has a maximum at Q*. The formula means Q*≠ R(O*).
Appendix B
Manufacturer’s cost function:
Case 1: Q < O
(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +

𝐸(cos𝑡) =

(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂) −

𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

.

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +

+

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
(4.4)

Assume: Q = R(O)
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫

( )

(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ ( )(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑅(𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + g + g ∗ O

− ∫ ( ) 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑅(𝑂))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

.

( )

ℎ (0.8𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ ( ) 𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
(4.5)

Apply Leibniz’s rule (Nahmias, S. 2009) to equation (4.5) to calculate

(

)

.

𝑑𝐸(cost) 𝑑VI 𝑑VII 𝑑VIII 𝑑IX 𝑑X 𝑑XI
=
+
+
+
+
+
𝑑𝑂
𝑑𝑂
𝑑𝑂
𝑑𝑂
𝑑𝑂 𝑑𝑂 𝑑𝑂
=

( p + c m )  R ( O )  R ' ( O )  f ( R ( O ))

+ (𝑝 + cm ) ⋅ 𝑅 (𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

+ cm )𝑅 (𝑂) ⋅ 𝑅(𝑂) ⋅ 𝑓 𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑔 + 𝑒 𝑅 (𝑂) 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

− (𝑝

− 𝑒 𝑂𝑓(𝑂)

+ 𝑒 𝑅(𝑂)𝑓(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝑅 (𝑂)𝐹 0.8𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑠𝑅′(𝑂) 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) − 1
𝑑𝐸(cost)
= 𝑅 (𝑂) 𝑝 + cm + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠 + 𝑅 (𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)
𝑑𝑂

𝑠 − 𝑝 − cm − 𝑒

+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8 ⋅ ℎ ⋅ 𝑅 (𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹 0.8 ⋅ 𝑅(𝑂) + g 0
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(

Set

)

= 0, we have

𝑅′(𝑂)(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠) + 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 )
+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) + 𝑔 = 0

(4.6)

Check if the second derivative of E(cost) is positive to ensure that the total expected cost
is minimized at O*.
It is too difficult to calculate

(

)

in general form. We will discuss it in uniform

distribution later.
Case 2: Q > O
Since penalty = 0, we have ∫ ( ) 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑅(𝑂))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥=0.


Case 2a: when Q > 1.2O, add m(O, Q) and g(O, Q)

𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ .
+∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

But add 2 new items:

∫.

(4.10)

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 and ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

Substitute Q = R(O),
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫

( )

(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ ( )(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑅(𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂) + ∫ .

+∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ ( ) 𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑅(𝑂))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

( )

( )

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.10’)
Set

(

)

= 0, we have

𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
= (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)
𝑑𝑂
+ 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+ 𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )]
(4.11)
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Next step is to check if the second derivative of E(cost) of Case 2a is positive to ensure that
the total expected cost is minimized at O*. However, it is very difficult to calculate
(

)



in general form. We will discuss it in uniform distribution later.

Case 2b: O < Q < 1.2O.

m(O, Q) = 0.
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
(4.14)

+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

To determine the value of O that minimizes the manufacturer’s expected profit E(cost), use
(

)

=0

Case 2b can be considered as a special case of Case 2a, (4.14) can be solved by setting
m(O, Q) = 0, Q ≠ R(O). R’(O) = 0 in (4.11) , we get:
𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
= 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑔 𝐹(𝑄)
𝑑𝑂

Set

(

)

(4.15)

=0

𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑔 𝐹(𝑄) = 0

(4.16)

0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) = −𝑔 (1 − 𝐹(𝑄))

Analysis:
Since F(Q) ≤ 1, the right side of the equation (4.16) is ≤ 0, i.e., RS = −𝑔 (1 − 𝐹(𝑄))≤ 0.
But the left side of the equation (4.16) is ≥ 0, i.e. LS = 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂)≥ 0. So
there is no O solution to satisfy

(

)

= 0 . Actually,

(

)

> 0 in this case.

Mathematically, since the first derivative is always > 0, and the target function is to
minimize the cost, the optimal solution is at the smallest O, i.e, O = 0. This is a constraint
optimization problem, constraint Q=1.2O needs to be considered to solve the problem.
Then the optimal O* > 1/1.2∙ Q*.
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So the constraint solution 1 for Case 2b is:
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

O* = 1/1.2∙ Q*

(4.17)

For example, substituting the parameter values (c0 = 500, p = 9300, cs = 8000) to the
formula (4.8) and (4.17), then F(Q*) = 1 - 500/(9300 – 8000) = 0.6154.


For normal distribution N(7500, 2166.672), Q* = 8136 from the inverse of F(Q*) =
0.6154. So the optimal solution O* = 0.833Q* = 6780.

 For uniform distribution U(1000, 14000), 𝐹(𝑄) =

, then Q = F(Q) (b-a) + a.

Since Q* = 9000, the optimal solution O* = 1/1.2∙ Q* = 7500.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SOLUTION FOR THE UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION CASE AND
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, we developed a new product optimal contract model. It is assumed that the
demand for new products is uncertain in the coming years, but the distribution can be
estimated. The solution of the model is independent of the distribution functions. Based on
the discussion of the optimal contract models and solutions in the last chapter, we will
provide the solution with the uniform demand distribution and conduct some numerical
experiments in this chapter. Uniform distribution is a simplest stochastic distribution with
equal probability density function (pdf), and the closed form solution can be obtained in
real-world application. In the new product development cases, the demand distribution of
new products is unknown. The pdf of new product demand can be assumed equally and
uniformly distributed within a certain range. Other stochastic demand distribution, such as
normal distribution, requires the historical data to calculate the variance about the mean.
Based on a real automotive supply chain case, the numerical experiments are also
conducted to study the behavior and performance of the proposed model under the uniform
distribution in this chapter. Also, some parameter sensitivity analyses are performed in
order to obtain the managerial insights into the contract model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2, the uniform
distribution background is introduced; Section 5.3 provides the contract model solution for
the uniform distribution; the constraint solution is discussed in Section 5.4; Section 5.5
illustrates a numerical experiment to get the subgame perfect optimal solution. The
sensitive analyses on varying several parameters are conducted in Section 5.6. Finally, the
remarks including a summary of the main results and some future work direction are given
in Section 5.7. Proofs of all propositions appear in Appendix 5.8.
5.2 Uniform Distribution
For uniform distribution, its probability density function (pdf) is:
𝑓(𝑥) =

0
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The cumulative distribution function (CDF) is:
0

𝑓𝑜𝑟
𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝑥<0
𝑎≤𝑥≤𝑏

1

𝑓𝑜𝑟

𝑥≥𝑏

𝑓(𝑥) =

For uniform distribution of demand x, assume: 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏, its pdf is shown in the Figure
5.1.

Figure 5.1. Uniform distribution of the demand. (Source: [4])

5.3 Solution for Uniform Distribution
As shown in Figure 5.2, there are two calculation methods to solve the contract model in
uniform distribution. The method I applies Leibniz’s rule to supplier’s profit function E(𝝿).
By setting the derivative

( )

= 0, the supplier’s optimal production capability Q* can

be expressed as a function of the manufacturer’s order quantity O, i.e. Q* = R(O). For
uniform distribution, assume Q* = R(O) = α + βO. Substituting Q* = α + βO to
manufacturer’s cost function E(cost), and setting

(

)

= 0, the manufacturer’s optimal

order O* can be found, and Q* can be calculated. Substituting O* and Q* to the integrals
of E(𝝿) and E(cost), E*(𝝿) and E*(cost) can be obtained by conducting an integral
operation.
In Method II, the first step is to take the integral operation for E(𝝿) and E(cost), and they
can be expressed in algebra functions. The second step is to take the derivatives

0 and

(

)

( )

=

= 0. Then Q* and O* are obtained. The optimal solutions Q* and O* can
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( )

be verified by checking the secondary derivatives if

≤ 0 and

(

)

≥ 0. Then

E*(𝝿) and E*(cost) can be calculated form the algebra functions.
Both methods have the same results. Note that Method II has the benefit to express
objective function E(π) and E(cost) as an algebra function of the variables. Therefore they
can be easily calculated and analyzed. Also it has the benefit to calculate the second order
derivative to prove whether the objective function is a concave or convex function. (See
Appendix A for details).
Two methods can be summarized in the flowchart as shown in Figure 5.2.
Supplier’s objective function E(π)

Method I

Method II

Apply Leibniz’s rule to E(π).
( )
Set
= 0 to find Q*=R(O)=α+βO

Integral to E(π), E(cost) into algebra
functions

( )

Substitute Q*=R(O) to E(cost).
(
)
Set
= 0 to find O*

(

Substitute O*, Q* to E(π), E(cost)
integral

= 0 to find Q*, test
)

( )

= 0 to find O*, test

(

)

Calculate algebra E(π), E(cost)

Same results
Figure 5.2. The flow chart of two methods

In the rest of this chapter, we will discuss the solutions of Case 1 and Case 2 in uniform
distribution separately.


For Case 1: Q < O,

Based on (4.2),
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) =

𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑄 ∗ )
𝑝−𝑐+𝑒
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From uniform distribution, for 𝑎 ≤ 𝑄 < 𝑏, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑂 < 𝑏,
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) =

𝑄∗ − 𝑎
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝐹(0.8𝑄 ∗ ) =

0.8𝑄 ∗ − 𝑎
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝐹(𝑂) =

𝑂−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎

The solution of (4.2) is:
𝑄∗ =

(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 )𝑏 + (𝑐 − 0.8ℎ )𝑎 + 𝑒 𝑂
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

(5.1)

= 𝑅(𝑂)
Where
𝛼=

(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 )𝑏 + (𝑐 − 0.8ℎ )𝑎
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

𝛽=

(5.2)

𝑒
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

(5.3)

Q* is the supplier’s optimal production capability.
Based on (4.6), (consider manufacturer’s shortage cost)
𝑅′(𝑂)(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠) + 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 )
+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) + 𝑔 = 0

(4.6)

For uniform distribution a ≤ x < b, from (5.1),
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = α + β𝑂,

𝑅′(𝑂) = β,

Also from a uniform distribution,
𝑓(𝑂) =

1
𝑂−𝑎
𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑎
, 𝐹(𝑂) =
, 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) =
,
𝑏−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) =

0.8𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑎
𝑏−𝑎

Substituting them to (4.6), the solution O* is:
𝑂∗ =

𝛼𝛽(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 𝑠 − 0.64ℎ ) − 𝑒 𝛼 + (0.8ℎ 𝑎 + 𝑠𝑏 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝑏𝑐 )𝛽 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎)
(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ )𝛽 + 2𝑒 𝛽 − 𝑒

(5.4)
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(

Apply Method II in Figure 5.2, we can prove

)

> 0 at O*, which means

manufacturer’s expected cost is the minimum at O*. So O* is the manufacturer’s optimal
order in Case 1.


For Case 2: Q > O, based on (4.8),
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

1
[𝑐 − 𝑚 (𝑄 ∗ − 1.2𝑂) ⋅ 𝑓(𝑄 ∗ )]
𝑝−𝑐

From uniform distribution, substituting 𝐹(𝑄) =

and 𝑓(𝑄) =

to (4.8), the solution

is
𝑄∗ =

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝) + 1.2𝑚 𝑂
= 𝜁 + 𝜂𝑂 = 𝑅(𝑂)
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

(5.5)

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

(5.6)

1.2𝑚
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

(5.7)

where
𝜁=

𝜂=
Based on (4.11),

(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

+ 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)

+𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )] = 0
For uniform distribution a ≤ x < b, from (5-5), Q* can be found:
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = ζ + η𝑂,

𝑅′(𝑂) = η,

Also from a uniform distribution, we have:
𝑓(𝑂) =

1
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝐹(0.8𝑂) =

𝑓 𝑅(𝑂) =

0.8𝑂 − 𝑎
,
𝑏−𝑎

1
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) =

𝐹(𝑂) =
𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑎
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝑂−𝑎
,
𝑏−𝑎

𝐹(0.8𝑅(𝑂)) =

Substituting them to (4.11), the optimal solution for O is:
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𝐹(1.2𝑂) =

1.2𝑂 − 𝑎
,
𝑏−𝑎

0.8𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑎
𝑏−𝑎

𝑂∗ =

𝜁[𝜂(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠 − 𝑔 − 𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ] − (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝜂𝑏 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 0.8ℎ 𝑎
𝜂 (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 2𝜂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 0.64ℎ + 1.44𝑚

(5.8)
where O* is the manufacturer’s optimal order.
Apply method II in Figure 5.2; we can prove that

(

)

> 0, so E(cost) is convex

function and has the minimum value at O* in Case 2 with a uniform distribution (See
Appendix A).
From the study above, we can see that in uniform demand distribution, the closed form
solutions of optimal O*, Q*, E(𝝿) and E(cost) can be found. The summary of solutions for
both Case 1 and Case 2 in uniform demand distribution is given in Tables 5.1.
5.4 Constraint Solution in Uniform Distribution
As we explained in Chapter 4, Case 1 is for Q ≤ O; and Case 2 is for Q > O, which consists
of subgame Case 2a with Q > 1.2O, and Case 2b with O < Q ≤ 1.2O. The solutions of
subgame need to be checked to see if they are within the constraints. If not, the solutions
need to be adjusted. In order to find the constraint optimization solution, the formulas of
uniform distribution is substituted into the equations in Table 4.2. The details are shown in
Appendix B.
Case 1, Case 2, their subcases, and the constraint solutions are summarized below.


Case 1 Q* ≤ O*,

Q*, O* is calculated from formula (5.1) ~ (5.4).
1) Case 1 constraint: If Q* > O*, let Q*= R(O) = O; which is defined as Case 1c.
After getting the optimal solution O*, Q*, the supplier objective function E(π)(O, Q) can
be calculated by the formula (5.14), and the manufacturer objective function E(cost)(O,
Q) can be calculated by the formula (5.12) for all Case 1.


Case 2 Q* > O*

1) Case 2a: Q* > 1.2O, Q*, O* is calculated from formula (5.5) ~ (5.8).
2) Case 2b: O < Q ≤ 1.2O
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𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

In a uniform distribution, (4.13) becomes
𝑄 ∗ = (1 −

𝑐
)(𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑎
𝑝−𝑐

(5.11)

𝑂∗ = 1/1.2 ⋅ 𝑄 ∗

(4.17)

3) Case 2a constraint: If the result Q* < 1.2O, let Q* = 1.2O +1, which is defined as Case
2c.
After getting the optimal solution O*, Q*, formula (5.15) is used to calculate the supplier
objective function E(π)(O, Q), and formula (5.13) is used to calculate manufacturer
objective function E(cost)(O, Q) for all Case 2.
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 summarize the optimal solutions, constraint solutions, and
objective functions for Case 1, subcase Case 1c, Case 2, subcase Case 2a, Case 2b, and
Case 2c in uniform distribution respectively.
TABLE 5.1 SUMMARY OF THE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS AND CONSTRAINT SOLUTIONS, AND OBJECTIVE
FUNCTIONS FOR CASE 1 AND THEIR SUBCASES IN A UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION.

Case 1: Assume Q ≤ O
Case 1 constraint: Case 1c

Case 1：Assume Q < O

If Q> O, let Q = O
Uniform

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂

Distribution
U(a, b)

𝛼=

(5.1)

(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 )𝑏 + (𝑐 − 0.8ℎ )𝑎
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

α=1

(5.2)

Optimal
Solution

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂, e1 = 0

𝛽=

𝑒
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ
β=0
(5.3)

(pcm e1 s 0.64h1) e1 (0.8ha
1 sb pbbcm)  g0(ba)
(s  pcm e1 0.64h1)2 2e1 e1

O*
(5.4)
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(5.10)

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂

Q*

𝑄 ∗ = O∗

Supplier
Objective
Function
E(π)(O,Q)
(5.14)

(5.16)
Or (5.14) when Q*= O*, e1 = 0

Manufacturer
Objective
Function
E(cost)(O,Q)
(5.12)

(5.17)
Or (5.12) when Q*= O*, e1 = 0

TABLE 5.2 SUMMARY OF THE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS AND CONSTRAINT SOLUTIONS, AND OBJECTIVE
FUNCTIONS FOR CASE 2 AND THEIR SUBCASES IN A UNIFORM DISTRIBUTION.

Case 2: Assume Q > O
Case 2a: Q >1.2 O

Case 2b: O < Q ≤ 1.2O, m1 = 0

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝜁 + 𝜂𝑂

(5.5)

Uniform

Q*≠ R(O)
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

(4.13)

Distribution
Optimal

𝜁=

(

)

(

)

(5.6)

𝜁=0

(5.7)

𝜂 = 1.2

Solution
𝜂=

.

O*
let
(5.8)
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O*= 1/1.2∙ Q*

Q*

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝜁 + 𝜂𝑂

(5.5)

𝑄 ∗ = (1 −

)(𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑎 = Q2b
(5.11)

Supplier

1
1

b( p  cs )  c0  Q
 cs  p  Q 2  
2(b  a )
b  a

1
2

(0.64 h1 )O
2(b  a)
0.8ah1
1

O
a 2 (cs  p  h1 )  csb
ba
2(b  a )

Objective
Function
E(π)(O, Q)
(5.15)

(5.18)
or (5.15) when m1 = 0

Manufacturer
Objective
Function
E(cost)(O,Q)

( p  cm  m1  s  g0 ) 2
1
Q 
( p  cm  s )b  Q
2(b  a )
ba
1.2m1  g 0
(1.44m1  0.64h1  g0 ) 2

O Q 
O
ba
2(b  a)
0.8ah1
1
 a 2 h1  b 2 s  ( p  cm ) a 2 
 ( g0 
)  O  gb 
ba
2(b  a ) 

( p  cm  s  g0 ) 2
1
Q 
( p  cm  s)b  Q
2(b  a)
ba
g
(0.64h1  g0 ) 2
 0  O Q 
O
ba
2(b  a)
0.8ah1
1
a2h1  b2s  ( p  cm )a2 
(g0 
)  O  gb 
ba
2(b  a) 

(5.13)

(5.19)
Or (5.13) when m1 = 0

Case 2c
Constrain

If Q*<1.2O, let Q*= 1.2O+1,

Since the boundary constrains are always
satisfied, no need to calculate boundary

O* is from (5.8), Q*= 1.2O+1,

Solution

conditions
Calculate E(π)(O, Q) from (5.15),
E(cost)(O, Q) from (5.13)

We use the backward induction to determine the subgame perfect equilibria. For any given
order quantity O, the first step is to decide the best action that the supplier will take.
Rationally, the supplier will take the action that provides the maximum expected profit.
The response functions of the supplier in different cases (actions) are given in the above
table. Because there are many parameters, it is difficult to compare the profit value without
the given values of the parameters. However, we can compare the values for the given
parameters and determine the action of the supplier.
5.5 Numerical Experiment
In this section, the model and solutions are to be verified with numerical experiments. The
hypothetical experiment data are given in Table 5.3. The data refer to an automotive
OEM, which develops a new electric vehicle (EV), and a major component supplier, which
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develops, produces and supplies the EV battery. The market demand for the new EV is
highly uncertain. The supplier needs to invest significantly on equipment or new
production line. Therefore, the key issue is to decide the production capacity of new
equipment or facility under the uncertain demand.
Parameter csb is supplier’s fixed cost for equipment at the beginning. It can be defined as
follows: assuming that the supplier’s initial investment is $5,000,000 and the program
lifetime is five years. Therefore the annual depreciation is $1,000,000, which is defined as
csb. gb is manufacturer’s fixed cost for equipment at the beginning. It is defined in the same
way as csb.
TABLE 5.3 NUMERICAL EXPERIMENT PARAMETER DATA SET
cs

c0

csb

g0

gb

cm

$8,000

$500

$1,000,000

$500

$2,000,000

p

h1

e1

S(=e1)

m1(<p-cs)

$9,300

$2,800

$15,000

$15,000

1290

$465

5.5.1 An Example of the Contract Model in Uniform Distribution U(1000,
14000)
In this section, an example of solving the optimal contract model and objective function in
a uniform distribution U(1000, 14000) will be summarized in Table 5.4. Following the
calculation steps in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, substituting the parameters in Table 5.3 to the
formulas for Case 1 and Case 2 and setting a = 1000, b = 14000, we get the optimal solution
and constraint solution and their objective function in algebra format for Case 1 and Case
2 as shown in Table 5.4.
TABLE 5.4. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF CALCULATION FOR CASE 1, CASE 2 OPTIMAL SOLUTION O*, Q*
AND OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS E(π)(O, Q), E(cost) WITH U(1000, 14000), PARAMETERS DATA IN TABLE 5.3

Case 1: Assume Q ≤ O
Case 1 constraint: Case 1c

Case 1：Assume Q < O

If Q> O, let Q = O
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂
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Uniform
Distribution
Optimal

𝛼=

(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 )𝑏 + (𝑐 − 0.8ℎ )𝑎
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

α=0

= 652.05

Solution
𝛽=

𝑒
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ
β=1

= 1.034
(pcm e1 s 0.64h1) e1 (0.8ha
1 sb pbbcm)  g0(ba)
(s  pcm e1 0.64h1)2 2e1 e1

O*
O* = 8964
Q*

O*=9823

𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂

Q* = O*

Q* = 9920
Q* = 9823
Supplier
Objective

From (5.14)

From (5.14)

– 0.558·Q2+728·Q+1.1538462·O·Q

–0.558·Q2+728·Q+1.1538462·O·Q

– 0.576823O2–942307.692

– 0.576823O2–942307.692

Function
E(π)(O, Q)
(5.20)

Manufacturer
Objective
Function

(5.20)

=7612107

= 8032317

From (5.12)

From (5.12)

–0.30665·Q2–5810·Q+1.1538462·O·Q–

–0.30665·Q2–5810·Q+1.1538462·O·Q–

0.576823O2+500·O+114809038

0.576823O2+500·O+114809038

E(cost)(O, Q)

(5.21)
= 87724721

(5.21)
= 88727545

Case 2: Assume Q > O
Case 2a: Q >1.2 O

Case 2b: O < Q ≤ 1.2O

Uniform

Q*≠ R(O)

Distribution
ζ=0
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Optimal
Solution

= 1170000

η = 1.2
= – 154.8
let
O*

O*= 1/1.2∙ Q*

O*= 7500
O* = 7476

Q*
Supplier

Q* =12175

Q*= 9000

From (5.15)

From (5.18)

Objective
Function

(

)

(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) ∙ 𝑄 +

(𝑝𝑏 + 𝑐 𝑏 − 𝑐 𝑏 − 0.8𝑎ℎ − 𝑠𝑏) ⋅

E(π)(O,Q)

𝑄+
(

𝑂⋅𝑄−
)

(

)

𝑂 +𝑔 ⋅𝑂+

[𝑎 (−𝑝 − 𝑐 + ℎ ) + 𝑠𝑏 ] + 𝑔

= 5677020
Manufacturer

(5.22)

From (5.13)

(5.26)

The result is the same as (5.22)

( p  cm  s  g0 ) 2
1
Q 
( p  cm  s)b  Q
2(b  a)
b a
g
(0.64h1  g0 ) 2
 0  O Q 
O
ba
2(b  a)
0.8ah1
1
a2h1  b2s  ( p  cm )a2 
(g0 
)  O  gb 
ba
2(b  a) 

Function
E(cost)(O,Q)

= 83202890

Constrain

= 5692308

From (5.19)

Objective

Case 2c

1
1

b( p  cs )  c0  Q
 cs  p  Q 2  
2(b  a )
b  a

1
2

(0.64h1 )O
2(b  a)
0.8ah1
1

O
a 2 (cs  p  h1 )  csb
ba
2(b  a )

(5.23)

If Q*<1.2O, let Q*= 1.2O+1,
O* is from (5.8), Q*= 1.2O+1,

Solution
Calculate E(π)(O,Q) from (5.15),
E(cost)(O,Q) from (5.13)
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= 86756731

(5.27)

Through the numerical calculation, we notice that Formula (5.14) (Case 1) and (5.16) (Case
1c) have the same result E(π); Formula (5.12) (Case 1) and (5.17) (Case 1c) have the same
result E(cost) when Q = O. So (5.14) and (5.12) are appropriate for all subcases of Case 1.
Also, it is shown that Case 2a formulas are appropriate for both Case 2b and Case 2c. The
result of Formula (5.18) (Case 2b) is the same as Formula (5.22) (Case 2a) when Q = 1.2O.
The numerical results for the above optimal solutions are summarized in Table 5.5.
TABLE 5.5 COMPARISON OF CASE 1 AND CASE 2 SOLUTIONS AND THEIR
CONSTRAINT SOLUTIONS WITH U(1000, 14000) AND PARAMETER DATA FROM TABLE 5.3
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO

Case 1c: Q = O*

Q*=O
Solution

Case 2 Case 2a: Q* >1.2O

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

α

β

652.054 1.0339
0
ζ

1
η

1170000 -154.8

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤ 1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

O*

Q*

E(π)

8964

9920 7611281 87724789

1.11

Q>O, invalid

9823

9823 8031726 88727545

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Q*/O*

7476 12715 5677020 83202878

1.70

Q*>1.2O*

1.2

7500

9000 5692307 86756730

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

1.2

7500

9001 5692307 86754775

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

We need to examine the results in Table 5.5 if the solutions are within the constraints. The
optimal solution of Case 1 is Q*> O*, which is contradicted with Case 1 assumption Q <
O. Therefore the optimal solution of Case 1, Q* = R(O) = α + βO, is invalid. The constraint
solution of Case 1c, Q*= O*, needs to be considered. Considering Case 2a, Q* = ζ + ηO*,
the optimal solution for Q*>1.2O* is satisfied with the assumptions of Case 2a. Comparing
the optimal solutions of all subcases in Table 5.5, Case 2a has the minimum expected cost
E(cost). So the manufacturer, as a leader, will choose Case 2a strategy. In the next section,
we will verify the solution of Case 2a (O*= 7476 and Q*=12,715) is the best response
among the three possible options, which will maximize the supplier’s expected profit.
5.5.2 Optimal Response Function E(π)
Since the optimal solutions in Table 5.5 have the different values of variable O, it is difficult
to compare the supplier’s response functions E(π) directly. In this section, we will verify
the optimal response function with regard to manufacturer’s order quantity O as E(π)(O).
In the example of uniform distribution U(1000, 14000) above, given an O, substitute Q =
R(O) to the related response function E(π)(O, Q) for each subcase shown in Table5.4.
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E(π)(O, Q) becomes E(π)(O), which is a single variable quadratic function. The following
are response functions E(π)(O) in each subcase:


Case 1:
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂
𝛼=

(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 )𝑏 + (𝑐 − 0.8ℎ )𝑎
= 652.05
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

𝛽=

𝑒
= 1.034
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

Then we have 𝑄 = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂= 652.05 + 1.034O. Because Case 1 is effective only
when Q ≤ O. The case is invalid for this instance. Then we need to check Case 1c.


Case 1c: Q = O
α = 0, β = 1, substitute Q = O to Formula (5.20)
E(π) = – 0.558∙O2 + 727.6923O + 1.15348462∙O2 – 0.5769231∙O2 – 942307.692
= 0.0189231∙O2 + 727.6923∙O – 942308



Case 2a:
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝜁 + 𝜂𝑂
𝜁=

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
,
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

𝜂=

1.2𝑚
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

ζ = 1170000, η = –154.8
Substitute Q* = 1170000 –154.8∙O to Formula (5.22)
𝐸(π)
=

1
(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) ∙ 𝑄
2(𝑏 − 𝑎)

+

1
𝑒
𝑒
(𝑝𝑏 + 𝑐 𝑏 − 𝑐 𝑏 − 0.8𝑎ℎ − 𝑠𝑏) ⋅ 𝑄 +
𝑂⋅𝑄−
𝑂
𝑏−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
2(𝑏 − 𝑎)

+𝑔 ⋅𝑂+

1
[𝑎 (−𝑝 − 𝑐 + ℎ ) + 𝑠𝑏 ] + 𝑔
2(𝑏 − 𝑎)
(5.22)
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E(𝜋) = – 0.000385∙ (1170000 –154.8∙O )2 + 900 ∙ (1170000 –154.8∙O)
– 0.119077∙O∙ (1170000 -154.8∙O) + 0.140369∙ O2 – 172.30769∙ O – 942307.69
= 9.34772∙O2 - 139353∙O + 525031192
Note that, for Case 2a, Q* >1.2O needs to be satisfied. Thus, from
Q* = 1170000 –154.8∙O >1.2O, we have O < 7500.


Case 2b: Q is not related O. Q ≠ R(O)
𝑄∗ = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑎 = 9000

For this case O < Q* ≤ 1.2O, we have 7500 ≤ O < 9000.
Substituting Q* = 9000 to Formula (5.22), we get the following
E(π) = 0.068923077 ∙ O2 –172.30769 ∙ O +3107692.31


Case 2c: if Q ≤ 1.2O (for O ≥7500 for this instance)
Let Q = 1.2O + 1, substitute Q = 1.2O + 1 to Formula (5.22), we have the following:
E(π) = – 0.000385 ∙ (1.2O + 1)2 + 900 ∙ (1.2O + 1) – 0.119077∙ O ∙ (1.2O + 1) +

0.140369∙ O2
– 172.30769∙ O – 942307.69
= – 0.0030778 ∙ O2 + 907.572 ∙ O – 941408
In summary, for the given parameters, we have the supplier actions, objective functions
and valid ranges in Table 5.6.
TABLE 5.6 COMPARISON OF SUPPLIER ACTIONS, OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND
VALID RANGES (BASE EXAMPLE)

Case (action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

1a

Q≤O

652.05 + 1.034O

1c

Q=O

O

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

0.0189231∙O2 + 727.6923∙O

Any O

– 942308
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2a

Q >1.2O

1170000 –154.8∙O

9.34772∙O2 – 139353∙O +

O < 7500

525031192
2b

O < Q ≤1.2O

0.068923077∙O2 –

9000

7500≤O<9000

172.30769∙O +3107692.31
2c

Q = 1.2O+1

– 0.0030778∙O2 +

1.2O + 1

O ≥ 7500

907.572∙O – 941408

To compare the different actions, we use the graph to show the different objective functions
and compare the objective functions directly. For uniform distribution U(1000, 14000), O
𝛜 (1000, 14000), the response objective functions E(π)(O) for each subcase are shown in
Figure 5.3. Since Case 1 result is not valid, it is not plotted.

a. O є (1000, 14000).

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.3. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, Case2c and their valid range (base)

From Figure 5.3a, we can see the supplier’s response functions or actions E(π)(O) for the
different subcases. The supplier’s best action in each range is different. The stars * in
Figure 5.3 represent the optimal solution for each subcase shown in Table 5.5.
Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as
shown in Table 5.7.
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TABLE 5.7 THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTIONS AND EFFECTIVE RANGES (BASE EXAMPLE)
Effective ranges for O

[0, 7500]

[7500,8994]

[8995, )

Best actions

2a

2b

1c

Comparing Table 5.7 and 5.5, we find the optimal solutions in Table 5.5 for Cases 2a, 2b,
and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the manufacturer, then the
manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the subgame perfect optimal
solution is Case 2a in this situation, and the optimal solution is given in the following table.
TABLE 5.8 THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION (BASE EXAMPLE)
O*

Q*

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

7476

12725

5.68E+06

8.32E+07

5.5.3 Subcase’s Effective Range
From the example above, we can see that each subcase has its effective range. The further
details are discussed below.


Case 1c, O 𝛜 (a, b).



Case 2a:
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝜁 + 𝜂𝑂 > 1.2O
𝑂<

(5.28)

𝜁
(1.2 − 𝜂)

where
𝜁=

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
,
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

𝜂=

1.2𝑚
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

Substitute 𝜁, 𝜂 to (5.28), we have
𝜁
𝑂<
=
(1.2 − 𝜂)
=

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚
1.2 −

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
1.2(𝑐 − 𝑝 + 𝑚 ) − 1.2𝑚
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1.2𝑚
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

𝑂<

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
1.2(𝑐 − 𝑝)

(5.29)

(5.28) and (5.29) represent the upper limit of O for Case 2a.
Therefore in Case 2a, O 𝛜 (a,

(

)
. (

(

)
)

)

Note that in Formula (5.29), there is no term m1, although 𝜁 and 𝜂 include m1. So
changing m1 will not affect the upper limit of O for Case 2a.


Case 2b, O<Q ≤1.2O
From (5.11)
𝑄∗ = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑎 =

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
(𝑐 − 𝑝)

Q*/1.2 ≤ O < Q*
Case 2b’s upper limit of O is: Q*
𝑄 ∗ 𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
𝑂>
=
1.2
1.2(𝑐 − 𝑝)

The lower limit of O
is:

So in Case 2b, O 𝛜(Q*/1.2, Q*),

𝑄∗ =

where

(5.30)

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
(𝑐 − 𝑝)

From (5.29) and (5.30), we can see that the upper limit of O for Case 2a equals the
lower limit of O for Case 2b.


Case 2c, if Q ≤ 1.2O,
𝑂≥

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
1.2(𝑐 − 𝑝)

Case 2c O 𝛜

(

)

(

. (

)
)

,𝑏

5.5.4 The Backward Induction Method Algorithm
The backward induction method above can be summarized in Figure 5.4. It determines
subgame perfect equilibria.
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Step 1. Apply the formulas in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2
to find the optimal solution and constraint solution,
objective function for Case 1, Case 2 and their
subcases in uniform distribution. (e.g. Table 5.5)

Step 2. Construct the supplier’s response function
E(π)(O) for each subcase. Draw the graph for all
subcase response function E(π)(O) (e.g. Figure 5.3)

Step 3. Find supplier’s best action E(π)(O) and
effective ranges (e.g. Table 5.6)

Step 4. Verify if the optimal solution from Step 1
is within the valid range. Find manufacturer’s
optimal solution O* and min E(cost).

Step 5. Conclude the subgame perfect optimal
solution: O*, Q*, E(π)(O*, Q*), E(cost)(O*, Q*).

(e.g. Case 2a in this situation. Table 5.7)

Figure 5.4. The backward induction method algorithm flow chart.

In the next section, we will use this backward induction method algorithm flow to perform
the sensitivity analysis.
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, the parameter effects are studied, including the effects of different lower
and upper limits (a, b) for uniform distribution, penalty cost e 1 and shortage cost s1 effects,
high production compensation m1, and low demand compensation h. The examples in the
above sections with parameters in Table 5.3 will be used as a base model for comparison.
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5.6.1 Effect of Different (a, b)
Table 5.5 shows all the solutions for Case 1, Case 2 and subcases with U(1000, 14000). In
this section, we will test the different lower limits a and upper limits b, i.e., U(5000, 10000),
U(3000, 12000) with the same mean, µ = 7500, of uniform distributions.


O ϵ U(5000, 10000)

Table 5.9a shows the performance of Case 1, Case 2 and their subcases in U(5000, 10000).
For a supplier to decide the response when (a, b) change, we can follow the backward
induction method algorithm flow shown in Figure 5.4 to determine the subgame perfect
equilibria. Table 5.9b summarizes the supplier actions, objective functions and valid ranges
for the given parameters in U(5000,10000).
TABLE 5.9a PERFORMANCE OF CASE 1, CASE 2
AND SUBCASES FOR U(5000, 10000), µ =7500, b
Solution

Case 1

α

β

O*

Q*

– a = 5000

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO -48.2492 1.0339

8477

8716 5181736 81343133

1.03

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

8687

8687 5246647 81547761

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

1050000 -154.8

6722

9434 4272549 79415148

1.40

Q*>1.2O*

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤ 1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

1.2

6730

8076 4272056 80672253

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

1.2

6730

8077 4272189 80669053

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

Q≤O

0

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

ζ

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

1
η

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

TABLE 5.9b COMPARISON OF THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS,
OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES FOR U(5000, 10000)

Case
(action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

1a

Q≤O

– 48.249 +
1.034O

1c

Q=O

O

2a

Q >1.2O

1050000 –
154.8∙O

2b

O <Q ≤ 1.2O

8077

2c

Q =1.2O+1

1.2O + 1

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

0.0492∙O2 – 140∙O + 2750000
2

Any O

24.328∙O –327320∙O + 1105250000

O < 6730

0.1792∙O2 –2240∙O + 11230769

6730≤
O<8077

–0.008∙O2 + 279.688∙O +2752099.999

O ≥ 6730
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Figure 5.5 graphically shows the results in Table 5.9a and 5.9b, or the performance of
E(π)(O) for U(5000, 10000). Figure 5.5(b) is the zoomed-in picture of Figure 5.5(a) for a
better view purpose. The stars represent the optimal solution O* and response E(π)(O*) of
each subcase.

a. O є (5000, 10000).

b. Zoomed-in left figure.

Figure 5.5. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, Case2c and their valid range when U(5000, 10000).

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as in
Table 5.9c.
TABLE 5.9c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES FOR U(5000, 10000)
Effective range for O

[0, 6730]

[6730, 8077]

[6730, 10000 )

Best action

2a

2b

1c

Comparing Table 5.9c and 5.9c, we can find that the optimal solutions in Table 5.9a for
Case 2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the manufacturer,
then the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the subgame perfect
optimal solution is Case 2a in this scenario U(5000, 10000) and the optimal solution is
given in the following table.
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TABLE 5.9d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE INSTANCE U(5000, 10000)



O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s profit

6722

9434

4272549

79415148

O ϵ U(3000, 12000)
TABLE 5.10a U(3000, 12000), µ =7500, b-a = 9000 PERFORMANCE OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASES
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 301.9024 1.0339

8720

9318 6359976 84477980

1.07

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

9255

9255 6595337 85073470

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

0

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

ζ

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

1
η

1110000 -154.8

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤ 1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

7099 11074 4735581 81059799

1.56

Q*>1.2O*

1.2

7115

8538 4742676 83464304

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

1.2

7115

8539 4742932 83461897

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

TABLE 5.10b THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS, OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES FOR U(3000, 12000)
Case (action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

1a

Q≤O

301.902+ 1.034O

1c

Q=O

O

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

0.027333∙O2 + 486.666∙O –

Any O

250000
2a

Q >1.2O

13.515556∙O2 –191666.667∙O

1110000 –
154.8∙O

2b

O <Q ≤1.2O

O < 7115

+ 684250000
0.099556∙O2 –746.6667∙O +

8538

7115≤O<8538

5015384
2c

Q =1.2O+1

–0.004444∙O2 + 733.16∙O –

1.2O + 1

O ≥ 7115

248766.667

Figure 5.6 illustrates the performance of E(π)(O) in Table 5.10a and 5.10b for U(3000,
12000). Figure 5.6(b) is the zoomed-in graph of Figure 5.6(a) for the better view purpose.
The stars represent the optimal solution O* and response E(π)( O*) of each subcase.
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a. O є (3000, 12000).

b. Zoomed in the left figure.

Figure 5.6. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, Case2c and their valid range when U(3000, 12000)

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as in
the following table.
TABLE 5.10c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES FOR U(3000, 12000)

Effective range for O

[0, 7115]

[7115, 8538]

[7115, 12000)

Best action

2a

2b

1c

Comparing Table 5.10c and 5.10a, we can find that the optimal solutions in Table 5.10a
for Cases 2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the
manufacturer, then the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the
subgame perfect optimal solution is Case 2a in this situation U(3000, 12000) and the
optimal solution is given in the following table.
TABLE 5.10d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR U(3000, 12000)



O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s profit

7099

11074

4735581

81059799

Summary of the performance for different (a, b) sets

Comparing the performance of 3 different (b-a) uniform distribution: U(5000, 10000),
U(3000, 12000), and U(1000, 14000), we see that three of E(π)(O) have similar
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characteristics, such as, Case 1 is an invalid solution; Case 2a is the subgame perfect
optimal solution for all 3 scenarios. We will only study the performance of Case 2a to
analyze the effect of (b-a).
TABLE 5.11 THE PERFORMANCE OF CASE 2a FOR DIFFERENT (a, b) SETS WITH THE SAME µ=7500
a

b

b-a

µ

ζ

η

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

2a range

5000 10000

5000 7500 1050000 -154.8

6722

9434 4272549 79415148

1.40

O<6730

3000 12000

9000 7500 1110000 -154.8

7099 11074 4735581 81059799

1.56

O<7115

1000 14000 13000 7500 1170000 -154.8

7476 12715 5677020 83202878

1.70

O<7500

Figure 5.7. The performance of Case 2a for different (a, b) sets with the same µ=7500

Table 5.11 and Figure 5.7 summarize the performance, O*, Q*, E(π), and E(cost) of Case
2a for the different (a, b) set with the same µ=7500 from the above experiments. From
Table 5.11, we see that when (a, b) changes, the effective ranges of Case 2a change, which
can be calculated from Formula (5.29). All the optimal solutions O* of Case 2a are valid
since they are within the effective ranges. We also see that when (b-a) increases, ζ increases
and η keeps the same; O* and Q* increase as well. The ratio of Q*/O* becomes large.
Both supplier’s profit and manufacturer’s E(cost) increase. It implies that in order to reduce
the manufacturer’s cost, the supply chain should forecast the demand more accurately as
(b-a) reduces.
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5.6.2 Effects of High Production Compensation m1
m1 is unit compensation of high volume production that the manufacturer pays to the
supplier, when Q > O and Dt >1.2O. It is only included in Case 2a and Case 2c contract
models. In Section 4.6 Appendix A, we derived that only if (m 1 + cs – p) < 0, or m1 < p –
cs , E(𝝿) has the maximum value at Q*. Since Case 1c and Case 2b do not include m 1,
changing m1 will not affect the performance of them. The performances of Case 1c and
Case 2b are the same as in Table 5.5. Changing m1 mainly affects Case 2a and 2c, which
are the optimal solutions among other subcases in Table 5.5. Also from the discussion of
Section 5.5.2, we conclude that changing m1 will not affect Case 2a’s upper limit of O,
therefor, not affect the effective range of each subcase. Based on the backward induction
method algorithm flow in Figure 5.4, we tested the performance of m 1 = 800, and m1 =
300, and compared them to the base model result of m 1 = 1290 as shown in Table 5.5.


m1 = 800
TABLE 5.12a THE SOLUTIONS OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASES FOR m1 = 800, U(1000, 14000)
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 652.0540 1.0339

8964

9920 7611281 87724789

1.11

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

9823

9823 8031726 88727545

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

0
ζ

1
η

23400

-1.92

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤ 1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

5515 12811 4707640 81737158

2.32

Q*>1.2O*

1.2

7500

9000 5672307 86756730

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

1.2

7500

9001 5672307 86754775

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

Table 5.12c is the same as Table 5.7 where m1 = 1290. This verifies the conclusion from
section 5.4.3, i.e. different m1 does not change the effective ranges of subcases. Comparing
Table 5.12c and 5.12a, we can find that the optimal solutions in Table 5.12a for Cases 2a,
2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the manufacturer, then
the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the subgame perfect
optimal solution is Case 2a when m1 = 800. The optimal solution is given in the following
table.
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TABLE 5.12b THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS, OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES FOR m1 = 800
Case (action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

Objective function(O)

Valid range

1a

Q≤O

652.054 + 1.034O

Invalid

Invalid

1c

Q=O

O

0.0189231∙O2 +

Any O

727.6923∙O – 942308
2a

Q >1.2O

23400 –1.92∙O

0.184123∙O2 –

O < 7500

1900.30769∙O +
9587692.307
2b

O < Q ≤1.2O

0.068923∙O2 –172.30769∙O

9000

7500≤O<9000

+3107692.31
2c

Q = 1.2O+1

–0.003077∙O2 + 907.572∙O

1.2O + 1

O ≥ 7500

– 941408

a. O є (1000, 14000)

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.8. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, Case2c when m1 = 800.

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as the
following table.
TABLE 5.12c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES WHEN m1 = 800
Effective range for O

[0, 7500]

[7500,8994]

[8995, b)

Best action

2a

2b

1c
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TABLE 5.12d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION WHEN m1 = 800



O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

5515

12811

4707640

81737158

m1 = 300
TABLE 5.13a THE SOLUTIONS OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASES FOR m1 = 300, U(1000, 14000)
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 652.0540 1.0339

8964

9920 7611281 87724789

1.11

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

9823

9823 8031726 88727545

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

0

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

ζ

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

1
η

1170000

-0.36

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤ 1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

1172 11278 3865360 80404218

9.62

Q*>1.2O*

1.2

7500

9000 5692307 86756730

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

1.2

7500

9001 5692307 86754775

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

TABLE 5.13b THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS, OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES FOR m1 = 300
Case (action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

1a

Q≤O

652.054 + 1.034O

1c

Q=O

O

0.0189231∙ O2 + 727.6923∙O
– 942308

Any O

2a

Q >1.2O

11700 – 0.360∙O

0.090523∙O2 –496.307692 ∙
O + 3865360.7424

O < 7500

2b

O<Q
≤1.2O

9000

0.068923∙O2 –

7500≤O<9000

172.30769 ∙ O
+3107692.31

2c

Q =1.2O+1

–0.003077∙O2 + 907.572∙O –
941408

1.2O + 1
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O ≥7500

a. O є (1000, 14000)

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.9. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, and Case2c when m1 = 300

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as in
the following table.
TABLE 5.13c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES WHEN m1 = 300
Effective range for O

[0, 7500]

[7500,8994]

[8995, )

Best action

2a

2b

1c

Comparing Table 5.13a and 5.13c, we can find the optimal solutions in Table 5.13a for
Cases 2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the
manufacturer, then the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the
subgame perfect optimal solution is Case 2a in this scenario and the optimal solution is
given in the following table.
TABLE 5.13d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION WHEN m1 = 300
O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

1172

11278

3865360

80404218

Comparing the performance graphs of E(π)(O) when m 1 = 300 (Figure 5.9), m1 = 800
(Figure 5.8), and m1 = 1290 (Figure 5.3), we find that when m1 decrease, E(π)(O) of Case
2a becomes flatter, but is still better than that of other cases in its effective region (a, 7500).
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Moreover, Case 2a optimal solution O* becomes smaller. Comparing the supplier actions,
the objective functions E(π)(O) and valid ranges for three m1 values (Table 5.6 for m1 =
1290, Table 5.12b for m1 = 800 and Table 5.13b for m1 = 300), we found that when m1
changes, only E(π)(O) of Case 2a changes. Other objective functions of Case 1, 1c, 2b keep
the same in 3 different m1 values since Case 1, 1c, and 2b do not include the m 1 item. In
the following discussion, we will only discuss Case 2a performance regarding m 1 effect.
The effect of different m 1 values to Case 2a are summarized in Table 5.14 and displayed
in Figure 9.
TABLE 5.14 EFFECT OF m1 FOR CASE 2a
Case 2a Solution
Case 2a: Q >1.2O
Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

m1

ζ

η

O*

Q*

300

11700

-0.36

1172

11278 3865360

80404218

9.62

1.50

0.16

800

23400

-1.92

5515

12811 4707640

81737158

2.32

1.71

0.74

1290 1170000

-154.8

7476

12715 5677020

83202878

1.70

1.70

1.00

a. m1 effect on Q*, O*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Q*/ µ

O*/µ

b. m1 effect on E(π) and E(cost)

Figure 5.10. m1 effect for Case 2a performance

From Table 5.14 and Figure 5.10, we can see that:
a) In Case 2a, O* is less than the demand means µ, even when m 1 = 1290, which is the
upper limit of m1. When m1 decreases, O* will decrease very fast, while Q* decreases
slower, and the ratio of Q*/ O* becomes larger. For example, when m 1 = 300, Q* is almost
10 times more than O*, which is an unreasonable solution. So m 1 not only needs an upper
limit m1 < p – cs, also needs a low limit in order to keep the ratio of Q*/ O* within a range.
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b) The minimum Q* is 9000 in the parameter set when m 1 = 0. It is the same result of Case
2b, in which m1 = 0. Q has no relationship with O, or Q ≠ R(O).
c) From Figure 5.8b, we can see that when m1 changes, E(π) and E(cost) do not change that
much since Q* only changes little. From the above analysis, it can be concluded that the
m1 effect to optimal capacity Q* is not significant.
5.6.3 Effects of Penalty Cost e1 and Shortage Cost s1
e1 is the unit penalty cost that supplier pays to the manufacturer, if Q < O and Dt > Q. And
s1 is manufacturer’s unit shortage cost if Dt > Q. According to (Nahmias, S. 2012 pp 207),
“The penalty cost, also known as the shortage cost or the stock-out cost, is the cost of not
having sufficient stock on hand to satisfy a demand when it occurs.” In fact, they are the
same cost.
In this section, e1 and s1 effects will be tested in Case 1 and Case 2 based on the backward
induction method algorithm flow in Figure 5.4.


e1 = s1 = 13500
TABLE 5.15a RESULTS OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS WHEN e1 = s1 = 13500
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 727.24477 1.0378

7801

8823 6408866 86398546

1.13

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

8690

8690 6810335 87448118

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

0
ζ

1
η

1170000 -154.8

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

7479 12250 5678341 83061145

1.64

Q*>1.2O*

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

1.2

7500

9000 5692307 85314423

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

1.2

7500

9001 5692307 85313044

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

It is noticed that Table 5.15c is the same as Table 5.7 for the base example because there
is no e1 or s1 item in Formula (5.29) and (5.30), which determine the effective range of
Case 2a and Case 2b. So changing e1 or s1 does not change the effective range of E(π)(O).
Comparing Table 5.15a and 5.15c, we can find the optimal solutions in Table 5.15a for
Cases 2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Case 2a gives the minimum cost for the manufacturer. So
the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the subgame perfect
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optimal solution is Case 2a in this scenario and the optimal solution is given in the
following table.
TABLE 5.15b THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS, OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES WHEN e1 = s1 = 13500
Case (action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

0.0189231∙O2 +
727.6923∙O – 942308

Any O

9.356923∙O2 –
139492.30769 ∙O +
525557692.30769

O < 7500

1a

Q≤O

727.2447+ 1.034O

1c

Q=O

O

2a

Q >1.2O

1170000 – 154.8∙O

2b

O< Q ≤ 1.2O

9000

0.068923∙O2 –
172.30769∙O +3107692.31

7500≤O<9000

2c

Q = 1.2O+1

1.2O + 1

– 0.003077∙O2 + 907.572∙O
– 941408

O ≥7500

a. O є (1000, 14000)

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.11. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, and Case2c with e1 = s1 = 13500

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as in
the following table.
TABLE 5.15c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES WHEN e1 = s1 = 13500
Effective range for O

[0, 7500]

[7500,8994]

[8995, )

Best action

2a

2b

1c
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TABLE 5.15d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE INSTANCE WHEN e1 = s1 = 13500



O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

7479

12250

5678341

83061145

e1 = s1 = 11000
TABLE 5.16a RESULTS OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS WITH e1 = s1 = 11000
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 900.2665 1.04682

3509

4573 2302191 81495353

1.30

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

4304

4304 2540218 82497929

1.00

Q*=O

O*

Q*

0

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

1

ζ

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

η

1170000

-154.8

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

7488 10857 5683316 82524737

1.45

Q*>1.2O*

1.2

7500

9000 5692307 82910576

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

1.2

7500

9001 5692307 82910159

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

TABLE 5.16b COMPARISONS OF THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS,
OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES WITH e1

Case (action)

Relations

Q* function (O)

= s1 = 11000

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

0.0189231∙O2 +
727.6923∙O – 942308

Any O

9.356923∙O2 –
139492.30769∙O +
525557692.30769

O < 7500

1a

Q≤O

900.2665+
1.04682 O

1c

Q=O

O

2a

Q >1.2O

1170000 –
154.8∙O

2b

O< Q ≤ 1.2O

9000

0.068923∙O2 –
172.30769∙O +3107692.31

7500≤O<9000

2c

Q = 1.2O+1

1.2O + 1

–0.003077∙O2 + 907.572∙O
– 941408

O ≥ 7500
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a. O є (1000, 14000)

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.12. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, and Case2c with e1 = s1 = 11000

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as in
the following table.
TABLE 5.16c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES WHEN e1 = s1 = 11000

Effective range for

[0, 7500]

[7500,8994]

[8995, b)

2a

2b

1c

O
Best action

Comparing Table 5.16a and 5.16c, we can find the optimal solutions in Table 5.16a for
Cases 2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the
manufacturer, then the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the
subgame perfect optimal solution is Case 2a in this scenario and the optimal solution is
given in the following table.
TABLE 5.16d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION WHEN e1 = s1 = 11000
O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

7488

10857

5683316

82524737

From the performance of the tested sets, e1 = s1 = (11000, 13500, 15000), we can see the
following facts:
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(a) For all the tested e1 and s1, Case 1 results show the same pattern, Q* > O*, which is an
invalid solution since it violates Case 1 assumption Q < O. The constraint solution Case 1c
Q = O is considered as the optimal solution for Case 1 when e 1 changes. Actually, when Q
= O, penalty e1= 0. That means the supplier cannot choose Case 1 Q < O strategy.
(b) Comparing the solutions in Table 5.15a, Table 5.16a and Table 5.5 (base example), we
can find that ζ and η in Case 2a and Case 2b solutions are the same for all the different e 1
or s1. Note that from Formula (5.6) and (5.7) for Case 2a (copied here),
 



c 0 (b  a)  b(c s  p )
c s  p  m1

1.2m1
cs  p  m1

(5.6)

(5.7)

ζ and η do not include e1. So e1 changes do not affect ζ and η. This verifies our model
assumption as of the penalty cost e(O, Q) = 0 in Case 2.
For Case 2b, the solution for uniform distribution is:
𝑄∗ = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑎

(5.11)

O* = 1/1.2 ∙Q*
There is no e1 or s1 item in Case 2b solution, so e1 changes do not affect the performance
of Case 2b. In Case 2, only item s affects the calculation of O* as shown in Formula (5.8)
below.
𝑂∗ =

𝜁[𝜂(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠 − 𝑔 − 𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ] − (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝜂𝑏 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 0.8ℎ 𝑎
𝜂 (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 2𝜂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 0.64ℎ + 1.44𝑚

(5.8)
(c) From the backward induction algorithm above, we conclude that Case 2a is the subgame
perfect optimal solution for 3 different e1 or s1 situations. Here we only analyze the effect
of e1 or s1 to Case 2a. Following the backward induction method algorithm in Figure 5.4,
we tested e1 or s1 with the different values from 10000 to 18000. Table 5.17 summarizes e 1
or s1 effects on Case 2a performance from the test.
TABLE 5.17 SUMMARY OF VARIED e1 OR s1 EFFECT ON CASE 2a PERFORMANCE
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e1 or s1

Case 2a: Q>1.2O
Q*=R(O)=ζ+ηO

ζ

η

O*

13179

5675867

83362683

1.76

17000 1170000

-154.8

7474

13024

5676233

83317790

1.74

16000 1170000

-154.8

7475

12870

5676617

83266404

1.72

15000 1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

567020

83202879

1.70

13500 1170000

-154.8

7479

12250

5678342

83061146

1.64

12500 1170000

-154.8

7481

11941

5679316

82918282

1.60

11000 1170000

-154.8

7488

10857

5683317

82524738

1.45

10000 1170000

-154.8

7498

9309

5690622

81943863

1.24

E(p, E(cost

O*, Q*

Q*/O*

7473

10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
14000

16000

100
80
60
40
20
0
10000 12000 14000 16000 18000

18000

e1, s1
O*

E(cost)

-154.8

12000

12000

E(π)

18000 1170000

14000

0
10000

Q*

Millions

Case 2a Solution

e1, s1

Q*

E(p)

E(cost)

Figure. 5.13 e1 or s1 effect on Case 2a performance

Table 5.17 and Figure 5.13 illustrate the effects of e1 or s1 on Case 2a performance. We can
see that the effects of e1 or s1 to O* and E(π) are small, but to Q* is large. When s1 increases,
the optimal solution O* decreases slightly, but Q* increases a lot. The ratio of Q*/O*
becomes larger. At the same time, E(π) decreases, and E(cost) increases. So a large s 1 is
not desirable for both manufacturer and supplier in Case 2a when Q > O.
Comparing the performance of Case 1 and Case 2 under different e1 and s1, some insights
for managers to choose the optimal strategy can be provided. For example, the supplier
should choose Case 2a strategy, i.e., Q > 1.2O, to avoid the penalty and get the optimal
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profit E(π). Also, the study about e1 and s1 helps managers to decide the optimal value of
e1 or s1 in the contract. e1 or s1 cannot be too small or too big. When e1 is between $12500
and $15000, Q* and O* are more reasonable.
5.6.4 Effects of Compensation h
The low demand compensation h usually includes the supplier’s fixed cost and some
handling cost. h1 is set to be $2800 per unit in the base experiment above. In this section,
tests will be performed on the different compensation values (from $800 to $2800) to
analyze the effects of h.


h = 1800
TABLE 5.18a RESULTS OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS WITH h1 = 1800
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 677.3171 0.99023 10080 10659 6591505 86254102

1.06

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

1.00

Q*=O

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

0
ζ

1 10682 10682 6800272 86736873
η

O*

1170000

-154.8

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

7476 12715 4722852 82248710

1.70

Q*>1.2O*

1.2

7500

9000 4730769 85795192

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

1.2

7500

9001 4730769 85793236

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

a. O є (1000, 14000).

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.14. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, Case2c with h1 = 1800
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TABLE 5.18b COMPARISONS OF THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS,
OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES WITH h1 = 1800

Case (action)

Relations

1a

Q≤O

Q* function (O)
677.31713+

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

– 0.005692∙O2 +

Any O

0.99023O
1c

Q=O

O

789.230769∙O – 980769
2a

Q >1.2O

1170000 –
154.8∙O

9.332308∙O2 –

O < 7500

139430.769231∙O +
525519230.76923

2b

O< Q ≤ 1.2O

0.044308∙O2 –

9000

7500≤O<9000

110.76923∙O +
3069230.76923
2c

Q =1.2O+1

– 0.02769∙O2 +

1.2O + 1

O ≥ 7500

969.110769∙O –
979869.23115

Based on the comparison, we obtain the supplier’s best actions and effective ranges as in
Table 5.18c below.
TABLE 5.18c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES WITH h1 = 1800
Effective range for O

[0, 7500]

[7500, 9000]

[9000, )

Best action

2a

2b

1c

Comparing Table 5.18c and 5.18a, we can see that the optimal solutions in Table 5.18a for
Cases 2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the
manufacturer, then the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the
subgame perfect optimal solution is Case 2a in this situation, and the optimal solution is
given in the following table.
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TABLE 5.18d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE INSTANCE WITH h1 = 1800



O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

7476

12715

4722852

82248710

h = 800
TABLE 5.19a RESULTS OF CASE 1, CASE 2 AND SUBCASE OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS WITH h1 = 800
Solution

Case 1
Q≤O

α

β

O*

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

Q*/O*

Notes

Case 1: Q < O

Q*=R(O)= α + βO 700.5321 0.95009 11531 11656 4770647 84232627

1.01

Q>O, invalid

Case 1c: Q* = O*

Q*=O

1.00

Q*=O

0

Solution
Case 2 Case 2a: Q >1.2O

ζ

Q*=R(O)= ζ + ηO

1 11733 11733 4790588 84302828
η

O*

1170000

-154.8

Q > O Case 2b: O<Q≤1.2O O = 1/1.2 Q*

0

1.2

7500

Case 2c: if Q< 1.2O Q*=1.2O + 1

1

1.2

7500

Q*

E(π)

E(cost)

7476 12715 3768684 81294542

Q*/O*
1.7

Q*>1.2O*

9000 3769230 84833653

1.20

Q*=1.2O*

9001 3769230 84831698

1.20

Q*=1.2O*+1

TABLE 5.19b COMPARISON OF THE SUPPLIER ACTIONS,
OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS AND VALID RANGES WITH h1 = 800

Case (action)

Relations

1a

Q≤O

Q* function (O)
700.53205+

Objective function(O)

Valid range

Invalid

Invalid

– 0.030308∙O2 + 850.769231∙O–

Any O

0.950089
1c

Q=O

O

1019230
2a

Q >1.2O

1170000 –
154.8∙O

2b

O< Q ≤

9000

1.2O
2c

Q=
1.2O+1

9.307692∙O2 –139369.2307 ∙O +

O < 7500

525480769.23076
0.019692 ∙O2 –

7500≤O<9000

49.230769 ∙O + 3030769.230769
1.2O + 1

– 0.052308∙O2 + 1030.649231∙O
– 1018330.769615
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O ≥7500

a. O є (1000, 14000)

b. Zoomed-in graph

Figure 5.15. E(π)(O) for Case 1c, Case 2a, Case2b, Case2c with h1 = 800
TABLE 5.19c THE SUPPLIER’S BEST ACTION AND EFFECTIVE RANGES WITH h1 = 800
Effective range for O

[0, 7500]

[7500, 9000]

[9000, b/1.2)

Best action

2a

2b

1c

Comparing Table 5.5 and 5.3, we can see that the optimal solutions in Table 5.3 for Cases
2a, 2b, and 1c are valid. Because Case 2a gives the minimum cost of the manufacturer,
then the manufacturer would choose Case 2a. Thus, we conclude that the subgame perfect
optimal solution is Case 2a in this situation, and the optimal solution is given in the
following table.
TABLE 5.19d THE FINAL OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE INSTANCE WITH h1 = 800
O

Q

The supplier’s profit

The manufacturer’s cost

7476

12715

3768684

81294542

From the performance of the tested sets of h1 = (2800, 1800, 800), we can see the following
facts:
(a) Case 1 results for all the tested h1 show the same pattern, i.e., Q* > O*. They are the
invalid solutions since they violate Case 1 assumption Q < O.
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(b) From the backward induction algorithm above, we conclude that Case 2a is the subgame
perfect optimal solution for 3 different of h1 situations. Here we only analyzed the effects
of h1 to Case 2a. Following the backward induction method algorithm in Figure 5.4, we
tested different values of h1 from 800 to 3300. Table 5.20 summarizes h1 effects on Case
2a performance from the test.
(3) Study the performance of Case 2a over varied h1.
TABLE 5.20 COMPENSATION h1 EFFECT IN CASE 2a
Case 2a Solution

h1

Case 2a: Q>1.2O

Q*=R(O)=ζ+ηO

ζ

η

O*

Q*

E(cost)

800

1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

3768684

81294543

1300

1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

4245768

81771627

1800

1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

4722852

82248711

2300

1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

5199936

82725795

2800

1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

5677020

83202879

3300

1170000

-154.8

7476

12715

6154104

83679963

h1 effect in case 2a

h1 effect in case 2a
100

12000

E(p,Ecost)

10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0

Millions

14000

O*, Q*

E(π)

80
60
40
20
0

500

1500

2500

3500

500

1500

h1
O*

2500

h1
Q*

E(pi)

Figure 5.11. Compensation h1 effect in case 2a
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E(cost)

3500

From Table 5.13 and Figure 5.11, we can see that when h 1 changes, ζ and η stay the same,
since Formula (5.6) and (5.7) do not include h1. It is interesting that when h1 varies, O* and
Q* almost do not change due to the small effect of h1 as shown in Formula (5.8). It means
that varying h1 almost has no effect on order O and capacity Q in the experiment. When h 1
increases, the supplier’s profit, and manufacturer’s cost increase. So increasing h 1 is good
for the supplier, but not good for the manufacturer. The manager should decide the
appropriate h1 to balance the manufacturer’s total cost and supplier’s total profit.
5.7 Remarks
Based on the study for the model of an optimal contract for product development with risk
consideration in Chapter 4, we conducted numerical experiments in uniform demand
distribution. The hypothetical experiment data simulate an automotive OEM data when a
new electric vehicle (EV) was developed, and also a major component supplier of
producing and supplying the EV battery. The market demand for the new EV is highly
uncertain. The Newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory are applied to formulate
the objective functions of the supplier’s profit and the manufacturer’s cost. The models
are based on a single supplier, single manufacturer, and a single period. Two cases are
considered, Case 1 (Q ≤ O), which includes 2 subcases, Case 1 (Q < O) and Case 1
constraint Case 1c (Q = O); and Case 2 (Q > O), which includes 3 subcases, Case 2a (Q >
1.2O), Case 2b (O < Q ≤ 1.2O) and Case 2c (Q =1.2O +1). We applied the backward
induction method to find Nash subgame perfect equilibrium solution. The calculation
procedures are: 1) calculate the optimal solutions O*, Q*, E(π), E(cost) of Case 1, Case 2
and subcases using related formulas, which are derived from Leibniz rule; 2) construct
supplier’s response function E(𝜋)(O) for each subcase; 3) find the supplier’s best action
E(π)(O) and effective ranges; 4) verify if the optimal solution from Step 1 is within the
valid range; 5) find the manufacturer’s optimal solution O* and objective function to
conclude the subgame perfect optimal solution; 6) use the backward induction to determine
subgame perfect equilibria: i.e. to decide the best supplier’s action for any given order
quantity O. Rationally, the supplier will take the action that provides the maximum
expected profit. We use numerical examples to illustrate the solution approach and provide
the optimal capacity solution.
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Our numerical experiments show that:


Uniform distribution is appropriate for new product development case. With a uniform
distribution, all models have the closed form optimal solutions.



In Case 1, the optimal solution conflicts with the assumption Q < O for the tested
examples. So the constraint solution of Case 1c, Q*= O*, is used in Case 1. It means
that the supplier’s planned capacity should be at least equal to the manufacturer’s
planned order quantity. Supplier’s capacity strategy of being less than the
manufacturer’s planned order quantity is not in the best interest of the supplier. This
result provides the managerial or operational decision implication. To get the optimal
results, the manager should choose the strategy Q* ≥ O* in any case.

 There is an effective range for each subcase. For a given O, the supplier needs to
compare the response actions to decide the best action that provides the maximum
expected profit. In most of the tested examples, the response function E(π)(O) of
subcase Case 2a Q > 1.2O is superior to that of all other subcases in the effective
regions.
 The parameter sensitivities were also studied through the numerical experiments.
 Effects of uniform distribution lower limit a and upper limit b: we tested different
sets of (a, b) with the same µ (7500). When (b-a) increases, O* and Q* increases
too. The ratio of Q*/O* becomes large. Both supplier’s profit and manufacturer’s
E(cost) increase. It implies that in order to reduce the manufacturer’s cost, supply
chain should forecast demand more accurately by reducing (b-a).
 Effects of high production compensation m1: since Case 1 and Case 2b do not
include item m1, only Case 2a, and Case 2c are affected by the m1 change.
Comparing the response function E(π)(O) for all subcases, Case 2a is the optimal
strategy when m1 varies. We also found that the effect of m1 on optimal capacity
Q* is not significant.
 Effects of the penalty cost e1 and shortage cost s1: these two costs are the same cost.
When e1 or s1 increases, the optimal order O* will decrease slightly, capacity Q*
will increase a lot, supplier’s profit will decrease, and manufacture cost will
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increase. So large s1 is not good for both manufacturer and supplier. Comparing the
performance of Case 1 and Case 2 under different e 1 and s1 will provide the insights
for managers to choose the optimal strategy. The supplier should choose Case 2a
strategy Q > 1.2O to avoid penalty and get optimal profit E(π). Also, the study about
e1 and s1 helps managers to decide the optimal value of e1 or s1 in the contract. e1
or s1 cannot be too small or too big. When e1 is between $12500 and $15000, Q*
and O* are more reasonable. Otherwise, the penalty has no meaningful effect on
the supplier’s capacity decision.
 Effect of low demand compensation h: when h decreases, Q* and O* increase, and
supplier’s unit benefit and manufacturer’s cost increase too. The manager should
decide appropriate h1 to balance O* and Q*, as well as manufacturer’s cost E(cost)
and supplier’s profit E(π).
The numerical experiments provide the interesting managerial insights on some critical
parameters in the contract model. Future work would include: conducting more sensitivity
analyses to parameters, such as supplier’s product price p, variable cost cs, and fixed cost
c0; also conducting the multiple parameter covariance analyses under different subcases;
changing the compensation with different level (20% in this research) for different
industries; and treating some key parameters as variables to get optimal solutions. Also for
the future work, more analyses can be done with the different stochastic demand
distributions, such as Poisson distribution, exponential distribution or normal distribution.
At the certain situation, such as normal distribution, it is hard to find a closed form solution.
So comparing the two cases to find the implied insights is also important for applying this
type of frameworks in practice.
5.8 Appendix
Appendix A: To prove E(cost) in uniform distribution is a convex function


Case 1: Q < O Manufacturer’s cost function:
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂) − ∫ 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑄 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

(4.4)
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𝑑𝐸(cost)
= 𝑅 (𝑂) 𝑝 +
𝑑𝑂

cm + 𝑒 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑠

+ 𝑅 (𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂)

𝑠−𝑝−

cm − 𝑒

+𝑒 ⋅ 𝑓(𝑂)(𝑅(𝑂) − 𝑂) + 0.8 ⋅ ℎ ⋅ 𝑅 (𝑂) ⋅ 𝐹 0.8 ⋅ 𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑔

We need to check if the second derivative of E(cost) of Case 2a is positive to ensure that
the total expected cost is minimized at O* or to prove Case 2a E(cost) is a convex function.
(

It is difficult to calculate

)

. We apply method II in Figure 5.2 to calculate it in a

uniform distribution. The step is that first to do integral to E(cost), which becomes to an
algebra function. Secondly, perform first order derivative to algebra function to find
solution Q*. Thirdly perform second order derivative to algebra function to test
Step 1. Substitute uniform distribution pdf 𝑓(𝑥) =

(

)

to manufacturer’s objective

function (4.4) and do the integral calculation.
𝐸(cos𝑡) =

(

)

+
−

(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) ⋅ 𝑄
((𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑏 − 0.8𝑎ℎ − 𝑠𝑏) ⋅ 𝑄 +

(

)

𝑂 +𝑔 ⋅𝑂+

Step 2. Do the derivative

(

)

(

)

(5.12)

𝑂⋅𝑄

[𝑎 (−𝑝 − 𝑐 + ℎ ) + 𝑠𝑏 ] + 𝑔

, substitute 𝑄 ∗ = α + β𝑂,

∗

= β to Formula (5.12)

𝑑𝐸(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)
1
𝑑𝑄 ∗
1
𝑑𝑄∗
[(𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑏 − 0.8𝑎ℎ − 𝑠𝑏] ⋅
=
(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅
+
𝑑𝑂
(𝑏 − 𝑎)
𝑑𝑂 𝑏 − 𝑎
𝑑𝑂

Set

(

𝑂∗ =

=

1
[𝛽 (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) + 2𝑒 𝛽 − 𝑒 ] ⋅ 𝑂
(𝑏 − 𝑎)

+

𝛽
𝛼𝛽
𝛼𝑒
((𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑏 − 0.8𝑎ℎ − 𝑠𝑏)
(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) +
+𝑔
𝑏−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
)

= 0, we get the same solution as (5.4):

𝛼𝛽(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 𝑠 − 0.64ℎ ) − 𝑒 𝛼 + (0.8ℎ 𝑎 + 𝑠𝑏 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝑏𝑐 )𝛽 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎)
(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ )𝛽 + 2𝑒 𝛽 − 𝑒

(5.4)

Step 3: Do the second derivative test for O*. Since e1 = s1
𝑑𝐸 (cos𝑡)
1
[𝛽 (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ ) + 2𝑒 𝛽 − 𝑒 ]
=
𝑑𝑂
𝑏−𝑎
1
[𝛽 (−𝑝 − 𝑐 + 0.64ℎ ) + 2𝑒 𝛽 − 𝑒 ]
=
𝑏−𝑎

Where
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.

(5.7)

𝑒
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

𝛽=

(5.3)

Substitute numerical example to (5.3), and (5-7), we have
(

)

> 0 so E(cost) is convex function and has the minimum value at O* in Case 1 with

uniform distribution.
Case 2: Q > O
Since penalty = 0, we have ∫ ( ) 𝑒 (𝑥 − 𝑅(𝑂))𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥=0.
o Case 2a: when Q > 1.2O, add m(O, Q) and g(O, Q)
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ .
+∫

.

(4.10)

𝑚 (𝑥 − 1.2𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥

𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
= (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)
𝑑𝑂
+𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )]

(4.11)

We need to check if the second derivative of E(cost) of Case 2a is positive to ensure that
the total expected cost is minimized at O*, or to prove Case 2a E(cost) is a convex function.
It is difficult to prove

(

)

> 0. We apply method II in Figure 5.2 to calculate it in

uniform distribution. The proof procedure is the same as the one used in Case 1.
Step 1. Substitute uniform distribution pdf 𝑓(𝑥) =

to manufacturer’s objective

function (4.10) and do integral calculation first.
𝐸(cost) =

(−𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑚 + 𝑠 + 𝑔 )
1
1.2𝑚 + 𝑔
(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑏 ⋅ 𝑄 −
⋅𝑄 +
⋅𝑂⋅𝑄+
2(𝑏 − 𝑎)
𝑏−𝑎
𝑏−𝑎
(5.13)

(1.44𝑚 + 0.64ℎ + 𝑔 )
0.8𝑎ℎ
1
⋅ 𝑂 + (𝑔 −
)⋅𝑂+𝑔 +
(𝑎 ℎ + 𝑏 𝑠 − (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑎 )
2(𝑏 − 𝑎)
𝑏−𝑎
2(𝑏 − 𝑎)

Step 2: Perform a derivative

(

)

, substitute 𝑄 ∗ = ζ + η𝑂,
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∗

= η to (5.13)

𝑑𝐸(cost)
1
1
(𝑝 − 𝑠)𝑏 ⋅ 𝜂
=
(−𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑚 + 𝑠 + 𝑔 ) ⋅ 𝑄 ⋅ 𝜂 +
𝑑𝑂
(𝑏 − 𝑎)
𝑏−𝑎
1.2𝑚 + 𝑔
1
0.8𝑎ℎ
−
⋅ (𝑄 + 𝑂η) +
(1. 2 𝑚 + 0. 8 ℎ + 𝑔 ) ⋅ 𝑂 + 𝑔 −
𝑏−𝑎
(𝑏 − 𝑎)
𝑏−𝑎
(

Set

𝑂∗ =

)

= 0, we get the same solution as (5.8):

𝜁[𝜂(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠 − 𝑔 − 𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ] − (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝜂𝑏 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 0.8ℎ 𝑎
𝜂 (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 2𝜂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 0.64ℎ + 1.44𝑚

(5.8)
Step 3: Do the second derivative test for O*,
𝑑𝐸 (cos𝑡)
1
=
[(−𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑚 + 𝑠 + 𝑔 ) ⋅ 𝜂 − 2(1.2𝑚 + 𝑔 )𝜂 + (1. 2 𝑚 + 0. 8 ℎ + 𝑔 )]
𝑑𝑂
𝑏−𝑎

where
𝜂=

1.2𝑚
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

(5.7)

Substitute numerical example to (5.3), and (5.7), we have (η < 0, s > p),

(

)

> 0, so

E(cost) is convex function and has the minimum value at O* in Case 2 with uniform
distribution.
o Case 2b: O < Q < 1.2O.
m(O, Q) = 0.
𝐸(cos𝑡) = ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝑝 + 𝑐 )𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + 𝑔(𝑂)
+ ∫ 𝑔 (𝑥 − 𝑂)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
+∫

.

ℎ (0.8𝑂 − 𝑥)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫

𝑠(𝑥 − 𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
(4.14)

𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
= (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝑅′(𝑂) 1 − 𝐹 𝑅(𝑂) + 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂)
𝑑𝑂
+ 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝐹(𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 1.2𝑚 𝐹(1.2𝑂)
+ 𝑓(𝑅(𝑂)) ⋅ 𝑅′(𝑂) ⋅ [𝑅(𝑂)(𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 𝑂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 )]
𝑑𝐸(cos𝑡)
= 𝑔 + 0.8ℎ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 𝐹(𝑂) − 𝑔 𝐹(𝑄)
𝑑𝑂
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(4.11)

As we discussed in Chapter 4, there is no solution to satisfy

(

)

= 0.

So the constraint solution for Case 2b is:
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

O* = 1/1.2∙ Q*.

(4.17)

For example, substituting the parameter values (c0 = 500, p = 9300, cs = 8000) to Formula
(4.8) and (4.17), then F(Q*) = 1 - 500/(9300 – 8000) = 0.6154.


For normal distribution N(7500, 2166.672), Q* = 8136 from the inverse of F(Q*) =
0.6154. So the optimal solution O* = 0.833Q* = 6780.


For uniform distribution U(1000, 14000), 𝐹(𝑄) =

, then Q = F(Q) (b-a) + a.

Since Q* = 9000, so the optimal solution O* = 1/1.2∙ Q* = 7500.
Appendix B: Constraint optimization solution in uniform distribution:
Case 1 Q ≤ O
1) For Case 1
𝑂∗ =

𝛼𝛽(𝑝 + 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 𝑠 − 0.64ℎ ) − 𝑒 𝛼 + (0.8ℎ 𝑎 + 𝑠𝑏 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝑏𝑐 )𝛽 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎)
(𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑒 + 0.64ℎ )𝛽 + 2𝑒 𝛽 − 𝑒

(5.4)
𝑂∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑂

(5.1)

Where
𝛼=

(𝑝 − 𝑐 − 𝑐 )𝑏 + (𝑐 − 0.8ℎ )𝑎
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ
𝛽=

𝑒
𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑒 − 0.64ℎ

(5.2)

(5.3)

2) For Case 1c constraint, if Q* > O, let Q*= R(O) = O, which means Q* = R(O) = O,
R’(O) = 1,
We have solution formula (5.9) for any type of distribution.
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(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠) + 𝐹(𝑂) ⋅ (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 ) + 0.8ℎ ⋅ 𝐹(0.8𝑂) + 𝑔 = 0

(5.9)

For uniform distribution, we have:
𝑂∗ =

𝑏(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠 + 𝑔 ) − 𝑎(𝑔 + 0.8ℎ )
𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠 − 0.64ℎ
(5.10)

O* from formula (5.10) and Q*= O is the constraint solution if Q* > O. Also if we substitute
α = 0, β = 1 to (5.4), we can get the same result as (5.10).
3) For Case 2a Q > 1.2O,


If Q*>1.2O, this is the normal situation.
𝑂∗ =

𝜁[𝜂(𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠 − 𝑔 − 𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ] − (𝑝 + 𝑐 − 𝑠)𝜂𝑏 − 𝑔 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 0.8ℎ 𝑎
𝜂 (𝑠 − 𝑝 − 𝑐 + 𝑔 + 𝑚 ) − 2𝜂(𝑔 + 1.2𝑚 ) + 𝑔 + 0.64ℎ + 1.44𝑚

(5.8)
𝑄 ∗ = 𝑅(𝑂) = 𝜁 + 𝜂𝑂
𝜁=

(5.5)

𝑐 (𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑏(𝑐 − 𝑝)
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

𝜂=

(5.6)

(5.7)

1.2𝑚
𝑐 −𝑝+𝑚

Formula (5.5) ~ (5.8) is the solution when Q* >1.2O.
4) For Case 2b O < Q ≤ 1.2O,
We have constraint solution 1: (from Q* to O)
𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) = 1 −

𝑐
𝑝−𝑐

(4.13)

O = 1/1.2∙ Q*
For uniform distribution, we have

𝐹(𝑄 ∗ ) =

So Q* can be obtained by
𝑄 ∗ = (1 −

𝑄∗ − 𝑎
𝑏−𝑎

𝑐
)(𝑏 − 𝑎) + 𝑎
𝑝−𝑐
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(5.11)

Calculate the profit of supplier and the cost of manufacture for constraint solution 1 and 2,
and compare the results then choose the solution.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
6.1 Conclusion
The automotive industry plays an important role in the global economy. The automotive
supply chain is complex due to the large number of parts assembled into an automobile,
the multiple layers of suppliers for those parts, and the coordination of the material,
information, and finance flows across the supply chains. Many uncertainties and natural
and man-made disasters have repeatedly stricken and disrupted automotive OEMs and their
supply chains. The purpose of this research is (1) to find the underlying supply chain risk
management problems in the automotive industry; (2) to develop the theoretical models to
help the decision-making of supply chain managers in these uncertain scenarios.
The major contributions of this study are:
(1) Provided a literature review of the existing research work on the supply chain risk
identification and management, considering (but not limited to) the characteristics of the
automotive supply chain, since the literature focusing on automotive supply chain risk is
limited. The review provides a summary and a classification for the underlying supply
chain risk resources in the automotive industry; and an overview of the current research on
automotive SCRM, with an emphasis on the quantitative methods and mathematical
models, currently used. Through the literature review, it was found that auto organizations
implementing supply chain risk management can gain many benefits, such as an improved
focus on risk and more effective risk mitigation. Other benefits include the elimination of
potential and unexpected costs, reduced disruption, and decreased recovery time.
Therefore, there are improvements in the overall supply chain performance. It is important
for auto organizations to understand the risk assessment and management along the supply
chain and to develop more theoretical models and practical risk mitigation methods to
guide the process in the future.
(2) Two mathematical models are developed focusing on the supply chain risk management
in the automotive industry. The first model is for optimizing manufacturer cooperation in
supply chains. Since the automotive supply chain is a multiple layer and complex network,
the relationship between supply chain members is very important for risk management.
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Supplier development is a long-term and resource-consuming business activity that
requires commitment from both the manufacturer and the suppliers. OEMs often invest a
large amount of money in supplier development to improve their suppliers’ capabilities
and performance. How to allocate the investment optimally among multiple suppliers to
minimize risk while maintaining an acceptable level of return becomes a critical issue faced
by manufacturers or automotive OEMs. Talluri et al. (2010) applied Markowitz’s model to
manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk. Talluri’s model assumes that
the return of investment to the supplier is proportional to the investment. Actually, in most
situations the return is nonlinear. This research revised Talluri’s manufacturer cooperation
model with the nonlinear return and intended to apply it to the auto industry.
(3) The second one is a mathematical model for an optimal contract for product
development with risk consideration (penalty and compensating) and demand uncertainty,
especially for the automotive supply chain. As a common ex-ante strategy in risk
management, the supply chain contracts play an important role for supply chain members,
such as OEMs and suppliers, to coordinate and to share risks arising from various sources
of uncertainty. The objective of this part of the research is to design a supply contract when
developing a new product in order to reduce the risks and maximize profits under
uncertainty demands. More specifically, we investigated how to decide the supplier’s
capacity and the manufacturer’s order in the supply contract when the demand for the new
product is highly uncertain. Based on the newsvendor model and Stackelberg game theory,
we developed a single period supply chain model for a product development contract
consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer with demand uncertainty. Two cases are
considered, Case 1 Q ≤ O, and Case 2 Q > O, which included two subcases, Case 2a Q >
1.2O and Case 2b O < Q ≤ 1.2O. The subgames are solved by Nash subgame perfect
equilibrium.
(4) The optimal solutions of the models with consideration for demand uncertainty were
discussed, and the numerical experiments, which simulate an automotive OEM data when
a new electric vehicle (EV), is developed. The analytical solutions are studied for the
situation where the demand follows a uniform distribution, and the computational tests are
reported. With a uniform distribution, all models have closed form optimal solutions. Based
on Nash subgame perfect equilibrium, comparing the performance in the subcases of Case
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1 and Case 2, the optimal solution is chosen. The comparing criteria are based on the value
of the manufacturer’s total cost E(cost), since the manufacturer is the leader in the
Stackelberg game. The smaller the E(cost), the better the solution. The sensitivity analyses
are performed for different parameters under uniform distributions; for the single period
decentralized case. The numerical experiment provides the interesting managerial insights
on some critical parameters in the contract model. The proposed solution provides an
effective tool for making the supplier-manufacturer contracts when the manufacturer faces
highly uncertain demand.
6.2 Future Research
The optimal supply chain contract model developed in this research is for a single period.
The future work can improve the model for two or more periods. In the single period
contract scenario, the forecast accuracy is very critical. If the real demand is far less than
expected demand, the supplier will be over-capacitated, and the manufacturer will be
requested to pay the compensation to suppliers, which would be very costly. A good
example is the plug-in electrical vehicle (EV). Many auto OEMs and EV start-ups forecast
a market demand is booming for plug-in EVs in the last few years. They made the
production schedules and requested the supplier capacities based on their forecast.
However, the actual market demand was far below that. It has posed detrimental risks to
the OEMs and suppliers. Some EV start-ups and battery suppliers, such as Fisker and A123, even went bankrupt. Some OEMs have to compensate the supplier’s cost up to
multimillion dollars each year for unused supplier capacity.
In the two period supply chain contract model, half of the full year order quantity is
contracted in the first period, and hence the supplier will prepare its capacity accordingly.
Based on Product Life Cycle as shown in Figure 6.1, in the introduction stage, the product
sales is about 1/3 of the sales in the peak time. From the sales in the introduction stage or
the first year, the manufacturer can understand the trend of product lifecycle more. Then
the manufacturer and the supplier can adjust the capacity through the second-period
contract. If the sales trend is far less than the forecasted demand, the capacity does not need
to be increased, so the second-period contract is not considered. Also, both the
manufacturer and the supplier can reduce the cost. If the sales trend is equal or larger than
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forecasted demand, the second-period contract can catch up the capacity gap. Since the
development of the second-period capacity takes less time, the production quantity can
meet the demand of growth period of product lifecycle in a fairly short time. The timeline
for two – the period contract is illustrated as Figure. 6.2.

Figure 6.1. Product Life Cycle

Figure 6.2. The Timeline of Two – Period Contract

A two-period supply chain contract can reduce the risk of going over or under capacity.
Based on this research, another possible future work is to apply non-linear return supplier
development models to the automotive industry, such as more suppliers (30 ~ 100), or more
investment amount. In addition, for a new product development contract model, the future
work would include: conducting more parameter sensitivity analyses for different subcase
response function E(𝜋)(O); changing the compensation for different levels (20% in this
research) and also for different industries; selecting and treating some key parameter as
variables to get optimal solution; developing nonlinear pricing contract model; extending
the contract model to a large and more complex risk game; investigating the performance
of two game players in information asymmetry situations; extending risk sharing model to
three players; studying the contract model in different stochastic demand distributions,
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such as Poisson distribution, exponential distribution or normal distribution to gain the
managerial insights.
Also based on the literature review in ASCRM, the following research work could be done
in the future:
1. The study and development of systematic methods and systems to analyze ASCRM by
integrating the different risk sources. Most research work in the automotive industry is
based on specific points of views, i.e., the suppliers or the manufacturers. There is no
systematic method of the system to analyze and integrate different ASCRM strategies, such
as how to choose supply locations, transportation, to optimize the objectives for both the
manufacturers and the suppliers as a system and to reduce geographic or political risks in
the automotive supply chain in the global environment. The existing research on the impact
on the automotive network resulting from supply chain risk has not been sufficient. This
area requires more related research to be conducted in the future.
2. The use of data- and big-data-based ASCRM: One of the major automotive supply chain
risks is nontransparency resulting from the multiple layers in the supply chain. Typically,
OEMs have substantial data about Tier-1 suppliers, but they lack data from Tier-2 to TierN suppliers. Nontransparency makes it very difficult to monitor risks and issue warnings.
Big-data analytics can provide a basis for transparency in automotive supply chains. With
the help of real-time big data availability, OEMs and suppliers can improve their supply
chain transparency, monitor the occurrence of risks, provide early warnings and responses,
and enable managers to develop risk mitigation strategy to prevent the risks. Big-databased sense-and-respond systems for ASCRM are worth further research.
3. The study of the downstream risks to the automotive supply chain: There is not enough
research on automotive-industry-specific models. The special aspect of the automotive
supply chain is its complexity owing to the huge number of multitier suppliers and
globalized network. Further study is required on downstream risks to the automotive supply
chain besides demand uncertainty, such as call-back risk and how to build a resilient
network.
4. The implementation of more quantitative models: Through a literature review, we found
that the majority of research on automotive supply chain risk employs empirical
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approaches. There is a real demand in the automotive industry to use quantitative models
to evaluate supplier risks regarding different tiers and different type of suppliers. Some
quantitative models just address simple two-layer supply chains owing to the lack of deep
downstream suppliers’ information. Proposed future work includes quantitative model
development for complex ASCRM and improvement of the mathematical models to cope
with real-life situations. Traditional risk modeling, including the use of the utility function,
variance, standard deviation, mean–variance, value at risk, and conditional value at risk,
has rarely been applied to ASCRM. These modeling methods can be applied to ASCRM.
5. Addressing advanced technology challenges: In recent decades, revolutions in
information technology and telecommunications have brought about dramatic changes in
our daily lives and the automotive industry as well. Automakers continuously offer new
high-technology features in their products (e.g., GPS, telematics, various sensors, ADAS,
and RFID.). These high-technology features present many technological challenges in the
automotive supply chain. One of these challenges is the risk posed to vehicle design,
production, quality, and after-sales services by the short product development cycle and
the long useful life of vehicles. Automotive manufacturers must mitigate risk through their
component suppliers. Future research needs to be done on car manufacturers' selection of
proper suppliers and on improving coordination and cooperation among supply chain
vendors.
6. The research on autonomous cars and car-sharing services: In recent years, autonomous
cars have emerged as the future of the automotive industry. Experts have predicted that
fully autonomous cars will arrive at the market by 2025 to 2030 (Liuima, 2016). Carsharing services using autonomous vehicles could be attractive for many private buyers as
well. It is suggested that new-car sales in the US could be eroded by as much as 40%. Like
any new product, autonomous cars will have demand uncertainty because of many
obstacles, such as adoption rate, technological challenges, liability disputes, laws, and
regulations. Demand uncertainty implies overcapacity risk or under capacity risk. Future
work includes improving forecast accuracy to optimize contracts and production capacity
and to reduce supply chain risk.
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